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Abstract 
This study will focus on explaining the dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s national security. 
In explaining these dynamics, the study will consider two of Buzan’s frameworks for 
analysing national security. Further enhancement will be given by conceptualising 
specific assumptions about Saudi Arabia’s national security – these will be based on 
the manner in which certain features are utilised within the Saudi state. Semi-
structured interviews will be utilised to examine the findings from the adapted 
frameworks. 
By studying the state’s domestic, regional and international concerns, as well as the 
specific threats that each level pose with regards to several security sectors (including 
the: social, political, economic, militant and environmental), this study will provide a 
distinctive analysis of national security within the Saudi state. 
Initially, this study acknowledges that only a few studies have been conducted into 
Saudi Arabia’s national security; furthermore, these have focused on the internal 
perspective by considering Saudi national security in terms of its military and 
strategic partnerships. Secondly, the study proposes that Saudi Arabia is unique (and 
unlike any other state) as it holds various important social and religious aspects that 
are not fully understood by external sources. Consequently, this study conceptualises 
Saudi national security from the internal perspective by considering the Saudi state’s 
specific features.  
Keywords 
National Security, Saudi Arabia, Gulf Region, Security Theories, Semi-Structured 
Interviews. 
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Introduction 
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1.1  Research Background and Problem 
As a result of economic and religious circumstance, the Gulf region has become an 
area of vital importance in the world.  Consequently, it is important that threats in this 
region are eliminated or reduced to ensure that countries within the region, as well as 
other countries, can continue to depend on the region’s resources. 
Since World War II, it has become impossible to separate the global, regional and 
national security issues which have developed as a result of rapid growth in 
transportation, finance and information technologies. The world’s economy is driven 
predominantly by oil and natural gas in the developing and developed worlds. As 
countries around the world grow their own economies, their requirement for energy 
also grows, especially in places like China and India. The geographical location of the 
Gulf area is strategic as it is an important international shipping route.  
The region’s countries hold approximately 60% of the world’s oil reserves 
(Cordesman, 2011) which account for the world’s second, third, fourth and fifth 
natural gas reserves after Russia. Most of the oil and gas exports from the Gulf are 
primarily dependent on the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries. Hence, the 
global economy is heavily dependent on the Gulf’s energy resources, and it will 
remain so for many years to come. Therefore, regional security in the Gulf is 
inherently related to socioeconomic development throughout the world, this supports 
the view that security in the Gulf is essentially a global security issue. 
In recent decades the Gulf region has become unsettled, this could lead to further 
conflicts as a result of involvement from external powers. The United States (US) and 
its allies’ war on Iraq, arms proliferation (such as Iran’s nuclear programme), and 
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terrorist incidents, have brought further instability to the area. The region also faces 
existing ethnic and religious tensions that can be traced back many centuries. 
Saudi Arabia is one of the largest nations in the region, its economic strength and its 
vast energy reserves have made it an important nation and major player in the security 
of the region.  It is also recognised as being the heart for Islam as it contains the two 
holy sites of Mecca (or Makkah1) and Medina.  The transition to the reign of King 
Abdallah, in 2005, culminated with the height of uncertainties, changes and 
challenges in security within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, this has affected the 
whole region. There were rising concerns over Saudi security policies and various 
questions were raised with regards to how the Saudi state implements and formulates 
it security policies. Furthermore, questions were raised as to whether the new 
challenges were really being examined and whether policies were changed to reflect 
these challenges. Ultimately, it is important to understand the dynamics, determents 
and ideology that the Saudi state considers when conducting its politics as this will 
provide information on how the country and other states understand the complexity, 
dynamics, and dimensions of Saudi Arabia’s national security with regards to regional 
and international security. 
Various new and critical challenges have affected the region and the Kingdom since 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, including: instability in Iraq and the growth in Iran regional 
influences and nuclear programme, thus generating Shi’a-Sunni struggles in Iraq and 
across the region (Bahrain, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen); the return of young Saudi 
militants from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria; as well as other internal economic, 
political and social challenges affecting the whole region. The Saudi Arabian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mecca and Makkah will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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government has always faced external pressures criticising it for being undemocratic 
and for not taking into account human rights, especially women’s rights. Saudi Arabia 
has also been criticised for not allowing religious or political freedom. Consequently, 
Saudi Arabia has openly banned certain political organisations and public 
demonstrations, and it has also discriminated against religious minorities such as the 
Shi’a minority.  
The Kingdom has also been criticised for its legal and administrative procedures as 
well as criticisms directed toward the Kingdom’s internal issues. The main problem is 
that most of these external criticisms are faced by internal opposition as these issue 
are generally interlinked with social and religious aspects. As a result, the Kingdom is 
struggling in its policymaking which has now become a security concern caused by 
the internal and external demands dilemmas.  Consequently, it can be argued that the 
external and internal aspects and demands are not fully understood; furthermore, 
Saudi Arabia’s security and politics are being analysed by foreign scholars and 
analysts who are not fully aware of the unique criteria and features within the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thus, it is important to study Saudi security from the 
internal perspective, especially as little research has been conducted into the national 
security policies of Saudi Arabia from the internal perspective. Al-Habbas (1999) 
conducted the only study which addressed this particular issue from an internal 
source. Al-Habbas’ thesis focused on Saudi Arabia’s national security to 1999. But, 
Saudi national security has changed considerably in the last 14 years – this thesis will 
therefore consider the period up to June 2013. 
In the field of security studies and international relations, traditionalists regard the 
concept of security predominantly in military and state-centred terms, which equated 
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security and military issues with the use of force. While rethinking the meaning of 
security as a dominant trend during the 1990s, a paradigmatic change in the 
perceptive of security occurred which included various issues to address security 
which went beyond the military and state-centric analyses. While this study aims to 
provide an up to date analyses of Saudi Arabia’s national security in terms of the 
internal dimensions of security threats as well as the traditional military or external 
threats. The framework of analyses will consider the following security threats: 
political, economic, social and environmental variables, as well as military factors. 
They will be considered as principle components of domestic, regional and 
international security threats and diplomacy, and will be considered with regards to 
Buzan’s (1991) regional security frameworks of analyses. Hence, it is important to 
understand the domestic and regional as well as international security policies 
affecting Saudi Arabia as this is an important subject of study because little research 
has been conducting in this area and Saudi national security is an integral part of 
regional and international security affecting the whole world. 
1.2 Research Questions  
The research problem clearly acknowledges the importance of understanding Saudi 
Arabia’s security and policymaking as international security and international 
relations problem that affect the whole world (due to its economic and religious 
status). Nonetheless, most of the previous research/studies have been conducted 
predominantly by foreign scholars and analysts who appear to have limited 
understanding and knowledge of the social, cultural and religious factors that play a 
major role in the state’s national security and policymaking. Consequently, the 
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internal perspective needs to be considered; hence, the following four research 
questions have emerged to consider this research problem: 
1. How does Saudi Arabia implement and formulate its national security policies 
and diplomacies? And, who are the main players influencing Saudi politics? 
(State dynamics and nature.) 
2. What are the main internal and external threats affecting Saudi Arabia? (State 
threats and concerns.) 
3. What states play a major role and are vital to Saudi Arabia’s politics and 
security? (State relationships and diplomacy.) 
4. How effective are Saudi Arabia’s state and national security policies 
domestically, regionally and globally? (State policies and diplomacies 
assessment.)  
5. What are the main obstacles that limit or affect Saudi Arabia’s potential 
political outcomes? And, what are the perceptions for Saudi Arabia’s politics 
and security? (National security prospects.) 
1.3  Research Hypotheses 
To answer the research questions, four hypotheses have been formulated in response 
to the literature review: 
Hypothesis 1: Saudi Arabia will maintain and advance its role as the leader in the 
Gulf region, and the Muslim world, by improving its domestic and foreign national 
security. 
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Hypothesis 2: Religious and social issues play a central role in policymaking and 
security – these issues are not fully understood by external analysts. 
Hypothesis 3: Oil procurement and distribution is viewed as the most important issue 
in Saudi Arabia’s security policymaking. 
Hypothesis 4: Foreign involvement in Saudi policymaking is seen as one of the major 
obstacles in reforming and improving Saudi Arabia’s security policy and regional 
security. 
1.4  Purpose of the Study  
This study will apply two of Buzan’s frameworks of security in order to study and 
analyse the Saudi state’s security context. The study aims to present a framework that 
will explain all of the aspects that involve all of Saudi Arabia’s national security, 
including national, regional and international security, in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the Kingdom’s security. Finally, a framework will be presented of 
Saudi Arabia’s national security in order to reduce its complexity (as it involves social 
and religious aspects). Hence, this study aims to address the following primary 
objectives: 
1. To examine the dynamics of Saudi national security and policymaking. 
2. To identify factors that may limit or affect the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s 
national security and policymaking. 
3. To identify and analyse the key aspects and weaknesses in each of the Saudi 
state’s social, historical, political, economic, military and environmental 
security. 
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4. To discuss and assess measures to improve the overall effectiveness of Saudi 
Arabian national security. 
1.5  Importance of the Study 
Saudi Arabia’s national security has not been the subject of many studies despite the 
importance that the Kingdom possesses regionally and globally. Only a few studies 
have attempted to understand Saudi security; but, most of these studies witness an 
absence in a deep understanding of the complexity that security and policymaking 
hold in this region with regards to social and religious internal characteristics and 
identity. Thus, to some extent these studies are difficult to understand as they have 
been conducted by external analysts and in some cases they have failed to even notice 
the importance of state identity.  Saudi Arabia is one of the main states in the region 
and it is a major player in the region’s security as it holds huge economic, religious 
and political statuses; thus, its security within the regional security context is 
inherently linked to the international security context.  
This study aims to provide a key analysis of Saudi Arabia’s national security by 
providing a full understanding of Saudi Arabia’s national security in terms of the 
various factors and aspects affecting the state (including: political, societal, economic, 
military and environmental); in addition to the state’s regional security perspective, 
insight will also be gained for the international security environment.  Hence, this 
study aims to conceptualise a special framework which will understand the 
Kingdom’s national security in terms of how it matches a specific and unique criteria 
that only the Saudi state imposes.  
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This study also intends to utilise an alternative theoretical approach. It will be 
structured using the theoretical framework which analyses security in the context of 
the Saudi state, as suggested by Barry Buzan – Buzan’s framework is considered to be 
one of his greatest contributions to the theory of international relations (IR). This 
study and framework aims to present a more complete understanding of the 
complexities of security based on how well they could then be applied as concepts to 
current issues or states. However, it appears as though only a few studies have applied 
Buzan’s framework as an analytical tool to analyse state security. This research will 
essentially focus on Buzan’s (1991a) frameworks theory, by incorporating the 
theoretical underpinning of different components of security which cover most of the 
factors involved in internal (national) and external (regional and international) state 
security dynamics and aspects, as well as their interaction with each other, in the 
sense that it asserts and focuses on states as the primarily referent object (study scoop) 
of security analysis. The individual and system levels are then considered as major 
contributing elements to the conditions for security within the specified states. 
Although, it should be noted that Buzan’s follow up work in 1998 focused on not 
rejected the state-centric as a referent object but rather proposed further levels of 
analysis, as objects of analysis, based on the role that these levels play in international 
relations (further explanation for the choice of Buzan and state-centric analysis will 
be presented in Chapter 3).  
1.6  Research Methodology 
To justify the philosophical stand, in accordance with the chosen method, approach 
and strategy, and to ensure that the research questions and hypotheses are adequately 
addressed, an in-depth semi-structured interview will be used, as it combines the 
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advantages of the unstructured and structured interviews. The semi-structured 
interviews will be based on the research setting, the objectives and the variables. 
These interviews intend to re-examine the outcomes of the first phase of the research 
by focusing directly on Saudi views. The first phase will examine Saudi national 
security in accordance with the supposed framework of security analysis and based on 
the literature analysis which consists of mainly foreign experts and analysts on Saudi 
national security. These data collection methods were employed to ensure that the 
study answers all of the research question thoroughly; ultimately, a full and clear 
understanding of Saudi Arabia’s national security will be gained as all aspects of the 
Kingdom’s security policy will be considered.  
Therefore, as Figure 1.1 shows, the first phase of the methodology was to locate the 
theoretical and study referent objects and variables that match the Saudi state’s 
criteria. The second phase of the methodology was to study security in Saudi Arabia 
by considering a range of secondary sources, drawing on the literature of international 
law, international relations theory, security studies, Saudi history, Saudi foreign 
policy and military history, as well as strategy. Moreover, the secondary data 
collection needed to include official documentation; think tank, including policy 
documents issued by the Saudi government; non-governmental organisations (NGO), 
conference reports and relevant speeches from Saudi government officials in order to 
fully consider Saudi security. A number of texts, translations from Arabic and other 
languages, books and online sources, were examined in order to understand the 
overall representations articulated. In addition, this study will include an analysis of 
experts’ studies on Saudi security, including Cordesman (2009), Peterson (2002) and 
Henderson (2006), as well as other analysts of international politics and state 
behaviour in relation to Saudi Arabia. Moreover, other English and Arabic audio-
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visual materials and media reports from the Gulf region and the Western world will 
also be used. 
The third phase of the methodology utilised in-depth semi-structured interviews, with 
key decision makers. These key decision makers were linked to security measures or 
they were academic consultants who had a deep understanding of particular security 
issues in Saudi Arabia – this provided insight into the broader phenomena as 
particular examples were utilised. Furthermore, these findings were then organised in 
a manner to re-examine the findings from the secondary data analysis so as to ensure 
that this study answers the research questions and objectives thoroughly by 
considering as many perspectives as possible (further detail of the methodology 
adopted in this research will be provided in Chapter 2). 
 
Figure 1.1: Research methodology phases and aims 
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1.7  Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis has been structured into eight chapters, a brief description of each chapter 
will now be given.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview, the background and the methodology for the project 
and the other chapters in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides an outline of the different steps adopted by the researcher: this is 
systematic, organised and logical in the manner in which it justifies the philosophical 
standpoint, in accordance with the chosen method, approach and strategy. 
The third Chapter 3 reviews the different philosophies and theories with regards to 
understanding the security philosophies and the meaning of security in general and 
national security in particular by placing specific attention on developing state 
security. Consequently, a basic assumption will be gained with regards to Saudi 
security and the most appropriate field of security studies will be identified to match 
the specific criteria that the Saudi state holds, the chosen field or framework will then 
be identified and the next chapter(s) will be used as examples for identifying and 
breaking down every aspect of Saudi security. The chosen framework (Buzan) 
suggested several elements for investigation in order to understand state security – 
this will be divided into three main parts (the first part is also presented in Chapter 2): 
the state idea will be identified, the institutions will then be identified and the 
relations between them will then be discussed. 
Chapter 4 presents the second part of the investigation, the state in which Saudi 
security is based upon.  The chosen framework implies that it is important to identify 
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the state’s five security sectors (social, political, economic, military, and 
environmental) and the threats that each pose to the state’s security. Consequently, it 
details the structure, dynamics and threats that each part impose, which represent the 
domestic threats and challenges to the Saudi state’s security.   
Chapter 5 presents the third part of the investigation into Saudi state’s security. It 
illustrates Saudi Arabia’s threats within the regional and global context by also 
enabling and understanding the regional and external dynamics of security. It views 
most of the threats to the Saudi state from the principle of amity and enmity divided 
according to regional and external threats – based on threats to the ideology, territory, 
ethnic lines and historical precedents that Buzan suggests.  
Chapter 6 presents the collected data by re-examining the findings from the second 
phase.  The interview findings and discussions for each part of the framework of 
analysis will also be presented. 
Chapter 7 will provide the key findings of the research which will be based on the 
data collection and secondary literature findings. It will also present the 
advantages/disadvantages of the literature findings by comparing them to the 
interview findings. This chapter will also focus on the effectiveness and the 
limitations of the adopted framework for analysing national security once all of the 
stages have been examined.  
Chapter 8 will provide a conclusion to the study by addressing the research objectives 
and hypotheses as well as the final findings. This chapter will present a summary of 
each chapter’s findings, it will also discuss the limitations and contributions of the 
14	  	  
study; finally, suggestions will be given for various directions in which future 
research could be conducted.  
1.8  Summary  
This chapter introduced the research topic by describing the background of the study. 
The problem statement was discussed, followed by a discussion of the need for the 
study. The purpose of the study was then discussed based on its aim to present a 
framework to explain all of the aspects that have evolved in Saudi national security 
which include domestic, regional and international security as a way of gaining a 
deeper understanding of Saudi Arabia’s security dynamics. The research questions 
were then developed in response to this. The methodology chosen for this study was 
then briefly discussed and an outline of the thesis was then presented. The following 
chapter will now provide a review of the relevant literature upon which this thesis has 
been constructed.
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Chapter 2 
 Research Methodology 
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2.1  Introduction 
This chapter will provide an outline of the various steps, systematic, organised and 
logical, adopted by the researcher to justify the research methodology in accordance 
with the chosen method, approach and strategy. The research design is viewed as a 
master plan which specifies the methods and procedures appropriate for gathering and 
analysing the data needed for the given study – this should be in line with the research 
structures. According to Jankowicz (2005), research methodology is a systematic and 
orderly approach for collecting and analysing data – ultimately the relevant 
information should be obtained to solve the research problem. The following chapter 
will provide an extensive literature review of the meaning of security and the different 
security theories with special reference to Saudi Arabia.  
In order to ensure that the research questions and hypotheses are covered by the 
research, an appropriate research methodology needs to be identified. The 
methodology of a project normally identifies how the research will be conducted by 
identifying the methods by which the data will be collected, analysed and presented. 
The research methodology for this study was developed in accordance with the ideas 
and theories presented in Chapter 3 (where the theoretical approach was located in 
terms of an understanding of national security in Saudi Arabia), and based upon the 
research objectives. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the reasons for 
choosing the specified methodology for this research project.   
Interestingly, Remenyi et al. (1998) argue that the research topic is one of the main 
aspects that needs to be considered when choosing the research methodology. He also 
believes that the literature review should unveil a suitable research methodology 
along with the research problem. This chapter will firstly present the research 
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objectives and the research variables will then be used to identify the most appropriate 
methodological approach. The significance of the selected methodology will be 
highlighted along with its theoretical importance to the specified discipline. Finally, 
an appropriate research strategy will be adopted and a discussion of how it will enable 
this research to be conducted will be given. This chapter will therefore explain and 
justify the data collection and data analysis procedures and methods for this study. 
2.2  Research Setting, Objectives and Variables  
It is important to understand that the Saudi state’s political behaviours and policies are 
affected by the political nature of the state itself. Religion and tradition (tribalism) 
have played a role in the policymaking; furthermore, conflict between the 
conservatives and liberalists (reformers) have also affected Saudi society. The Saudi 
regime is still experiencing conflict, differences and tensions as a result of Islamic 
reforms within the state; nonetheless, these same elements have also worked to 
develop strong alliances within Saudi society. Saudi Arabia is one of the rare states 
that is continually facing internal armed threats (from Al-Qaeda); hence, the internal 
(domestic) and external (regional and international) threats need to be considered.  
This study focuses on the internal and external dimensions of security by analysing 
the state’s position. Consequently, the espousal of a multi-level analysis of individual, 
group, state and international levels of security will be considered in order to provide 
a wider understanding of the domestic and foreign policies, dynamics and diplomacy 
so as to fully understand the main features of national security in Saudi Arabia. The 
purpose of this research will be addressed further in Chapters 4 and 5 (detailed 
literature reviews), this will be reassured and reflected further in Chapter 6 (Saudi 
views). Hence, the following research objectives were formed in order to identify the 
18	  	  
empirical evidence that best matches the theoretical proposal – it is important to 
identify these elements in order to allow clear analysis of the state’s national security. 
The main objective of this research is to analyse and study (conceptualise) Saudi 
Arabia’s national security by investigating how the state formulates and implements 
its national security policies and its diplomacy. Hence, it is important to understand 
the state threats, the dynamics, the main players, the future prospects (internally and 
externally) as well as the state actions and practices as the main referent objects of the 
study. Consequently, an analysis of the international sources of behaviour, which are 
common to all states in the international system is needed. The researcher will 
therefore gather this information by examining Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign 
policies/diplomacy, their threats, the main players and the influencers that are 
concerned with maintaining the state’s survival based on their commitment to national 
security. Hence, the research objectives can be formulated upon the following points: 
1. To examine the dynamics of the Saudi national security and policymaking. 
2. To identify factors that may limit or affect the efficiency of Saudi Arabia’s 
security and policymaking. 
3. To find out the threats and challenges affecting security and policymaking in 
Saudi Arabia.  
4. To discuss and assess the measures to improve the overall effectiveness of 
Saudi Arabia’s security policymaking. 
To answer these objectives, this study will investigate the dilemmatic and dynamic 
interplay of national security threat perceptions on the regional and international 
levels, which have influenced or shaped in some way state policies or behaviour. Such 
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security measures are both structurally generated and inter-subjectively shaped based 
on the changing and current world politics. This thesis will demonstrate how the 
resultant conflict within the Gulf region has had a cyclical action-reaction process by 
understanding the relationship that the individuals level in the Gulf has effects on the 
superpowers (international level) that are involved in the region. National security is 
effected by the national, regional, and international dynamics and changes in each 
level.  The dynamics of this cycle will be developed further in the following chapters. 
Overall, it will be shown that the security issues in the Gulf region are complex as 
they have both unique characteristics as well as general lessons that are applicable to 
other regional nations facing conflict.  
Various theories, and their strengths and weaknesses, will be discussed in Chapter 3 
based on their relevance to the specific time period, the current state of global politics 
and to their relationship with other non-Western states. Hence, the criteria for 
considering what should be regarded as a security issue will depend primarily on the 
assumptions proposed by the researcher about national security in Saudi Arabia. 
Ultimately, an integrated notion and theories about the meaning of national security 
will be identified in order to imply how the specific nature of the Saudi state shares 
views about security from both neorealist and constructivist viewpoints.  
2.3  Research Philosophies 
Researchers who are concerned with facts (such as: resource requirements and 
objectives) are likely to have a very different view of the way in which research 
should be conducted than researchers who are concerned with the subjective attitudes 
and feelings associated with human constructs. 
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Collis and Hussey (2009) emphasise the importance of taking appropriate steps to 
check proposed research designs not only for overall cohesion, in terms of the 
paradigm, methodology and research strategy logic, but also to check whether the 
scope is realistic against the given and applicable resource and time constraints. They 
warn how weaknesses at this juncture can undermine proposals leading to subsequent 
failure. However, it should be expected that the identification and planning of a 
research design will be an iterative and time/resource hungry activity if it is to meet 
the required rigour. The following figure (Figure 2.1) clearly explains the scheme for 
analysing assumptions about the nature of social science (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
 
Figure 2.1: A scheme for analysing assumptions about the nature of social science  
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979). 
 
The objective of discussing research philosophies is not to inform the audience 
philosophically but rather it is to provide a better reflection upon which the researcher 
choses and defends their philosophical choice over alternatives that could have been 
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adopted. Research philosophy suitability, however, depends upon the research 
questions needing answering, but it is unlikely that a particular problem or research 
question will always fall within only one philosophical domain.  Because of the way 
in which researchers thoughts largely differ, research philosophies tend to be 
categorised into one of the following approaches: i) ontology, ii) epistemology, and 
iii) axiology. Collis and Hussey (2009) summarise the differences between their 
contrasting assumptions concerning ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology 
(what is acceptable as being knowledge), axiology (the beliefs about the nature and 
role of values), rhetoric (the appropriate style of language) and methodology (the 
research process).  
2.3.1  Ontology 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality, it raises questions over the 
researcher’s assumption about the way in which the world operates and over their 
commitment in relation to particular views. The researcher’s ontological position can 
be explained from three aspects, namely: objectivism, subjectivism and social 
constructionism.  
Followers of objectivism believe that social phenomena confronts us as external facts 
which are beyond our reach and influence. Subjectivists, however, believe that social 
phenomena are created by the perceptions and subsequent actions of the actors 
concerned with their existence (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009). Objectivism, is 
more likely to be static and deterministic as it ignores human feelings; in contrast, 
subjectivism is deemed to be more dynamic as it views social phenomena as constant 
states needing revision as social interactions change – it values the feelings of people. 
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Social constructionism, argues that it is necessary for researchers to understand the 
subjective meaning of the social actions that motivate people to perform particular 
actions (Collins, 2010). Constructionism frequently results in an interest in the 
representation of social phenomena; interestingly, it has become referred to as a term 
that reflects the indeterminacy of our knowledge of the social world (Taylor, 2012).  
2.3.2  Epistemology 
Epistemology is a research philosophy concerned with what constitutes to be 
acceptable knowledge within a given field of study. The central question in 
epistemology is whether the social sciences can and should be studied by the same 
principles, ethos and procedures as the natural sciences. Although recognising that the 
concept is not always applied consistently in research literature, Collis and Hussey 
(2009: 55) explain their view that a paradigm refers to “a framework that guides how 
research should be conducted, based on people’s philosophies and their assumptions 
about the world and the nature of knowledge”. 
Positivism: The basic theme or principles of positivism is based on the philosophical 
stance of a natural scientist. Saunders et al. (2003: 83) and Remenyi et al. (1998: 32) 
note that positivism refers to “working with an observable social reality and that the 
end product of such research can be law-like generalisations similar to those produced 
by the physical and natural scientist”. In this philosophy, the researcher acts as an 
objective analyst and follows a very structured methodology to facilitate replication 
(Gill and Johnson, 1997). Furthermore, data are collected in a numerical form and 
statistical tools are used to analyse the collected data. This philosophy can make the 
research independent, whereby the researcher neither effects or is affected by the 
subject of the research (Remenyi, Williams, Money and Swartz, 1998).  
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Interpretivism: Interpretivism has been adopted as an alternative to the positivist 
orthodox, it recognises the subject matter of the social sciences – people and 
institutions – as being fundamentally different to that of the natural sciences. The 
studies in social sciences, therefore, require a different approach that reflects the 
distinctiveness between humans and the order of natural sciences. Consequently, 
social scientists aim to grasp the subjective meaning of social actions (Bryman et al., 
2003). 
Realism: Realism shares two prime features of positivism: a belief that both the 
natural and social sciences should apply the same kind of approach for data collection 
and explanation, and that objects have an external reality that is independent to our 
discretion (ibid).  
Pragmatism: Pragmatism is an epistemological philosophy which argues that the 
most important determinant of the epistemology, ontology and axiology is based on 
the researcher’s adoption which will be chosen based on its appropriateness for 
answering their particular research questions. However, if the research question does 
not suggest unequivocally that either a positivist or interpretivist approach is most 
suitable then the pragmatist view will be chosen. This involves the use of mixed 
methods, both qualitative and quantitative, which are most appropriate to the study 
(Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2009).      
2.3.3 Axiology 
Axiology is another branch of philosophy that is concerned with studying the value of 
the researcher’s judgment – this is of influence at every stage throughout the research 
process. The researcher’s own value plays a significant role in making the research 
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credible. Heron (1996) argues that values guide the reason for all human actions and 
for researcher’s demonstration of axiological skills in articulating their own values as 
a basis for making judgments about the research they are conducting and the way in 
which they go about doing it.  
The researcher chose the ontological stance for this research as the author will 
interview academics and senior government officials in order to obtain their 
viewpoints on certain security measures. It is subjective as it is likely to be necessary 
to reflect on their background, their personal experiences/views and on their work 
experiences. A subjective observation will allow the researcher to investigate deeply 
so as to identify the root cause of the viewpoints and explanations. In applying an 
interpretivist stance, the author anticipates collecting mainly qualitative data, i.e. it 
will be nominal rather than quantitative, numerical form.  
 
Collis and Hussey (2009: 65) state that one of the main advantages of the 
interpretivist perspective comes from its potential for generating high levels of 
validity where “research findings accurately reflect the phenomena under study”.  
They contrast this against the trade-off found in the positivistic which emphasises 
reliability and rigorous measurements.     
In this study, the researcher will apply the interpretive approach. This will allow the 
researcher to reflect and focus on subjective perceptions, thoughts and values of the 
individual participants in order to attempt to understand their multiple points of view 
of the national security context. If the researcher followed an objective approach then 
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the external reality would be seen as the physical realm – this would not make sense 
and it could even bias the outcomes with regards to the national security issues.  
In terms of the axiology, this research is open minded in terms of the political views 
about Saudi Arabia and the rest of the world. This research will follow an interpretive 
philosophy as the researcher’s values will have an impact on the research activities. 
As mentioned earlier, the main purpose of this research is to identify the key national 
security threats to Saudi Arabia – to identify these threats, interactions across the 
region and internationally will be considered in terms of security levels. In order for 
this research to be credible, it needs to be neutral, impartial and unprejudiced. As the 
debate continues, there is no right or wrong philosophical stance. Saunders et al. 
(2009) conclude that it is important for the researcher to have a clear value position, 
as it will help them to choose what is appropriate and ethical.  
2.4   Research Data Collection Approach 
Every research project comprises theories which may not be explicit in the research 
design, but the findings and conclusions should be presented in an explicit manner. 
The research approach is determined by the available theory, in accordance with the 
research problem. Gibbons et al. (1994) proposed mode-1 and mode-2 research which 
considers the amount of knowledge production. They explain that the primary focus 
of mode-1 research is knowledge creation which is driven by an academic agenda and 
follows a linear fashion in the further development of knowledge, i.e. theory to 
practice. Mode-2 research, in contrast, emphasises trans-disciplinarity, however, in 
order to overcome limitations in this research of single-disciplinarity, the academics, 
practitioners and policymakers need to exploit a range of skills and experiences in 
order to solve a practical problem rather than to create knowledge. Research can be 
26	  	  
distanced into two types of categories qualitative and quantitative research (Creswell, 
2003). In addition to the quantitative and qualitative approaches, there are two other 
approaches available: deductive and inductive, by which the researcher is able to 
create new knowledge and the acquisition of new knowledge (Hyde, 2000). 
2.4.1 Qualitative vs. Quantitative Approaches 
The division between quantitative and qualitative approaches is widely used and very 
important, but it is not often discussed (Marsh, 2002). The combining of both 
methods cannot be processed without problems because each approach is deeply 
different and impacts greatly on the methodology. Marsh (2002) argues that many 
authors ignore the ontological and epistemological issues by failing to link them to 
their methodology, instead they focus solely on the empirical questions in which they 
are interested in. But, all research should be aware of the ontological and 
epistemological position within the social sciences. Nevertheless, Marsh (2002) 
believes that the core problem of combining the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches is because of the links between the ontology, epistemology and 
methodology. On the other hand, it is difficult for researcher’s to adopt two different 
positions, at the same time, within the same research project, unless it is done in a 
way that ensures that the basic ontological and epistemological positions are not 
compromised. 
Quantitative research has been defined as a method that primarily seek to express 
information numerically (Remenyi, 1998). Marsh (2002) argues that quantitative 
researchers tend to adopt a deductive approach by using theory to produce 
hypotheses. Nevertheless, he also argues that quantitative methods are most likely to 
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be used by foundationalist or positivist authors. Conversely, qualitative methods are 
often used by anti-foundationalist or non-positivist authors.  
Unlike the quantitative approach, the qualitative approach is often small-scale and 
aims to obtain details rather than statistical information. It also aims to understand the 
phenomenon under investigation by way of observation and involvement (Bryman, 
1992). In addition, qualitative research mainly involves collecting, analysing and 
interpreting data by observing what people do and say (Creswell, 2003). According to 
Lee (1992) one of the most fundamental distinctions often declared is that the 
qualitative approach is subjective and the quantitative approach is objective. In 
addition, qualitative research is concerned with observations, descriptions and the 
generation of hypotheses, as a contrast to positivist traditions.  
However, in some cases, conducting a comparative method is needed because the use 
of just one of the methods (quantitative or qualitative) fails to allow the researcher to 
address all aspects of the research. However, in such cases the researcher needs to be 
willing to compromise on the quantitative and qualitative methods by being aware of 
the differences between the two approaches (quantitative and qualitative), from all 
aspects in particular with regard to the link between the ontological and 
epistemological position on the research – for many researchers this can only occur 
within the epistemological position. 
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Positivist  RESEARCH APPROACH  Interpretivist  
    
Deductive  RESEARCH LOGIC deductive  
   
Scientific experiment 
Survey 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  Action research  
Case study  
Ethnographic research  
Grounded theory research  
   
Questionnaire 
Interview 
Experiments 
Observation 
DATA COLLECTION METHODS  Questionnaire  
Interview  
Focus groups  
Use of text  
Observation  
   
Statistical methods 
Other numerical methods 
DATA ANALYSIS METHODS  Descriptive statistics  
Textual analysis  
Discourse analysis  
Figure 2.2: Research approaches and logic 
Source: Adapted from Saunders et al. (2009) 
Figure 2.2 shows the step-by-step approach to the research and the logic behind such differences (the 
circled sections shows the approach applied in this study).  
 
2.4.2  Deductive vs. Inductive Approach 
In a specific context, the inductive approach is an inference of a generalised 
conclusion. The inductive approach is basically a theory building process, starting 
from a specific instance that the researcher will attempt to prove in order to make a 
generalisation (Hyde, 2000). Zikmund (2003) stated that the inductive approach refers 
to establishing a general proposition supported by logic, on the basis of observation. 
Conversely, the deduction approach is the process whereby conclusions about 
particulars are linked predominantly with general or universal premise. The deduction 
approach is a theory testing process which considers an established theory or 
generalisation and then tests it to determine whether the theory is applicable to a 
specific context (Hyde, 2000). It is also a logical process whereby a conclusion is 
developed about a specific context, based upon a known general premise or some 
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established truth (Zikmund, 2003). This approach has a unique property in that the 
findings may change the established theory, the results may also be generalised with 
the help of scientific tools. 
For the purpose of this research, the researcher will follow the deductive approach 
because the research output is likely to propose a conceptual framework whereby 
Saudi Arabia’s national security is explained – this will be based on a framework of 
security analysis that will be identified and examined through two phases of data 
collection and analysis. 
2.5  Research Strategy  
This research will use a number of methods within the qualitative methodology so as 
to achieve the research objectives. Specifically, this study will employ an empirical, 
semi-structured interview method with key decision makers and academic consultants 
with experience of security in order to obtain a deeper understanding of particular 
security issues in Saudi Arabia. The findings should provide insight into broader 
phenomena using particular examples, it will also examine the secondary data 
outcome which is based on Buzan’s frameworks of security analysis (these will be 
examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5). 
In order to meet the different research objectives, the researcher has already used a 
multi-level analysis across different factors/sectors suggested by Barry Buzan in his 
book, People, State and Fears (1991b). Methodologically, this study constitutes a 
“thick description” (Ponterotto, 2006); a thick description of Saudi social, political, 
economic, military and environmental sectors of security threats and strategic 
contexts will be provided within which the policies and positions are formulated, 
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articulated and implemented for the domestic level of security.  In addition, all of the 
perspectives of the national state’s systems and threats in relation to the other nations 
in the region and the international powers involved in the Gulf area will be 
acknowledged in order to fully understand the aims of the study which is to gain a 
detailed understanding of the dynamic nature of national security in Saudi Arabia. 
Ultimately, this study will provide analysis of the internal challenges, regional 
conflicts and developing international security. The use of a thick description is 
similar to the way in which some neo-classical realists aim to “provide a richer 
portrait of the dynamism and complexity” of the insecurity dilemma (Lobell, Norrin 
and Taliaferro, 2009). Thick descriptions require the researcher to gain a “deep 
cultural immersion and understanding of a subject” (King et al., 1994). In this sense, 
the researcher is particularly well-placed as he was born into a family who played a 
major role in negotiation for a peaceful solution between the Saud family and the 
Ottoman Empire. The house in which the researcher’s father was born into is 
currently a national museum and cultural centre – the Bayt Naseef or Naseef House. 
The researcher has maintained close contact with his parents as well as family and 
friends who hold high political statuses within the country.  The author therefore has a 
unique sense of intimacy with the national security issues in the region. The author’s 
understanding of the issues are of relevance to the security measures and he is 
uniquely a cumulative product of keen observation since his high school days and 
more recently in academic work. The researcher’s political milieu and his upbringing 
in such a politically engaged family has therefore enhanced the research conducted 
within this thesis. 
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Moreover, whenever a possibility exists, the researcher used the method of 
triangulation “using multiple perceptions [and datasets] to clarify meanings… or… 
interpretations… [and to] clarify meaning by identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen” (Stake, Denzen and Lincon, 2000: 443-444). As such, the 
researcher will cross reference data from materials ranging from primary and 
secondary sources in Arabic and English. Practically, the research methodology will 
use a two-pronged strategy. First, the above-mentioned sources will be examined to 
obtain an initial understanding of the security concerns in Saudi Arabia. Second, 
insights from these sources will be supported by additional research in order to 
confirm or qualify the preliminary insights gleaned from the reading of the first 
primary and secondary texts and other types of sources. It is the combination of these 
sources which allows an in-depth examination of the security issues; ultimately, a full 
understanding of Saudi Arabia’s national security should be conceptualised from 
different perspectives by using different levels of analyses.  
The first phase of the methodology will study the meaning of security in general, as 
such, the most appropriate security theories and frameworks of security analysis were 
located based on their suitable to the Saudi state’s features. The second phase of the 
methodology will study Saudi national security, dynamics and threats, by considering 
a range of secondary sources, including: drawing on the literature of international law, 
international relations theory, security studies, Saudi history, Saudi foreign policy, 
Saudi military history and strategy. Moreover, the secondary data collection will 
include official documentation, think tank, including: policy documents issued by the 
Saudi government; NGO and conference reports; and, relevant speeches from Saudi 
government officials that are involved with security in Saudi Arabia. A large number 
of sources, including: texts, translations of Arabic and other language documents, 
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books and online sources, have been examined in order to understand the overall 
representations being articulated and so as to provide an extensive understanding and 
evaluation of security policies and behaviours in Saudi Arabia. In addition, an 
analysis of expert studies on Saudi security such as Cordesman (2009), Peterson 
(2002) and Henderson (2006), as well as other analysts of international politics and 
state behaviour in relation to Saudi Arabia, will be conducted. Consequently, the 
research arguments have been developed further as the discussions have developed. 
Finally, audio-visual materials and media reports from the Gulf region and the Arab 
world, and from the West (in Arabic and English), will also be used. 
The third phase of the research will utilise in-depth semi-structured interviews, so as 
to combine the advantages of unstructured and structured interviews. Semi-structured 
interviews can also give participants more flexibility and freedom in their responses; 
but, this structure will provide the researcher with some control over the interview. 
The sample will comprise of two categories; further explanation of the interview type 
and sampling will be discussed later in this chapter.  
All of these research methodology phases will be employed to ensure that the study 
answers the research question thoroughly, and so as to not dismiss any aspect of Saudi 
Arabia’s security policy. Furthermore, to gain a full awareness of the Kingdom’s 
main behaviours and for a clearer understanding of Saudi Arabia’s national security 
practice, the differences between the foreign literature and the literature on security 
from within the region will be examined; ultimately, this should provide a detailed 
understanding of the regional security dynamics. 
The respondents will be asked about how they evaluate the current security policies of 
Saudi Arabia in terms of the domestic, regional and the international arena. The 
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participants will also be asked to evaluate the main threats that they feel the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia faces. Respondents will also comment on the key aspects that Saudi 
Arabia needs to focus in order to strengthen its internal and external politics. Finally,  
the participants should identify the difficulties that they feel could result from 
improving Saudi’s internal politics and external diplomacy in this area.  
2.5.1  Sampling and Participants 
Sampling techniques can be broken down into two distinctive groups: probability 
sampling and non-probability sampling. When using a probability sampling approach, 
every member of the targeted population will have an equal chance of being sampled; 
whereas, non-probability sampling means that certain members of a targeted 
population will not have a chance of being sampled and it is unlikely that they will be 
statistically chosen at random (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2007).  
This study will use a purposive sample (a type of non-probability sampling) to gather 
the data; Figure 2.3 illustrates advantages and disadvantages of the different sampling 
tools. One advantage of using a non-probability sampling type is that it is simple to 
plan and organise. With a probability sampling method, there has to be a strict rule to 
decide on how participants will be selected, to ensure an equal chance of members of 
a population being selected. However, with a non-probability sample, this planning is 
not necessary, as the selected sample will not be representative. A specific advantage 
of a convenience sample is that it will be quick to find participants in large quantities; 
thus, aiding itself to the strict timeframe that will be followed in this study. 
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Figure 2.3: Sampling techniques  
Source: Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2007: 207) 
It is important to consider that the sampling frame used will be very large, therefore it 
would be difficult to obtain a sample large enough to be representative of the whole 
population if a probability sample were to be used (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 183). 
During the pilot phase of the study, the researcher struggled to extract any 
information from the interviewees selected because of random sampling. As a result 
of the nature and sensitivity of the information required in this study, as well as time 
and cost restraints, the researcher felt that it would be more relevant to use a non-
probability sample as the sample does not need to be a representative of the whole 
population. Moreover, because of the collectivist nature of the Saudi society, it was 
assumed that the respondents would be more open to provide sensitive information if 
they trusted the researcher. Such bonds of trust are usually developed through social 
contact and recommendations from well-reputed personalities or high officials. 
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Hence, the researcher used his network of support to contact highly political officials, 
journalist, and academics that are experts in Saudi national security in order to obtain 
maximum support from the respondents which should generate more honest opinions 
on the subject.   
The interview participants came from one of three categories. Firstly, officials and 
politicians associated with the Saudi Arabian government (as representatives of the 
Saudi view) were considered. All of these respondents were selected from the 
different government sectors that were connected in some way with Saudi Arabia’s 
national security, such as: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Education and Interior 
Ministry and other relevant parties that play a role in security in the Gulf region.  The 
second group included various political scholars that were of relevance, and the third 
consisted of journalists involved in political matters. The participants were coded 
according to their background; the official and politicians will be coded as P1, P2, P3, 
etc.; the academics will be coded as A1, A2, etc.; and, the journalist as J1, J2, etc.  
The participants came from various backgrounds, differing in: ethnicity, age, gender 
and socioeconomic status. But, they had other similar characteristics, including: 
nationality, religious affiliation, Arab nationalism and longstanding involvement in 
Gulf region affairs. Consequently, it is likely that the different participants will have 
different motivations and responsibilities which will affect their perception of Saudi 
security; thus, the use of varied interview questions was needed. 
2.5.2  Conducting the Interview 
Initially, a formal letter, using the university’s letterhead and signed by the supervisor, 
was sent to the participant prior to the interview to inform them about the interview. 
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This formal letter gives more validity and reliability as it informs the interviewee 
about the requested issues and allows them to gather any relevant supporting 
documents. 
This letter also addressed the ethical issues related to the interview, including 
anonymity and confidentiality. It included an introduction to the study, its purpose 
and who authorised it, as well as acknowledging the participant’s right to not 
participate in the interview. 
The letter identified a time, date and place of the interview, so as to encourage the 
participants to partake. The duration of the interview was also discussed. 
All of the interviews began with a brief introduction to describe and explain the 
purpose of the study; information was also given on who had authorised the study. In 
addition, the research objectives were presented, the participant would also be 
reminded of the formerly agreed arrangements of anonymity, confidentiality and data 
protection – in some cases the interviewees agreed for certain statements and/or 
names to be included. Some of the interviews were recorded once the interviewee 
gave permission – these were used along with notes of the raised points. Ethical issues 
concerning the tape recordings were fully considered before and after the interview. 
The interviews were designed to collect the following data: 
1. The respondent’s understanding of the situation in the Gulf. 
2. The respondent’s evaluation of the current security situation in the Gulf. 
3. The respondent’s evaluation of the current threats and challenges that face 
Saudi Arabia internally and externally. 
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4. To identify what drives, effects and limits the policy-making process in Saudi 
Arabia.  
5. To identify the main friends and allies to the Saudi states – the states which 
hold more importance to Saudi security should be identified. 
6. Finally, to discover the areas (either internal or external policies) in which 
Saudi Arabia should focus upon in order to enhance its political behaviours. 
The interview introduction included points on the following: 
• Name; the purpose the project; and, the project funding.  
• The purpose of the interview. 
• Consent (in order to ensure that the interviewee agrees to be interviewed and 
recorded as well as discussions over protecting anonymity). 
• Confidentiality (to reassure the interviewee that the recorded replies and 
interview information will remain confidential – only reviewed by the 
interviewer). 
• Anonymity (to assure the interviewees that their opinions will remain 
anonymous – unless they have agreed to something different – otherwise they 
will be referred to solely by their initials. Assurances that all details that could 
lead to identification be removed/deleted from the transcribed text to ensure 
that only the researcher knows the interviewees actual identities). 
• Advise on the time period that the audiotape will be safely stored. 
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2.5.3  Rationale for the In-Depth Interviews 
One to one interviews were deemed to be more appropriate than group interviews or 
focus groups because of the following: 
• Since the author was acting as an international researcher, it was easy to 
arrange individual interviews, especially during the summer holiday period. 
• The opinions and views stemmed from one source, which made it easy for the 
author to locate the specific ideas and their owners. 
• Since the research topics to be discussed were sensitive in nature, one to one 
interviews allowed the researcher to build trust with the respondent in order to 
allow them to be more open and impartial while responding.  
• It was easy to control. 
A semi-structured interview was chosen over a structured or unstructured interview 
for the following reasons: 
• The research was aimed at discovering rather than checking. 
• The interviewees were encouraged to use their own words and develop their 
own thoughts. This enabled the author to obtain in-depth information about 
complex issues. 
• This research method is aimed at the conduction of in-depth investigations.  
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2.5.4 Actions 
In light of such implications and in order to gain access to the necessary data and 
information, the respondents were assured of confidence (e.g. collected information 
will not be associated with them). Hence, the following actions were taken: 
• Participants were given the research objectives and project scope and they 
were assured that the data would be used solely for academic purposes; thus, a 
letter from the university was given to ensure validity and to explain that the 
research was being conducted as part of the requirement for the researcher’s 
PhD. 
• It was made clear from the outset that participants could choose not to 
participate at all. 
• In some cases, where it is deemed to be necessary to show an organisation or 
an official’s name, the organisations/officials were asked to give their 
permission to mention their names explicitly.  These organisation and officials 
were given the opportunity to read the work, once completed, to guarantee that 
confidentiality and anonymity were maintained. If there was any disapproval, 
the information would be modified to obtain agreement from the interviewee 
while also checking that the reliability of the presented information was not 
affected.  
• The participants’ identities and names were coded in such a way that only the 
researcher would be able to identify their source – this maintained 
confidentiality and anonymity even if the data were stolen or accessed 
illegally. 
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2.5.5  Qualitative Data Analysis  
Morse (1994, cited in Collis and Hussey, 2009) argues that every analysis of 
qualitative data requires the comprehending, synthesising and theorising of the full 
range of available material. But, as Collis and Hussey (2009) point out, if the data is 
collected and stored in an organised way, and a systematic approach is applied at the 
research analysis stage, this will help manage the high volume of accrued data; but, 
ultimately the analytic value lies in the interpretation. They also note that “few 
researchers describe their methods in enough detail to provide a comprehensive 
guide” (Collis and Hussey, 2009: 183). Again, qualitative content analysis goes 
beyond the mere counting of words to examine language intensely for the purpose of 
classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories that represent 
similar meanings. Themes will be developed from two methods – looking through the 
responses (an inductive approach) and by considering the themes found in the 
literature review (a priori approach). The deductive approach will therefore involve 
revisiting the responses several times, to identify topics that occur repeatedly. 
Both closed- and open-ended interview questions have been used. For the closed-
ended question, the respondents were asked to choose from prepared answers about 
how they evaluate the current role of policies in Saudi Arabia; whereas, the open-
ended question explored new solutions and ideas that could improve the policies in 
Saudi Arabia based on how they face difficulties that could result in improving their 
role in security.  
The content was analysed and coded, using content analysis and computer software 
programs, to organise and process the data. According to the study’s objectives, the 
collected data were analysed and different values were derived through the analysis of 
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symbols and indicators for each question, the results were reported for each of the 
research variables. The researcher chose the content analysis technique for a number 
of reasons, including:  
• This technique allows for a close relationship between the researcher and the 
data.  
• It can give in-depth information.  
• It can answer “how” and “why” research questions.  
In addition, when conducting the content analysis for the qualitative data, the 
following steps were applied:  
• A computer program called NVivo was used to analyse and code the data 
because it can identify important concepts and present the findings in 
graphical form.  
• The interviews were transformed into a transcript.  
• According to the researcher’s concerns, various sub-categories (such as: 
words, items, sentences, characters) were selected for analysis. Then, all of the 
categories and sub-categories were reviewed and compared.  
• Finally, the outcomes were coded based on the numbers and words coded – 
this can help to obtain meaning from the data and answer the research question 
and aims by focusing on the content of the research. 
After the interviews (units of analysis) were transferred into transcripts, the researcher 
could then start to identify the important categories by relating them to the main 
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research question. Once organised, an in-depth analysis of the text could be conducted 
in order to answer the research questions. 
2.5.6  Presentation and Analysis of Interviews 
The researcher managed to easily transcribe each respondent’s dialogue, word by 
word, since they were fluent in the native language (high communication skills). The 
researcher then needed to code the transcribed data into a number of colours. Each 
colour indicates a theme from the question sheet (based on the background theories). 
The purpose of this coding was to highlight the data that needed further discussion. 
Mason (1996) notes that the researcher needs to acknowledge that not all of the 
information/data obtained during the interview session is essential to the discussion 
part. As a result, the discussion chapter needs to be developed once the data has been 
construed by the author. Since this research contains sensitive matters, the author 
maintains trust with the interviewee and their organisation – this pronouncement may 
have encouraged participation in the interview. In order to compliment the 
respondent’s contribution, the researcher offered the interviewees the opportunity to 
comment on the empirical chapter – this assures credibility and is discussed in terms 
of the trustworthiness substance.  
Trustworthiness: A qualitative method criterion basically concerns credibility, 
transferability, dependability and conformability when compared to the quantitative 
method which focuses on reliability and validity. According to Bryman and Bell 
(2003), the general term for the criterions concerned with qualitative studies 
accountability is trustworthiness which is comprised of the four abovementioned 
criterions. These criterions and how they are correlated to this thesis will now be 
discussed in turn. 
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Credibility: Basically credibility is sustained when the researcher develops a high 
scale of viability for the respondent – this is usually detailed in the empirical findings 
chapter. Hence, the basic need for credibility is firstly based on the findings of the 
study which require the accomplishment of good practice. In this area, the research 
needs to be conducted harmoniously with the obtainable rules and regulations. 
According to Bryman and Bell (2003), the second need for credibility is concerned 
with the fundamental nature of the research findings within which the 
data/information congregates in the social world; the respondent needs to achieve 
verification, respondent validation/triangulation.  
Within this thesis, the researcher conducted 24 semi-structured interviews. During the 
interviews, the researcher again highlighted the rationale of the thesis by explaining 
how the empirical findings would contribute to knowledge of the particular national 
security context. Nonetheless, in the final stage, the researcher processed the findings 
into subjects and perceptions – at this stage the interviewees were offered the 
possibility of verifying their input (for the empirical chapter), by which they were sent 
a copy of the transcribed interview. The interviewees appreciated this and they then 
sent back any comments on the findings which needed to be amended (upon request). 
The implementation of this process allows for respondent validation. 
Transferability: Qualitative research commonly examines minor groups or individual 
characteristics in the social world. Within this, transferability plays a crucial role in 
sustaining the findings perspective and its origin. This process can be complicated 
because the findings are obtain from one context and then applied to another (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). In order to enhance and uphold the transferability of this research, the 
researcher has endeavoured to be as open-minded as feasible in demonstrating the 
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setup and background of the interviews. As per the researcher’s understanding, the 
empirical results are trustable and are likely to be applicable based on the country 
profile to other countries in the Gulf region as well as the developing world. In 
addition, the country profile, and its basic information in this thesis, can be used to 
guide discussions of further common understandings because the researcher feels that 
the findings are transferable because of the historical similarity to other countries in 
the Gulf. 
Dependability: The function of dependability facilitated the researcher to apply the 
findings at another time. In addition, the frequency of use of the findings will increase 
the dependability of the empirical. To enlarge the dependability, researchers must 
fully document all of the research processes; from: developing the research question, 
choosing the interviewees and from making the analysis decisions – this provides 
verification that the research has been carried out in accordance with appropriate 
procedures. Consequently, similar research could be re-conducted and would attain 
similar objectives and outcomes (Bryman and Bell, 2003). In this thesis, the author 
attempted to illustrate that the research included many important details that could be 
explored again in future research. 
Conformability: Qualitative research concedes subjectivity in its approach as the 
subject itself could be biased. As a result, the researcher needs to remain objective 
while analysing the data in order to avoid personal feelings and other unrelated 
preferences that could influence the direction of the research or the empirical 
collection so as to maintain conformability (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Furthermore, 
this thesis focuses on the preconceptions aspect by which respondents are able to 
obtain fair perceptions regarding their experiences. The researcher will now attempt 
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to explain how the interview session and data analysis were controlled to ensure that 
transparency was maintained throughout the conducted research. 
2.5.7  Reliability and Validity 
In order to check the reliability and validity of the interviews questions, the following 
elements occurred: 
• The interview questions were firstly checked by a supervisor and by academic 
researchers experienced in questionnaire and interview design. This confirmed 
that the selection of questions and adjustments were made in accordance with 
their feedback.   
• A pilot test was then conducted to check for validity. The completeness and 
readability of the questions were also checked and then reworded as required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46	  	  
	  
2.6  Conceptual Framework for the Study 
Figure 2.4, below, shows a summary of the research methodology for this study. 
	  
	  
	  
Figure 2.4: Conceptual framework for the study 
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2.7  Ethical Issues 
As this research’s strategy involves the use of interviews and meetings with 
executives from the Saudi government and experts in Saudi Arabia’s regional politics, 
some ethical issues relating to privacy need to be considered as this study aims to 
conduct research which targets the Saudi government, organisations and agencies 
involved in Saudi politics. 
It is important to note that Saudi Arabia is a country whereby the collection of 
empirical data concerning such a sensitive nature issues, from primary sources, is 
difficult. Consequently, the researcher will use his judgment at different stages. 
Ethical issues pertaining to anonymity and confidentiality are also of importance; to 
illustrate, the participants were not always willing to talk about the government, 
despite confidentiality and anonymity being guaranteed. Thus, the interviewees 
generally preferred not to discuss the government – this was difficult as the subject of 
investigation is so closely linked to governmental policies. 
Hence, ethical issues developed concerning the lack of participants’ freedom of 
speech. Therefore it is vital to consider the ethical issues from the perspective of the 
participant’s society. The collection of sensitive information, including governmental 
evaluations, has always been done by obtaining participant agreement and by 
explaining the topic of research, as well as the research objective. Furthermore, each 
participant must be given the opportunity to refuse participation or to withdraw from 
the interview. In summary, the author carefully followed the ethical guideline 
suggested by Saunders et al. (2009).  Figure 2.5, below, provides detail on the ethical 
considerations for each stage of the research undertaken in this project. 
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Figure 2.5:  Ethical issues at different stages of research  
Source: Saunders et al. (2009: 188) 
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2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an outline of the various steps adopted by the researcher. A 
systematic, organised and logical approach were taken to justify the philosophical 
standpoint, in accordance with the chosen method, approach and strategy. In order to 
address the research settings, objectives and variables, the research methodology and 
data collection methods were designed to include an in-depth, semi-structured 
interview as it combines the advantages of the unstructured and structured interviews. 
A semi-structured interview was chosen based on its advantages in regards to the 
chosen topic. This chapter has also presented the data sampling techniques. This 
chapter has therefore considered all of the necessary elements that are concerned with 
analysing the use of a qualitative method, from the beginning to the final stage, 
including the criterions that focus on: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
conformability, as well as reliability and validity. 
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Chapter 3 
Locating Security Theories: Understanding Saudi National Security 
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3.1  Introduction  
Despite the numerous efforts by scholars of security studies to conceptualise 
“security” in a coherent and systematic way, no single, generally accepted, definition 
of security has been produced. The evolution of the security paradigm and the 
changes in conceptions of security are based on different theoretical, political and 
historical assumptions, where each corresponds to specific values, threats and 
capabilities to meet the perceived challenges. 
This chapter intends to analyse the ways in which the term security has been 
identified and how the academic discourse of security have evolved over time. The 
purpose is to provide an overview of the concepts and ultimately to provide a better 
understanding of the concept of security for certain cases like Saudi Arabia. The most 
appropriate framework of national security analysis will be identified based on how it 
best suits the Saudi state’s criteria. Hence, this chapter will predominantly aim to 
explain: the meaning of the term security based on the way in which the concept has 
developed in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods; it will also aim to explain how 
each approach views the concept of security by explaining the political nature of 
Saudi Arabia and by locating the most appropriate approach to understanding and 
analysing Saudi Arabia’s security.  
This chapter is divided into six parts. A contemporary overview of the evolving 
concept of security will be given in section 3.2. Hereafter, in section 3.3, the key 
debates will be highlighted with regards to the aftermath of the Cold War which 
redefined the concept of security. Then, section 3.4 will illustrate how the different 
theoretical traditions have formed and identified the term security, as well as the non-
traditional approaches to security. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 will locate the study referent 
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object in the light of the reviewed theories of international relations (IR). These 
sections will discuss the diverse dimensions of security based on their connection to 
the nature of the Saudi state and proposed on the identification of the referent object 
of security in this study. Section 3.7 will provide a discussion of Barry Buzan’s 
thoughts on security, it will also outline Buzan’s security analysis framework as a 
possible framework to follow in order to analyse Saudi Arabia’s security. Section 3.8 
will introduce the basic assumptions of Saudi Arabia’s national security by relating IR 
general assumptions about security from different approaches to the case of Saudi 
Arabia. The last section (section 3.9) will provide a general review of how the wider 
literature approaches Gulf security. It will also illustrate where this study is located 
within the field, from a regional perspective. The literature presented in this chapter 
will therefore provide a basis for understanding the importance of security in the Gulf 
region. 
3.2  The Meaning of Security and National Security  
The concept of security is an indefinite concept because of its multi-dimensional 
nature. Defining security within the study of world politics or international relations 
remains a source of debate. Security is often referred to as an “essentially contested 
concept”, one for which, by definition, there can be no consensus as to its meaning. 
There is no single universally accepted definition or concept of the term “security”, 
“national security”, “international security” or “global security”. In this sense, each 
refers to different historical, theoretical or political periods and assumption. Every 
security concept corresponds to different values, threats and capabilities which are 
associated with meeting certain challenges (Haftendorn, 1991).  
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The meaning of security varies, depending on the time and place; but, in terms of 
academic and professional inquiries, security thinking has developed substantially 
since the Second World War. Historically, the concept of security is intertwined with 
military security – military power has been a prominent priority for most states. 
According to Buzan (1991b: 1), in order to have a proper understanding of the 
national security problem one must first understand the concept of security, which is, 
in much of its prevailing usage, “so weakly developed as to be inadequate for the 
task”. Buzan (1991b: 1) considered five possible explanations for what he describes 
as “the persistent underdevelopment of thinking about security”. The first explanation 
is that the idea of the concept of security is too complex to attract analysts and has 
therefore been neglected in favour of more tractable concepts. The second, and in 
Buzan’s view the more convincing explanation for the neglect of security, lies in the 
real scope for overlap between the concepts of security and power which result in 
conditions of actual confrontation. A third reason, for the underdevelopment of 
security, lies in the nature of the various revolts against realist orthodoxy which 
occurred up to the end of the 1970s. Buzan argues that, rejecting the realist model as 
dangerously self-fulfilling and too war-prone for a nuclear-armed world by those with 
idealist notions as they organised themselves around the concept of security. 
Interestingly, many idealist critics turned instead to the grand concept of peace. A 
fourth reason, for the conceptual underdevelopment of security, can be found in the 
nature of strategic studies, a sub-field which has produced large volumes of empirical 
literature on the development of conceptual notions of security. 
A fifth and final reason that Buzan imposed, as an enduring cause of the neglect of 
security, hinges on the argument that, for the practitioners of state policy, compelling 
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reasons exist for maintaining its symbolic ambiguity. The appeal of national security 
as a justification for actions and policies that would otherwise have to be explained is 
a political tool of immense convenience for a large variety of sectional interests, in all 
types of state. Because of the leverage over domestic affairs, which can be obtained 
by invoking it, an undefined notion of national security offers scope for power-
maximising strategies for political and military elites (Buzan, 1991b: 7-11). 
Conversely, Baldwin (1997) assert that security is an important concept, which has 
been used over the last 50 years to justify the suspension of civil liberties, the 
initiation of war and the reallocating of resources. Baldwin also stated that most 
recent works on security do not qualify as providing serious conceptual analyses. He 
argues that security has not received the serious attention that it needs for the concepts 
of justice, freedom, equality, obligation, representation and power. Baldwin (1997: 9) 
also declares that Buzan’s five explanations for the neglect of security are not 
convincing, but, he argues that security should still be described as a “neglected 
concept”, he states that: 
Paradoxical as it may seem, security has not been an important analytical 
concept for most security studies scholars.  During the Cold War, security studies 
was composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft. If military force 
was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force 
was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics. 
Security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to 
be used by most security studies specialists. 
Adding the adjective “national” to the term “security”, develops the concept to refer 
to the security concerns of the state, the security of the nation and/or the society (Al-
Habbas, 1999). Haftendorn (1991: 9) also argued that:   
The concept of international security is based on a mutual interest in survival 
under conditions on nuclear deterrence and on recognition that an adversary will 
be deterred from attacking out of its own self-interest. This is more than political 
restraint. International security, in contrast to national security, implies that the 
security of one state is closely linked to that of other state, at least of one other 
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state. States are independent in their security affairs such that security of one is 
strongly affected action of the other, and vice versa.    
Individuals, corporations, governments and academic specialists, all employ the term 
security to a large range of contexts and for a multitude of purposes.  It encompasses 
and refers to things and individual subtleties, to means and ends, and state and global 
events (McSweeney, 1999).  
3.3  Rethinking about Security  
The general term of security still remains ambiguous– it is defined by dictionaries as 
relating to the state of safety. Traditionalists, in the field of security studies and 
international relations, regard the concept of security in almost absolutely military and 
state-centred terms, equating security with military issues and the use of force. But 
conceptualisations of the meaning of security became a dominant trend during the 
1990s. As a result, this led to a paradigmatic change in the perception of security 
which focuses on a wider understanding of the concept of security that goes beyond 
military-political understanding – this was not considered until the latter part of the 
Cold War (Islam, 2009: 2). 
The longstanding notion of security focuses on the military and state-centred concepts 
which were closely linked to the realist approach. As will be discussed in more detail 
later, the focus on military threats and the use of force or power as an approach to 
foreign policy seemed appropriate during the Cold War era. The following table 
(Table 3.1, cited in Collins, 2010) provides definitions of security from various key 
security studies authors. 
Many academics have criticised the limited focus that the military threat considers 
with regards to security. Ullman (1983: 129) argues that: “defining national security 
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merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of 
reality. That false image is doubly misleading and [is] therefore [a] false image of 
reality”. Ullman (1983) progressed to provide two reasons for this: firstly, it causes 
states to concentrate on military threats and ignore other, and perhaps even more 
harmful dangers. The second cause of misleading is that it contributes to pervasive 
militarisation of international relations, which increases global insecurity in the long 
run.  
Author, Year Definitions of Security 
Bellamy  
(1981: 102) 
Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high 
expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur. 
Luciani  
(1989: 151) 
National security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from 
abroad. 
Ayoob  
(1995: 9) 
Security-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities – both internal and 
external – that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state 
structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes. 
Kolodziej  
(2005: 25) 
Security… implies both coercive means to check an aggressor and all manner of 
persuasion, bolstered by the prospect of mutually shredded benefits, to transform 
hostility into cooperation. 
Hough  
(2004: 9) 
If people, be they government ministers or private individuals, perceive an issue 
to threaten their lives in some way and respond politically to this, then that issue 
should be deemed to be a security issue. 
Table 3.1: Definitions of security  
Source: Collins (2010) 
In order to accept a broader definition of security, Ullman (1983: 133) attempted to 
provide “a redefinition of threats” where he argues that: a threat to national security is 
an action or sequence of events that: 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief 
span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 2) threatens 
significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a 
state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within 
the state. 
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Many other scholars have tried to provide definitions of security that consider a broad 
variety of possibilities. Haftendorn (1991: 5) argues that Ullman’s definition 
considers a broad variety of contingencies, but further clarification is required as 
different questions of applicability are raised. It must be seen in their specific cultural 
context of the highly industrialised democracies of the West. Other countries have 
their own concept of security, but, most of the developing countries emphasise the 
economic and social as well as the domestic dimensions of security.  
Expanded definitions of security rarely fully clarify the security meaning, this can 
affect its theoretical and intellectual coherence, and it can even affect the scope of the 
solution to certain problems.  Walt (1991: 213) argues that: 
Issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse or economic recessions could all be 
viewed as threats to “security”. Defining the field in this way would destroy its 
intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of 
these important problems.  
The idea of considering an issue as a security threat would have to follow the 
“securitisation” process. This idea is based on the concept of securitisation as 
formulated by Ole Waever (1997). According to Waever (1997), something becomes 
securitised when it has been declared a security problem by the elites; that is when 
they dictate that in issue is a threat to the state. It should be noted that Waever’s 
explanation is not harmonious as the elite security interests and the interest of the 
society rarely match – this could be in itself a source of threat to the state’s security. 
Such arguments however, raise debates around state-centric theories of security by 
questioning the “who” and “what” of security (the referent object).  
The following sections will now highlight the different theoretical approaches by 
focusing on the concept of security and the referent object in each approach. 
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3.4  Security Theories and Trends 
The concept of security within international relations (IR) has mostly focused upon 
the state’s security and the state’s survival as a political community by which the 
ultimate goal of state behaviour is to provide security for the state against anything 
that may threaten its existence or integrity (Lawson, 2003).  
The previous chapter discussed and addressed the search for security meaning in 
terms of the issues raised about the referent object of security and the philosophy of 
knowledge, such as epistemology (how do we know things?), ontology (what 
phenomena do we think make up the social world?) and the method (how should we 
study the social world?). William (2008) argues that by accepting the notion that 
security is an essentially contested concept, by definition, such debates cannot be 
definitively resolved in the abstract as some positions are more dominant and 
enforced through the application of power. William (2008) progresses to note that 
security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of threats to cherished 
values; especially those that threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the 
near future. 
3.4.1  Theoretical Traditions in Security Studies 
In defining security, various authors take different philosophical stands in terms of the 
traditional perspectives, namely: realism, liberalism and constructivism. Although 
both realists and liberals clearly diverge in many respects, both still placed the state as 
the prime or ultimate object of security and they both assert the centrality of the state 
to the international system (Lawson, 2003). 
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Realism is the most significant theoretical tradition in international relations and 
security studies. According to Collins (2010), realism is not a single theory; it is 
rather a broad approach of theories and arguments. Despite the diversity of realist 
thought, nearly all realists assert the centrality of military threat and the use of force. 
Nevertheless, almost all realists believe that the international system suffers from a 
lack of authority, or what they described as international anarchy, which is defined as 
the lack of a single authority with sovereign power over states in the international 
system (Jordan et al., 2009). Since there is no central authority, realists believe that 
the state utilises self-help strategies to maintain their own survival.  
Generally, realists believe that the possibility of war compels states to pursue security 
above any other interest, this forms a security dilemma between states as each state 
assesses their security with reference to the other states’ capabilities, rather than their 
behaviours or intentions (Ross, 2009). As the various states develop their security 
capabilities, they enhance the threat perceptions of the other states, which can then 
contribute to unintentional arms races (Collins, 2007).  
The main criticism faced by the realist concept of security is that it limits other 
dimensions of security that are not solely military. Nonetheless, critics have 
questioned the state centrism of the realist approach. Realists argue that because of 
the influence of international anarchy the states will behave in a certain manner – 
regardless of their internal composition. Hence, the realist believes that the state will 
remain the main actor in international politics (Jordan et al., 2009). 
Thus, the realist’s main position can be summarised in the following points: 
1. The centrality of military threat and the use of force. 
60	  	  
2. The international system suffers from a lack of authority or what they describe 
as “international anarchy”. 
3. The state’s sovereignty and power shapes its international system. 
4. Due to the “international anarchy”, when the state develops their security 
capabilities, they enhance the threat perceptions of the other states, which can 
then contribute to unintentional arms races and “security dilemmas”.  
Liberalism, on the other hand, is another tradition of international relations and 
security studies. Liberalism focuses beyond the state to include other actors, such as 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental international organisation 
(NGIOs), multinational corporations as well as domestic actors (interest groups, 
elites, and political parties). Liberalists believe that a state’s behaviour is 
predominantly a result of the perceptions, preferences and decisions of the elites and 
officials; thus, the character of the international system changes according to the 
nature of its members and their objectives (William, 2008). 
Conversely, constructivism, is another approach that focuses on the “society” as the 
most important referent object of security studies. According to this approach, the 
“reality” of the world, which includes the world of international relations, is socially 
constructed via complex inter-subjective understandings. Constructivists emphasise 
the impact of ideas and identities on creating and shaping a state’s understanding and 
their response to a situation (Taylor, 2012). Constructivist approaches are quite 
diverse and do not suggest a combined set of notions of ideas or identity issues. 
Constructivists believe that the security dilemma is an outcome of the social 
interaction between states (Lawson, 2003). They try to demonstrate how the social 
sciences can help IR scholars understand the importance of norms and identity in 
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world politics, as understanding could help to uncover important issues that are 
neglected by neo-realism and neo-liberalism.  
The major criticism to constructivism concerns the separation between the state and 
society; to illustrate, those who speak for the society and the state may be political 
and manipulate perceived threats to societal security in order to legitimise specific 
political agendas (Baylis et al., 2011). 
Below, in Table 3.2, a summary of all three theoretical traditions has been presented.  
  Realism Liberalism Constructivism 
Main theoretical 
proposition 
Self-interested, 
states compete 
for power and 
security 
Political or 
economic 
considerations 
override concerns 
for power 
State behaviours are 
shaped by collective 
norms and social 
identities 
Highest virtues Power and 
security 
Peace and freedom Inter-subjective 
agreement; flow of 
norms and ideas 
 
Main units of analysis States State and non-state 
actors 
Individual (especial 
elites); groups; 
states; supra-state 
actors 
 
Key instruments Force, principally 
military; 
diplomacy 
Varies (spread of 
democratic value; 
international 
organisations; 
economic 
exchange) 
 
Ideas; discourse 
Main threat to (national) 
security 
External military 
threat 
Non-democratic 
regimes 
Non-cooperation, 
externalisation  
 
Table 3.2: Dominant theoretical traditions in the study of international affairs 
3.4.2  Non-Traditional Theories of Security Studies   
After the Cold War, subsequent thinking suggested different referent objects. The 
various schools of thought on security studies have developed beyond the traditional 
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philosophical stand of realism, liberalism and constructivism, and now focuses on the 
state as the referent object. Some analysts have argued that the priority should be 
given to human security as people are the referent object of security; thus, the state is 
only a referent object as it is a means to people’s security. They also believe that 
unless the ultimate goal of state-centric security is to the security of people, then the 
government’s security is unverified.  
The notion of human security can be found in the publication of the Human 
Development Report of 1994, issued by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). This report notes that human security should include the following seven 
areas: economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security and political security (Baylis et al., 2011). In fact, human security 
represents an ongoing effort to place the individual’s security at the centre of the 
national and global security concerns. However, Buzan (1991b) suggests that despite 
individuals being threatened by their own state, in many ways, the question of 
national security cannot be reduced to the individual level because both the state and 
the system have characteristics that make them more than the sum of their parts. 
Nevertheless, he asserts that it is the state that has to deal with or be responsible for 
state, sub-state and international security issues. 
Critical theory or critical security studies is another non-traditional approach that 
rejects the focus of the state as the referent object; instead, it focuses on a much 
border range of factors. The critical theory offers an analytical framework for thinking 
about various possible referent objects, from the lowest level (the individual) through 
various sources of collective identities (including states, regions, civilisations), up to 
the international system, by analysing the relationships and tensions between the 
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different levels (William, 2008). This theory also focuses on societal security 
concerns and the maintenance of collective identity as being pivotal – if society loses 
its identity it is unlikely to survive; thus, military means may be employed to defend 
societal identities, especially when identity is linked to territory (Collins, 2010). 
Another approach places the environmental change as a security risk by viewing the 
environment as a referent object of security. This approach calls for greater attention 
to be given to the planet earth itself rather than the human beings inhabiting it. As 
mentioned earlier, the environment is one of the seven sector identified in the early 
definition of human security in the UNDP (Collins, 2010: 232).  Thus, for some time, 
environmental change has been identified as a human security issue; nonetheless, 
environmentalists have used environmental security to “securitise” environmental 
problems. The environmental and peace movement also focuses on environmental 
change as a cause of violent conflict rather than human security. This has led others to 
think that environmental security is more concerned with security than with the 
environment (ibid). The environmental movement has helped in raising the 
recognition of the environmental issues as it contests the practice of national security. 
3.4.3  Security in Developing States  
Many scholars place economic and social welfare in developing states as paramount 
aspects of national security (Sayigh, 1990; Al-Habbas, 2010; Ayoob, 2002). This 
approach is known as the development approach, which was first raised decades ago. 
The development approach incorporates anything which relates to economic or social 
progress, as such education, health and agriculture are important elements that 
enhance the civic aspects of developing countries. Failure to meet basic human needs 
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will lead to domestic instability in developing states, this is closely linked to the 
wellbeing of a society (ibid).  
Al-Habbas (2010: 70-73) asserts that in most developing states physical protection 
from external issues is only one part of national security problems as “the security 
problem of developing states is about achieving political stability amidst sweeping 
social, economic and ideological change”. Therefore any comprehensive study of 
these states’ security would need to focus not only on the military dimension, but also 
on the internal sources of threats arising from a weak domestic environment.  
Saudi Arabia however is not considered to be a developing country because of its 
economic status and state infrastructure (please see Chapter 5, section 5.4 for more 
detail); hence, it cannot be studied from the perspective of a developing state. It is 
worth considering various security theories when studying a completed state, such as 
Saudi Arabia (due to its social, religious, political and economic standpoints).   
3.5  Buzan’s Framework of Security 
Buzan introduced five important sectors of security (political, military, economic, 
societal and environmental) that need to be understood when analysing a state’s 
security.  When Buzan introduced these five sectors of analysis, his aim was to 
analyse the effect of these sectors on the “periphery”, based on changes in the 
“centre”. Buzan explains that each of the five sectors cannot be analysed in isolation 
from the other sectors. Buzan (1991a) clarifies in his article, New Patterns of Global 
Security in the Twenty-First Century, that each factor has a point of concern in 
relation to state security. In other words, when Buzan introduced his framework of 
analysis, he aimed to measure the impact and consequence of changes in the north 
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(which were directly linked to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union) to the security agenda in the south, in terms of these five sectors. However, it 
became a valid framework of analysis that has since been utilised to conduct general 
security analysis. As argued by Stone (2009), Buzan provided a more complete 
understanding of the complexities of security by applying these concepts to current 
issues or states. Buzan’s approach can be adopted to breakdown most of the aspects 
that contribute to or affect security, from the individual and society as the main 
referent, which, for Buzan is the state. In connection to Buzan and the earlier 
dissection of the idea of the state, this notion led him to another level of analysis: 
insecurity, threats and vulnerabilities as referred to in Buzan’s book: People, State 
and Fear, whereby “a key divide [occurs] in security policy”. In this respect Buzan 
attempts to highlight the internal debate within national security based on how it deals 
outwardly with focusing on cutting off threats to the state at the source, or what 
Buzan refers to as the international security strategy which is inwards, whereby the 
state’s vulnerabilities are reduced as part of the national security strategy. Buzan then 
argues that a “policy which mixes elements of a national security strategy with 
elements of an international security one” is the best. 
Buzan proposed an integrated model which incorporates the neorealist beliefs, such as 
anarchy, but the depth of his analysis is constructivist. This is a holistic approach that 
cuts through the traditional concepts by suggesting that national security needs to be 
assessed from the micro and macro perspectives, and the security at the three different 
levels of individual, national and system also need to be considered. This 
constructivist integrated approach allows researchers to address the contemporary 
issues, i.e. terrorism, by investigating the five identified sectors. Buzan suggests that 
the definition of security should not only include the military sector, but also the other 
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four sectors: economic, political, societal and environmental; this has opened up new 
horizons in the field of security literature. However, it should be noted that this 
framework is not a fool proof model that can be effectively implemented in all 
scenarios. Firstly, there is strong criticism from academics who are sceptical about the 
state itself as a referent object.  
Buzan (2007) himself contradicted his work in the introduction section of his second 
edition of the People States and Fear book, by suggesting that if he had a choice, he 
would, “… weave securitisation arguments much more deeply throughout the text...”. 
However, his national security framework is considered to be one of his major 
contributions to the theory of international relations. This is substantiated by the UN 
Report (2004) “A more secure world: Our shared responsibility”. The report intended 
to propose a security framework to reduce the national threat by making the world a 
more secure place. The findings of the report suggested that collective security is 
founded on the three pillars of national, regional and global security levels. The report 
also recommended the following (UN Report, 2004: 2):  
There are six clusters of threats with which the world must be concerned now and 
in the decades ahead: 
• Economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and 
environmental degradation 
• Inter-state conflicts 
• Internal conflicts, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale 
atrocities 
• Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons 
• Terrorism 
• Transnational organised crime. 
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One can argue that the UN’s framework is a reproduction of Buzan’s five sector 
framework, since it represents all the six clusters proposed above. Hence, it clearly 
validates his work on national security.  
Moreover, Buzan also introduced another framework of security analysis which 
focuses on the concept of regional security – he describes this as a “relational 
phenomenon” because it includes several important assumptions. The first is that of 
“amity and enmity” among the various states – this can be understood by 
acknowledging that a states relationship can vary from that of friendship to an enemy 
or a source of threat. The issues that control these feelings range from things such as 
ideology, territory, ethnic lines and historical precedent. Buzan (2007: 190) argues 
that the concept of amity/enmity leads to the idea of “security complex”, which 
means: “A group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently 
closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one 
another”.  
This is a very relevant concept for the current study since Saudi Arabia’s national 
security can be connected to several regional security complexes. Traditional 
established security theories in IR are inadequate to answer the research questions set. 
With the aim of performing the tasks set above, the study requires a framework that 
integrates several theories in order to assess the contemporary issues in a complex 
political situation in the context of politics in the Middle East. The exhaustive 
literature review demonstrates a significant mismatch between implementing the 
traditional theories of national security and the contemporary regional issues in the 
turbulent Middle Eastern region. The traditional schools of thought of political and 
military concerns are not sufficient to assess the current highly unstable region and 
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more factors therefore need to be considered, including: societal, environmental and 
economic. The traditional theories are mostly designed and developed in a particular 
time period of the Western or European historic perspective, hence they are unsuitable 
in eloquently engaging with the regional turbulence in the Middle East because it is a 
radically transformed world.  
Ayoob (2002: 33) mentioned that realism and liberalism fail to: 
Explain adequately the behaviour of the primary units constituting the 
international system [by ignoring the historical experience and contemporary 
security practice of states in the global south] and fail to explain sufficiently the 
origins, both as beginnings and causes, of the majority of conflicts in the 
international system today. 
This study will therefore use Buzan’s national security paradigms and frameworks as 
a guideline to concentrate on examining the empirical evidence of how practitioners, 
politicians, religious leaders and academics in Saudi Arabia perceive and interpret the 
national security in terms of the existing national and regional/international threats. 
As Waever suggests: “A theory is not basically a proposition about reality (true or 
false): it is a model from which one might produce empirical statements” (2011: 470). 
It should be noted that, since there is no comprehensive framework on national 
security, the intention of the researcher is not to claim Buzan’s security theory as the 
most appropriate theory for all circumstances in IR literature; instead, the researcher 
will use the theory as a basis for gaining insight and understanding of Saudi Arabia’s 
national security practices/issues, so that structural similarities/dissimilarities can be 
assessed. This will allow the researcher to investigate a related topic for potential 
improvement of national security in Saudi Arabia.  
In fact, Buzan introduced a set of frameworks to analyse state security which has 
offered a solid foundation of useful analytical tools for professionals, academics or 
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policymakers to handle national or international security concerns that can be useful 
to any policymaker. By understanding the general idea of security, as well as the 
breakdown of the different sectors and factors that affect security, it is expected that a 
more detailed understanding of the state’s security aspects and security policies will 
be obtained.  
3.6  Why State National Security: “Security Scope Variables” 
For each approach, a different referent object or research variables has been 
highlighted; however, it is important to recognise the elements that are considered to 
be security issues for each particular referent as these are the items that need 
investigation (individuals, states, global issues, etc.). According to William (2008), in 
order to identify what counts as a security issue for a particular referent, the process 
by which threat agendas are constructed needs to be analysed. It is important to 
consider how representatives of particular groups and organisations construct threat 
agendas because not all groups or threat agendas are of equal political significance. 
3.6.1 Security for Whom?  Which Values?  What Threats? 
The academic field of security studies contains various arguments about what should 
be considered a security issue. Some argue that security analysts should focus their 
efforts on issues related to armed conflict and the threat or use of military power; 
however, others argue that if security is about alleviating serious threats which 
prevent people from pursuing their cherished values then, for many, the lack of 
effective systems of healthcare are no less important than the threat of armed conflict 
(Collins, 2010). 
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Although most analysts reject the notion of total or absolute security, the study of 
security is significant as it may help in identifying the manner in which it can be 
achieved.  Security cannot be achieved purely by understanding what security is or by 
understanding how different parties view it; but, knowledge of these elements could 
help to shape the future in desired ways through conscious efforts. Hence, knowledge 
of an ideal secure environment (including the how and what) could shape the security 
policies that are advocated (William, 2008). 
Currently, IR studies generally focus on political “realism”. IR students are more 
involved with studying state actions and how the states formulates and implements 
their security policies. Nevertheless, in some cases the study of security is designed to 
revolve around the concerns of a state which determines the state’s behaviour within 
the international system. But, as argued by Weaver (1998), Lawson (2003) and 
William (2008), as well as many others, the study of security is mainly concerned 
with who and what needs to be secure – this relates directly to the specific referent 
object of the study.  
3.7  State National Security Ends and Means: The Saudi State’s Nature 
The previous sections of this chapter have discussed the nature of the security concept 
by explaining that the concept of security varies in accordance with its historical 
context. In order to create a study which focuses on security and these different 
approaches, one main factor, the referent object of the study (whereby security needs 
to be studied), must be identified and revealed. In this research the state security of 
Saudi Arabia or Saudi national security has been identified as the referent object of 
the study. Studying Saudi Arabia’s national security involves identifying and 
explaining the factors which have affected the building of the state and the state’s 
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nature (these generally incorporate: Islam, tribalism and oil). The existence of a 
shared Islamic and tribal cultural heritage is what distinguishes Saudi Arabia as a 
nation-state or as having an idea of state.  The main causes of political instability in 
Saudi Arabia are not as a result of a lack of institutionalisation, but rather they are a 
result of the social environment which has created reluctance from the conservatives 
in the Saudi society, on the one side, and from the government, on the other side. The 
Al Saud family as a monarchy, unlike other Arab states, is not exposed to the pressure 
of democratic electoral politics; the monarch is, therefore, not at risk of losing power 
(caused by elections in other states). The system of government within the Kingdom 
is therefore based on tribal and Islamic traditions rather than on Western models.  
Each state generally has different values and interests which may focus on physical 
safety, economic welfare, etc. As has been explained earlier, the traditional concept of 
national security considers political independence and territorial integrity as values 
which need protection (Baldwin, 1997). Legitimate governments are supposed to 
represent their citizens by developing policies that seek to protect their social values 
and national priorities. Hudson (1979: 18-24) attempted to explain the various 
instruments and strategies of legitimacy building that the Arab governments can 
employ. Hudson referred to David Easton’s threefold classification of legitimacy 
resources, which include: personal, ideological and structural legitimacy. Leaders 
tend to depend on their personality to legitimise their values that arise from the 
political culture, most notably nationalism. Leaders may also associate the regime 
with values and meaningful collective goals in order to strengthen or gain legitimacy. 
Finally, Hudson explains structural legitimacy as the extent to which the 
governmental system is institutionalised; this is dependent on the ability of the Arab 
regime to develop bureaucratic and party structural capabilities that extend the 
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governmental ideals and politics to perform services and extractive functions 
(Hudson, 1979: 18-24). 
The state also usually designs their national security policies according to the state’s 
challenges and political objectives and values, this identifies ends and means in the 
form of desired outcomes. States attempt to influence their own people’s behaviours, 
as well as other states’ behaviours, so that they can develop the most appropriate 
national and international policies, some of which will be successful, failures or a 
mixture of both. National security can be achieved by reliance on the following three 
categories: military, diplomacy and economic (Al-Habbas, 2010). Each of these 
categories will be studied in this research in order to analyse the Saudi state’s internal 
and external dimensions of security in relation to understanding the Saudi state’s 
security features.   
The question of state security cannot be reduced to the individual level because the 
state is responsible for the state, sub-state and international security issues. It is 
important to recognise the approach of human security theories in order to identify 
how individuals can be threatened by their own state; hence, the attitude of the Saudi 
government towards its citizens will be studied by focusing on the domestic politics 
conducted by the government. This will be examined in the literature that will be 
presented in Chapter 4 and again by the interview discussions in Chapter 6. 
3.7.1 Saudi State Ends and Means 
The illustration below (Figure 3.1) identifies the basic components, and how they 
interact with each other, of the national security processes in Saudi Arabia. 
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Figure 3.1: National security making in Saudi Arabia 
Source: Adapted from Al-Habbas (2010) 
As illustrated above, the components of national security in Saudi Arabia include 
domestic, regional and international dynamics which are all interconnected. Regional 
factors, such as: geopolitical ethnic rivalry (e.g. Iran and Iraq); GCC complexity in 
terms of their relationship; as well as the security situation in the neighbouring states 
(e.g. Yemen internal security and economy), are all shaped by the international 
environment (e.g. international anarchy, security dilemmas and external interventions) 
and vice versa. Furthermore, the illustration also explains that the ends are obtained 
by the means available and the role-play of the domestic elements (for instance: elites 
interests, religion and cultural aspects, etc.). Thus, all of the factors mentioned appear 
to be interconnected in their influence. The ends to a means are decided based on the 
domestic elements as well as the influences by regional and international elements. 
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Similarly, the relationship between the regional and international elements is affected 
by the end results – the means that the government achieves. Thus, an analysis of 
Saudi Arabia’s actions, and how Saudi Arabia formulates and implements its security 
policies (state security policy and dynamics), is also vital.  
Saudi Arabia’s national security needs to be analysed in terms of the internal 
dimension of security threats as well as the traditional military or external threats. The 
framework of analysis therefore needs to include all of its security threats, including 
the political, economic and social variables, besides the military factors, as principle 
components. An understanding of Saudi Arabia’s domestic and regional security 
policies is an important subject of study, especially as little research has been 
conducted on Saudi security policies. As explained earlier, Saudi Arabia is one of the 
largest nations in the region and a major player in the region’s security. Its economic 
strength and its huge energy reserves (natural gas and oil) have made it an important 
nation; it is also geographical significant for Islam as it contains the two holy places 
of Mecca and Medina. Furthermore, most of the oil and gas exports from the region 
are primarily dependent on the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries; hence, the 
global economy is heavily dependent on the Gulf’s energy resources and it will 
remain so for decades to come (Cordesman, 2009). Regional security in the Gulf 
region is inherently tied to socioeconomic development throughout the world; 
consequently, security in the Gulf region should be viewed as a global security issue. 
3.8  Saudi Arabia’s National Security Framework of Analysis  
The concept of security and its theorising has been predominantly studied in the West 
(Al-Habbas, 2010), whereby national security considers protecting states from 
external threats. Al-Habbas (2010: 56-59) assert that security is better conceptualised 
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in relation to particular cases and that the analysis of national security in developing 
states entails a border conception that includes internal and external security concerns. 
As discussed previously, national security definitions are useful in indicating the 
essence of national security which involves protecting the national values from 
threats; nonetheless, the concept of national security has been described by many as 
being uncertain in its nature (Baldwin, 1997; Collins, 2010; William, 2008).  
It is therefore necessary for this study to identify some of the general and common 
assumptions about national security in order to relate these specifically to Saudi 
Arabia. Consequently, the specific nature of the state of Saudi Arabia will be 
considered in relation to the domestic, regional and international security as one of the 
main aims of this research. Hence, this study will present the following assumptions 
which will provide the basis for the study. 1) States are the primary unit in 
international politics. Due to the unique political nature of the Saudi state and its 
international political context, a realist framework will influence this study. Saudi 
security policy reflects the impact of the international structure and the exceptional 
system of government (drawing on tribal and Islamic traditions rather than Western 
models) of the Saudi policymakers. 2) State national security involves domestic, 
regional and international dynamics. 3) Threat goes beyond mere military threats, to 
include anything that forms a threat to the idea of security or the sovereignty of the 
state, including political, social, economic, environmental and military threats. 4) 
Most nation-states develop a national security policy that is composed of ends and 
means to deal with its threats. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this has been designed in 
favour of the ruler and the nation as well as being in accordance with religion, 
social/cultural aspects, as well as regional and international dynamics. 
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Hence, the adopted framework aims to understanding and conceptualise the national 
security of Saudi Arabia, by focusing on the following: 
1. Analysing the state’s five sectors of security: political, military, economic, 
societal and environmental, from an internal perspective that will consider all 
three levels of security, individually, nationally and the system (these will be 
addressed in Chapter 4). 
2. Analysing state regional security and external threats through the use of 
Buzan’s pattern of “amity and enmity”, and by reviewing each state in the 
region to determine what each state identifies as threats to the state’s five 
sectors of security, as mentioned above in the first point (these will be 
addressed in Chapter 5). 
This framework will incorporate the theoretical underpinning of the different 
components of security that have been discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, this 
framework arguably covers most of the factors, including national, regional and 
international security dynamics and their interaction with the different internal and 
external elements. Hence, this thesis will be predominantly influenced and structured 
in accordance with the adoption of this framework since it includes the central issues 
of security measures, including: political, economic, military, societal and 
environmental components and regional/external threats evaluation as suggested in 
Buzan’s People, State and Fears (1991b) book. Thus, the structure of the following 
two chapters will be based upon this. Then, Chapter 7 will examine these notions 
further by presenting and analysing the collected data (semi-structured interviews). 
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3.9  General Review of Security Practices in Saudi Arabia (within the Region) 
A general review of how the wider literature approaches Gulf security will now be 
given in order to identify where this study is located within the research field. The 
existing literature provides a basis for understanding the importance of the Gulf area 
as well as acknowledging the threats this area faces. It is commonly agreed that the 
Gulf region is one of the most important strategic areas in the world; thus, it is 
extremely important that this region is well secured. This thesis will differ from the 
other current literature in that it will not only be concerned with the issue of security 
in the Gulf, but instead Saudi Arabia will be analysed to determine the role it plays in 
regional security. The challenge in conducting research on this topic is that there is a 
paucity of existing literature, and access to the actual strategies (primary resources) 
applied by Saudi Arabia will be difficult. 
Most of the Gulf monarchies have or are facing demands for political, judicial and 
economic reform. According to Khalaf and Luciani (2006), the regimes and critics 
agree on the need for reform, but they differ on the content of the “reform package” 
and on how the actors perceive the urgency and pace of reform, as well as on the 
means of sustaining the reform movement. Hence, this research thesis will analyse the 
Saudi Arabian domestic policy actions that affect security in the area; furthermore, an 
analysis of Saudi Arabia’s political actions in the Gulf region will also be given. 
Consequently, the threats and limitations affecting Saudi Arabia’s role and its security 
will be given. In addition, a political history and the main historical periods, that have 
shaped and influenced the Saudi state, will also be provided to include the rise of 
Islam and Shi’ism.  Interestingly, Khalaf and Luciani (2006), also argue that other 
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similar political regimes, demographic structures as well as economic and social 
systems, in the GCC countries, make the path of reform comparable.  
Others, including Cordesman (2009), argue that Saudi Arabia needs to reassess its 
priorities in order to deal with threats within the Gulf area. It is likely that they will 
need to adjust their forces to deal with real-world threats in the region for deterrence 
and defence, by utilising effective cooperation efforts and by examining the full range 
of threats rather than just the most obvious military and security issues. 
Cordesman (2009) provides a wide literature search, with rational and clear research 
objectives. He provided a broad multi-level approach which analysed the threats and 
challenges facing Saudi Arabia. He also analysed Saudi Arabia’s policy towards 
internal and external challenges and concluded by providing comprehensive solutions 
for confronting challenges in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. 
Other research suggests that over the last few decades most threats have emanated 
from two states, Iran and Iraq, along with other internal problems which have created 
more difficulties for the Saudi role in the region. Al-Saud (2002) believes that 
security ties between Saudi Arabia and the United States must be strengthened, taking 
into account that both nations have been affected by the global war on terrorism – 
they therefore have common interests. Al-Saud also believes that aggressive actors 
must be confronted by military capabilities; this clearly indicates his view on how 
regional threats should be addressed. However, Al-Saud fails to suggest an effective 
or comprehensive solution for facing the dangers that affect the Gulf region or that 
could improve the role that Saudi Arabia plays in the Gulf region’s security. 
Henderson (2008) agrees with Cordesman, by noting that the GCC countries should 
prepare for the worst-case scenario, as any action by or against Iran could result in 
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problems with maritime traffic through or into the Gulf. Nevertheless, Henderson 
(2008) argues that Egypt has become inactive in leading the Arab World and, due to 
the increased importance gained by Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has become diplomatically 
powerful in the region through action over a number of issues in Palestine, Lebanon, 
Iraq and particularly in Iran. Both Cordesman and Henderson argue that most of the 
threats in this region come from Iran and terrorism in general, but Henderson fails to 
acknowledge whether Saudi Arabia or any of the other GCC states could work to 
improve security in the Gulf area. 
Byman (2002) argues that the conflicts and instabilities that have affected the Persian 
Gulf, for a long time, have diminished over the last decade. He also notes that the 
conventional military threats affecting their US partners are reducing; however, this is 
contested by most of the authors under review who believe that instability and threats 
to US partners have increased. It should be noted that Byman’s paper was completed 
prior to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 – thus, these findings are likely to now be 
dated. Byman also argues that many of the Gulf regimes may face increased pressure 
to cut ties with the US, particularly in terms of US military presence in the area. 
Conversely, Byman identified some of the factors that the GCC countries need to 
obtain in order to strengthen their security role in the Persian Gulf area. Similar to 
Cordesman (2009), Byman (2002) highlights some of the weaknesses of the GCC; he 
notes that these urgently need to be resolved as the first step to improving the 
situation in the region. 
Russell (2009), notes that the US’ strategy and policy in the Gulf has changed little 
over the last 20 years – any changes have occurred in response to the need for access 
to reasonably priced oil, along with the need to ensure that no unfriendly force 
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controls the region. Indeed Hajjar (2002) also believes that the US’ security strategy 
is motivated by various factors of interest, but he also notes that the securing of Israel 
is also one of the main priorities of the US in the region. Furthermore, Hajjar (2002) 
is unique in his opinion that it is likely to be difficult for any of the GCC countries to 
develop security in the Gulf area without involvement from the US. Although Hajjar 
published his paper before the US invasion of Iraq, it can be argued that he 
demonstrates a particularly realistic grasp of the subject and the area. 
Similar to Cordesman, Russell (2009) argues that the only available mechanism for 
the US is for it to work with all members of the GCC states, including Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as this will provide integration by 
strengthening collective security across the Gulf region. Nonetheless, Russell (2009), 
among other authors, acknowledges that the GCC states have failed to develop a 
significant mechanism for collective security. 
Russell (2009) also notes that conditions in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime highlighted that the US and the GCC countries needed to work together in 
order to strengthen regional security. However, other authors including Gause III 
(2003) believe that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, in America, marked a 
turning point in US relations with the GCC states, especially with Saudi Arabia, 
where the relationship was affected negatively due to subsequent events and other 
political and religious aspects. This led to an increased US military presence in Saudi 
Arabia which became less acceptable for the US and Saudi Arabia; consequently, 
according to Gause III, this could lead the US to shift its alliance to smaller Gulf 
states who might be more willing to accommodate the US military forces. Similarly, 
Saudi Arabia could also look to other major powers (not just economically), such as 
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China or India, for support as new players in world politics. Gause III’s work 
provides detailed consideration of important issues surrounding the Gulf region’s 
security. 
Peterson (2002), on the other hand, examines Saudi Arabia’s security from the Saudi 
point of view, focusing on external threats and internal challenges whereby he argues 
that Saudis view internal threats as being more serious to the state’s security.  He also 
believes that many people in Saudi Arabia regard internal developments and 
challenges as the greatest threat to Gulf security; thus, Saudi Arabia should follow a 
policy of inclusion “vis-a-vis” for Iraq and Iran, rather than simply following the 
Western emphasis on the exclusion of these states. He also argues that the 9/11 
terrorist attacks damaged cooperative relationships between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States; but, he asserts that maintaining close ties is important for both parties 
and for security in the Gulf region.  He also argues that the governments of the West 
and Saudi Arabia share the same view over the essence of Gulf security – which is to 
protect the oil. Furthermore, he also asserts that past success in coping with regional 
threats is not a guarantee for the future and that the extent of fundamental internal 
change appears to generate increasing pressures on the country, government and the 
ruling family. 
To summarise, most of the literature and approaches are based on ways to improve 
the US’ role in the Gulf region or based on the role of the US allies in the area, 
namely the GCC; thus, most of the published analyses is from an essentially Western 
perspective. In contrast, this study aims to investigate the domestic and foreign 
strategies employed by Saudi Arabia to maintain its role in regional security; 
consequently, more emphasis will be placed on the Saudi perspective. In order to 
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understand such strategies, the researcher will therefore develop notions for the 
determinants of such security issues. This summary of the literature illustrates the 
need for alternative accounts of Saudi Arabia’s internal and external security policies, 
and its role in the region. Saudi Arabia’s reactions towards its domestic and regional 
challenges will also be studied, by analysing the actions, laws, policies and practices 
that the Saudi government has undertaken to not only deal with, but maintain and 
improve upon, security for the the challenges facing the Gulf region. 
The context of how Saudi Arabia came into existence will be identified by examining 
the most important historical periods that have influenced the Arabian Peninsula and 
Saudi Arabia’s historical development. Hence, this research will focus on the Saudi 
political, economic, societal, environmental and military threats, as well as the 
regional pattern of enmity and amity. The significance of understanding how the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia originated and how the Saudi regime faces threats and 
challenges will be critical to gaining a full appreciation of their political approach to 
security. Questions such as: how the Kingdom views the current threat/situation 
within the Gulf region; how the Kingdom’s security policy works; how important the 
social elements are to Saudi security/politics; what effect/concerns do all of the three 
levels have – individual, state, system – on state security; and, what does oil 
(economy) mean to the Kingdom, will all help fundamentally in understanding the 
main question proposed by this research, which is “What are the main domestic and 
foreign strategies employed by Saudi Arabia to maintain its security within domestic 
and regional security?”. 
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3.10  Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a review of the different philosophies and theories of 
security, the meaning of security in general and national security in particular have 
also been identified. This chapter has provided a nuanced understanding of the 
insecurity dilemma facing Saudi Arabia, based on how it has manifested itself at the 
macro level, specifically in terms of the national and regional levels. A review of the 
existing literature and interviews with academics, practitioners and politicians will be 
given in the following chapters. From the extant literature review it can be argued that 
the definitions and theories of national security are continuously evolving because of 
their dynamic nature. Historically, the IR literature defines and focuses on the 
academic theories of national security based on how they have changed across three 
periods of time, in particular: during the Cold War period, in the post-Cold War 
period and in the post-9/11 era. During these phases, the IR literature has shifted its 
national security focus from the military perspective to the political, economic, 
societal and environmental perspectives. All of the theories mentioned have their own 
strengths and weaknesses, some are very relevant to specific time periods and are 
therefore not compatible to the current state of global politics. 
An analysis of the concept of national security illustrates that the concept generally 
relates to the condition of safety, for the state and society, from anything that may 
harm the idea of the state. Historically, the term security has changed with time and it 
is dependent on various political and historical assumptions. The various approaches 
toward security indicate that each approach corresponds to different values, threats 
and capabilities in order to meet the perceived challenges. Hence, the state’s interests 
and values may differ in accordance with differences in their national security. 
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However, it should be noted that the anarchy of the international environment, as 
presented by the realist approach, implies that the state must develop their own 
capabilities in accordance with other regional powers – this can be observed in the 
case of Saudi Arabia and Iran. The realist view focuses on the anarchy of the 
international system. Whereas, liberalism focuses beyond the state by considering 
other actors such as intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), non-governmental 
international organisation (NGIOs), multinational corporations and domestic actors 
(interest groups, elites and political parties); while, constructivism focuses on 
“society” as the most important referent object of security studies.  
The concept of national security, as a dynamic phenomenon, has been continuously 
evolving according to the global political situation and the policies of security at the 
regional level. Major events have occurred in the post-Cold War era, these have 
shaped the IR literature on national security. Interestingly, the traditional models have 
been heavily criticised and contested as they are one dimensional with regards to 
security; consequently, they fail to provide an examination of issues that are beyond 
the military/international organisations or the social issues. In contrast, Buzan 
proposed an integrated model which incorporates the neorealist beliefs by providing a 
detailed analysis using the constructivist approach. Buzan suggested that national 
security needs to be assessed from both the micro and macro perspectives, and the 
three different levels of security: the individual, national and system also need to be 
investigated. Such constructivists utilise an integrated approach to investigate the five 
sectors, in addition to focusing on the military perspective, the other four sectors of 
economic, political, societal and environmental are also considered to ensure that the 
specific nature of the state/issue under study is investigated. This perspective has 
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identified new perspectives that need investigation in order to fully understand state 
politics; thus, new horizons in the field of security literature have been identified. 
The fact that the different states diverge in their nature and capabilities implies that 
national security and the source of threats differ from one state to another; thus, there 
is a need for a framework of analysis to be conceptualised that could be applied to 
different states to determine their situation. Hence, this chapter has helped to identify 
the referent object of this study; in particular, this is the Saudi state’s security or Saudi 
national security. Thus, in order to analyse Saudi Arabia’s national security, the 
different internal dimension of security threats and the traditional military/external 
threats need to be considered. The framework of analysis will include the following 
security threats: political, economic, environmental and social variables as well as 
military factors as principle components. It is important to understand Saudi domestic 
and regional security policies because of the pivotal role that the Gulf region plays in 
the whole world’s economy; thus, it is an important subject of study, especially in 
light of the fact that little research has been conducted into Saudi security. This 
chapter has introduced a conceptualised framework that matches the specific criteria 
of the Saudi state by taking into account the various theoretical perspectives of 
security analysis. All in all, this has contributed to the structuring of Chapters 4 and 5 
which focus on Buzan’s framework for analysing national security, this will then be 
examined further through the data collection and analysis that will be presented in 
Chapters 6 and 7.      
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Chapter 4 
Saudi Arabian National Security: Internal Dimensions 
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4.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the first part of the adopted framework of security analysis 
which addresses the different sectors of security; this allows for a broader 
understanding of security based on levels and sectors. The three levels are: domestic, 
regional, and international. The sectors, which are addressed in Buzan’s book and also 
in the article, New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, are 
political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. These sectors affect the 
security of the state and cannot be isolated from each other when examining national 
security. Buzan argues that each one is interlinked with the others in a complex 
manner, forming a web of information that a security analyst must examine to 
understand each concept individually. Further, this examination will enable an analyst 
to understand how they affect each other on the whole. This micro/macro 
methodology is vital in obtaining a better understanding of how to deal with what 
Buzan calls the “National Security Problematic”. As Buzan, in People, State and 
Fears, stated: 
It is worth examining the character of threats within each of these sectors in 
order to try to get a general sense of the legitimate national security agenda. In 
this exercise, it is helpful to keep in mind the idea that national security is about 
the ability of state to maintain their independent identity and their functional 
integrity. It is also worth remembering that national security is a conservative 
concept inasmuch as it relates to existing states. Opinions vary strongly about the 
desirability of some states, and about the viability of others. But national security 
analysis has at least to start on the level of existing states, whether they are seen 
as desirable and viable or not (1991b: 116). 
Hence, this chapter will be divided in accordance with these five sectors. The 
meanings and assumptions relating to each sector will be explained in each chapter 
section. These meanings are consistent with Buzan’s basic assumptions, but do not go 
into detail about the arguments he discussed for each section, as most of his 
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arguments evolved around or were affected by the Cold War (the events of which 
were dominant at the time he published his works).   
Although the frameworks are workable for all states, the specific characteristics of 
each state differ; accordingly, the nature and causes of threats will also differ for each 
state. Thus, this chapter will discuss internal security threat aspects from the five 
sectors while taking into consideration the three levels of domestic, regional, and 
international system. Additionally, the state structure in each of the five sectors will 
be explained.  
The next chapter will discuss regional and international security/threats by reviewing 
each regional state under the pattern of enmity and amity, in addition to examining the 
sources of threats that it might pose or hold in the context of the other sectors. Each of 
the identified threats will be re-confirmed through semi-structured interviews later in 
Chapter 6.  
4.2  Societal Security 
Analysis of the security policy of Saudi Arabia first requires study of the main 
historical periods that have shaped and influenced Saudi society and politics, 
including the rise of Islam and Sunni and Shi’a. It is essential to comprehend the 
significant influence of the country’s social and traditional role on Saudi politics. This 
section aims to identify the most important historical periods that have influenced and 
shaped the social and cultural life of the Arabian Peninsula, including: the rise of 
Islam; the emergence of Shi’a; and the development of the various Saudi states that 
have materialised since the first Saudi state was established. The literature reviewed 
in this study demonstrates that the historical background of Saudi Arabia has not 
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always been fully recognised, despite it having a major role in shaping many of the 
current internal and regional threats, especially at the societal and political level (e.g. 
Shi’a and other social divisions). 
Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional 
patterns of language, culture, association, religious and national identity, and customs 
within acceptable conditions for evolution. However, most Western writing refers to 
Saudi Arabia as a “traditional” society; this misconception has led to a 
misunderstanding of a complicated Saudi society, which must be explained in order to 
fully understand the influence of social actors on Saudi politics (Fandy, 2001).  
It is very important for any research in the field of security and politics to understand 
the deeply rooted historical origin of Saudi Arabia. This will ultimately help in 
understanding the current status, and comprehending most of the social threats 
occurring in Saudi politics and the political attitudes of the leaders.  Islamic values 
have inspired and uniquely influenced the culture and people’s lifestyles in the Saudi 
desert. Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam. Islamic values began to emerge during 
the seventh century and have remained solid until recent years. The rise of Islam 
around 620 AD, and the subsequent religious importance of the two holiest native 
Arabian cities of Makkah (or Mecca) and Medina, in conjunction with the discovery 
of large oil reserves in the early twentieth century, have provided the rulers of this 
colony with a significant power that stretches much beyond its territories (Long, 
2005).  
Saudi Arabia is a relatively small nation, however, it holds an ancient history. King 
Abdul Aziz Al-Saud founded the modern Saudi state on September 23, 1932, after a 
campaign lasting for 30 years to unify most of the Arabian Peninsula. The unification 
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brought competing tribes together into a modern state, with differing borderlines, 
which in total covered nearly 80% of the Arabian Peninsula (Broberg, 2002). Many of 
the settled communities had lived within the peninsula for more than 6,000 years and 
interacted and related well with the nomadic tribes (Long, 2005).  
The contemporary political history of Saudi Arabia started in the mid-eighteenth 
century, by the Al Saud dynasty. Prior to this time, the country had only fractured 
regions which were governed by various local political systems. Nevertheless, to 
better understand the country’s current position, the national political history and 
regional cultural history, from the differing periods, will now be reviewed.  
4.2.1 Social Structures: Historic Origins 
4.2.1.1  Pre-Islamic Period                                                                        
4.2.1.1.1  The First Arabs 
The first people to become known as Arabs lived in northern Arabia, between the 
period of the tenth and seventh centuries BC. (This area of the Arabian Peninsula is 
known today as northern Saudi Arabia and the Syrian Desert.) The nomadic camel-
breeding tribes were linked with the oases, each of which also served as a cult centre. 
These tribes were the first recognised inhabitants of Arabia; however, history records 
the presence of people in Arabia as far back as the Stone Age (Facey, Lunde, 
McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 29).  
The southern part of Arabia has evolved significantly as a result of the continual 
contact, via the trade routes, with the outside world. Historically, the region indicates 
that it originated from the ancient culture of Dilmun, a major trading link between 
Mesopotamia (an ancient region of south-western Asia which is now part of present 
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day Iraq) and the Indus River Valley (an early civilisation in southern Asia). A 
network of trade was established between India and Africa which became known as 
the Arabia Felix. As a result of the trade routes between the Arabia Felix and Egypt, 
the trading cities in the west, collectively known as the Hijaz region, were created 
(Congress, 2006).  
By 600 BC the Arab people had created a unique civilisation. The Arabs were co-
existing with the other different great empires: the Persians, Greeks and Romans. By 
500 BC, Arabia was becoming rapidly engaged in international commerce. To 
outsiders, the Arabian Peninsula acted as a barrier between the two major economic 
areas of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and 
Pledge, 2006: 35-37).  
4.2.1.1.2  The Jahiliyyah (the Age of Ignorance) 
Despite significant achievements of the overland trade age, little survived or was 
recorded to the collective memory of the Arabs. Muslim historians viewed these 
Arabs that lived in the age of ignorance, as pagans who had changed their belief in 
one god to worship different local gods; their beliefs were embodied in natural 
features, such as dates or rocks (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006).  
The Jahiliyyah period marked the end of several centuries of commercial prosperity in 
Arabia. Overland trade was reduced and caravan towns decreased, as a result, political 
power also fell. It is probably from these times that the collective memories, 
represented by Arab traditions, began (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 
55).  
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The Arabs in the north, in the Syrian Desert, fell under the rule of the rival Persian 
and Roman Empires. Emperors in Byzantium assigned the border region of the 
western Syrian Desert, in north-western Arabia, to a series of warrior clans with Arab 
tribal confederations; this inadvertently acted as a shield against the Sasanian Persian 
Empire to the east (Lapidus, 2002: 185). The Sasanian’s maintained their 
confederation as client lords of powerful tribes in eastern Arabia; they also attempted 
to control commerce in the Gulf and Indian Ocean. By 570 AD they had taken control 
of Yemen and had placed a governor in Al-Hasa oasis to directly rule eastern Arabia. 
Other confederations continued to appear, claiming to be protectors of the trade area 
and producers of dates and grain (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 55).  
However, by the beginning of the seventh century, a process for establishing a new 
centre of political and religious influence, and identity, had begun to emerge in 
western Arabia, particularly in Makkah (Lapidus, 2002: 183). The Quraysh tribe (the 
tribe that the Prophet Muhammad belonged to) utilised their social position to invent a 
nexus and various alliances with other tribes; in doing so, Makkah became an 
important commercial and political centre. Concurrently, the Byzantium and Sasanian 
Empires had been warring, which had significantly weakened them (Facey, Lunde, 
McKinnon and Pledge, 2006). 
During this time, many of the inhabitants of Arabia, especially in Makkah, believed 
that Makkah and Ka’bah (the central place of worship towards which all Muslims 
face when in prayer to God) were sacred. Although pilgrimages to Makkah were 
performed by many of the Arabs of that time, who were pagans because it was before 
Islam emerged; these Arabs were aware that the Ka’bah had been built by the 
Prophets Abraham and his eldest son, Ishmael, to represent the house of God.  
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The Prophet Muhammad was born into a powerful family within the Quraysh tribe, 
sometime around 570 AD; this tribe had already built a commonwealth in order to 
protect their trade with Yemen and Syria. The Quraysh family was the protector of the 
Ka’bah; however, as most of the people, including the Quraysh tribe, were pagan, 
they were also surrounded by many other idols (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 
2006). 
In spite of the pagan beliefs and the success of the Quraysh commonwealth in 
Makkah, the forthcoming revelation of Islam would lead Makkah to become 
influential and central in revolutionising Arabian and Islamic affairs to the rest of the 
known world. 
4.2.1.2 The Rise of Islam and Shi’a in Arabia  
4.2.1.2.1  Early Islam 
Modern Saudi Arabia has developed from the rise of Islam; the birth of the Prophet 
Muhammad shaped Arabia (Saudi Arabia) forever. As mentioned earlier, many 
Muslims refer to the period before Islam began as “the age of ignorance”. Prior to the 
seventh century, the tribes in the Arabian Peninsula fought a series of wars around the 
central aim of gaining control of the region.  
Prophet Muhammad, with his Quraysh background – the most powerful tribe in that 
era – unified Arabia, spread Islam and brought most of the peninsula under Arab rule. 
A mixture of Arabian culture and Islam have shaped the region ever since. Prophet 
Muhammad established the first Islamic government in the region’s history. The 
Arabian Peninsula was ruled mainly by different Arab families and tribes, who 
generally believed that religion was more important than politics (Alsuud, 2002).  
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In order to spread Islam, Prophet Muhammad faced many difficulties. His own tribe 
forced him to leave Makkah after he received threats of death if he did not stop 
preaching. He established the first Muslim community in Medina, after he migrated 
from Makkah to Medina with his followers in 622 AD. Upon moving to Medina, 
Prophet Muhammad established the earliest Islamic political indenture, which became 
known as the constitution of Medina. This constitution regulated relationships 
between: the emigrants, the “Muhajirun” (those who immigrated with the Prophet to 
Medina), the supporters, the “Ansar” (those who accommodated and supported them 
when they arrived to Medina) and the rest of the inhabitants of Medina. This 
constitution also clarified the role of non-Muslims in the community of Medina. 
Three Jewish tribes became part of the commitment, which established how they 
would be treated during that time. They were given a commitment of protection and 
cohabitation if they obeyed the new laws.  
Furthermore, all members of the commitment became an equal part of the 
community, irrespective of their origin.  Those who would not accept or breached the 
commitment were expelled from Medina. To illustrate, a number of Jewish tribes 
experienced deteriorating relationships with the Muslim immigrants and, as a result, 
open conflict ensued, forcing the Jewish tribes out of the oasis (Facey, Lunde, 
McKinnon and Pledge, 2006). 
Later on, many battles with the Quraysh tribe followed, these ended when Prophet 
Muhammad captured Makkah. The situation changed suddenly at the time the Prophet 
died in 632 AD. Prophet Muhammad and his political successor Abu Bakr, possessed 
the faithfulness of almost all of Arabia. For the 30 years following the Prophet’s 
death, the caliphs (the heads of the Muslim communities) ruled the Islamic world 
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from Medina. They responded to threats that emerged from the Byzantine and Persian 
Empires by utilising alliances from the Arab tribes. Consequently, the Islamic Empire 
expanded northward into what is known today as Spain, Pakistan, and the whole of 
the Middle East (Savory, 1976: 15).  
4.2.1.2.2  Emergence of Shi’a  
Maintaining unity has been a continual challenge in the region since that era. The 
differences between the Sunni and Shi’a became evident after the death of the third 
caliph, Uthman; as a result, splits began to appear in the Islamic Empire in 656 AD. 
There has been much disagreement about the various theories as to how the Shi’a 
emerged.  
The first theory alleged that the Umayyads (661–750) and the Uthman workers in 
Syria and Egypt established a hereditary line of caliphs which were centred in 
Damascus. The Abbasids claimed a different hereditary line, centred in Kufah, in 
Iraq. Some rebels from the Abbasids revolted against Uthman, and despite the fact 
that they called for Ali ibn Abi Talib to be the new caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib, himself, 
tried to provide advice to Uthman ibn Affan to save the prestige of the Islamic state; 
unfortunately though, Uthman was killed at the hands of rebels (Facey, Lunde, 
McKinnon and Pledge, 2006).  
The second theory involves the idea that a political struggle, concerning the 
succession of Muhammad, started after his death, which was during the early history 
of Islam. According to this theory, the Shi’a were a political faction that supported the 
caliphate family of Ali and his descendants; this faction, gradually, developed into a 
religious movement.  
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Conversely, the Sunni or “ahl alsunnah wa aljam’ah” (the people of the Prophet’s 
custom and community) believed that the only successors of Prophet Muhammad 
should be heads of the community. This should have been an elected caliph, thus after 
the death of the Prophet, the selected caliph should have been, in order of importance: 
Abu Bakr, Omar, Uthman and then Ali. The Shi’a, on the other hand, believed that 
the caliphate (which they called the imam) should only become the head of the 
community if he is a descendant of Prophet Muhammad (Savory, 1976). An 
alternative perspective, which is common among some of the Sunni, views the Shi’a 
movement as an alien movement instigated by Abdullah ibn Saba, a Jew, which was 
utilised to ignite strife among the Muslims of that time by creating doubts and 
uncertainty (Lewis, 1984).  
The caliph is considered by the Sunni to be the guardian of the Shari’ah law (Islamic 
law) and it is, therefore, his duty to ensure that society is regulated accordingly. In 
contrast, the Shi’a believe that the caliph, or imam, inherits not only the Prophet’s 
spiritual knowledge, but the Shari’ah as well.  
However, the death of Uthman (the third caliph), had a marked and negative 
development on the relations with the Shi’a (the rioters), those who claimed to be 
supporters of Ali and the supporters of Uthman. The supporters of Uthman included 
Uthman’s cousin Mu’awiyah, the Governor of Syria, who refused to recognise Ali as 
the legitimate caliph because Ali refused to surrender to Uthman’s killers, because he 
was waiting to become caliph. A conflict launched in 657 AD ended with Ali 
agreeing to submit their disagreement to arbitration, where Mu’awiyah was chosen as 
caliph (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006).   
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Despite this, one of the Shi’a religious groups, known as the Kharijitte from the 
Arabic word Khawarj which means “those who opt out”, began to undertake actions 
that ended in 661 AD with the assassination of Ali, who had become the fourth 
rightfully guided caliph, as successor to Prophet Muhammad (Division, 2004: 50). Ali 
had moved from Medina to Kufah in Iraq, this movement marked the beginning of the 
Umayyads. After the death of Caliph Ali, unity among the Muslims again possessed 
new challenges. The Kufans proclaimed that Ali’s son Hasan should be the next 
caliph; however, Hasan relinquished his rights to Mu’awiyah (who had previously 
proclaimed that he was the rightful caliph after Uthman), the governor of Jerusalem.  
Mu’awiyah moved the capital of the Muslim state from Medina to Damascus in Syria. 
Although Mu’awiyah maintained his duties as caliph, he failed to resolve the 
dissatisfaction of the Shi’a. Prior to his death, he followed the advice of his council 
and chose his son, Yazid, to succeed him as caliph; however, when he died discontent 
arose again. The Shi’a refused to recognise Yazid as caliph and proclaimed that Ali’s 
son Hasan was the rightful caliph. A subsequent battle developed between the Yazid 
troops and Hasan supporters; the Shi’a were defeated and Hasan died, consequently, 
the public were outraged with Yazid (Ruthven, 1997: 52-53). The conflicts between 
the Sunni and Shi’a have continued to pose challenges throughout the ages and to the 
present day. 
Zaydiyyah is another sect of the Shi’a which began when Zaid bin Ali repeated the 
attempts of his grandfather, Al-Hussein bin Ali, and rebelled against the Umayyad 
caliph, Hisham bin Abdul-Malik. This ended in 744 when Zaid bin Ali was killed; as 
a result, his followers established a sect based on his ideas and which has become 
known as Zaydiyyah. Although the sect is Shi’a based, the Zaydiyyahs agree with the 
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Sunni’s teachings most of the time, except in holding Ali in a higher position than the 
first three caliphs. The Zaydiyyah followers can be mainly found in north Yemen by 
the borders with Saudi Arabia, they are the nearest Shi’a sect to the Sunni (but, they 
are currently warring with Yemen and Saudi Arabia) (Elsergany, 2009).  
It is worth noting, that the structures of Shi’a Islam are different from those of Sunni 
Islam. Rather than a specific school of law, there are sects founded by the followers of 
the various imams. The Twelver branch is the largest branch of the Shi’a, which has 
derived from their belief in twelve divinely ordained leaders. The second largest 
branch of the Shi’a is the Isma’ilis. Each of these branches has developed their own 
religious principles; thus leading to more disagreements within the different Shi’a 
branches, as well as with the Sunni Muslims (Lapidus, 2002). 
The Shi’a sect is recognised as being one of the most important minority sects in 
Islam; this sect is becoming stronger in some areas, especially in Iran, southern Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia (in certain parts in the east and the south), Syria and India. The Sunnis, 
until the nineteenth century, controlled much of Islamic history. Throughout history, 
there were rival challenges from the Shi’a regarding claims about the rightful caliph; 
these challenges occurred during the Umayyad and Abbasid eras and through to the 
current day. The Islamic empires during the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries 
reached much farther than anyone would have imagined. Although the Sunnis 
controlled much of Islamic history, they allowed Shi’a states to rise in various parts of 
Arabia (Saudi Arabia), Iraq and Persia (Iran) (Savory, 1976: 18-24).  
The political importance of Makkah and Medina has declined since the caliph’s 
capital was transferred to Damascus, during the Umayyad caliphate (661-750), and 
then to Baghdad, during the Abbasids caliphate (750-1258); however, the spiritual 
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significance and importance of both Makkah and Medina has remained constant 
throughout all of these times (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 91) 
4.2.1.3 The Portuguese Presence  
Portugal was the first European power to establish a presence in the Arabian 
Peninsula; it was here that they faced the Ottomans (Ross, 1989). The Portuguese 
dominated the major ports in western India and along the east coast of Africa. In 1498 
they took control of the spice and textile trade from India to the Arabian ports, which 
had an immediate effect on Arabia (Saudi Arabia) and Egypt (Facey, Lunde, 
McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 109). As a result, the Mamluk Sultan, Al-Ghawri, built 
defences around the city of Jeddah, to protect it from the Portuguese. Consequently, 
an alliance between Mamluk Sultan Al-Ghawri and the Ottomans ensued, but this 
ended abruptly when the Ottomans killed the last Mamluk in 1517 (he had served the 
Muslim Arab caliphs from the ninth to the sixteenth centuries). The Ottomans 
inherited the Mamluk domination over Yemen while continuing to oppose Portuguese 
expansion and the securing of the holy cities of Makkah and Medina (Facey, Lunde, 
McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 109).     
4.2.1.4 Arabia and the Ottomans  
In 1517, the Ottoman Empire (based in Istanbul, Turkey) established their authority 
over Al-Hejaz, including Makkah and Medina, in Arabia (Bowen, 2008: xi). They 
assumed the position of serving the holy cities and each year, at the time of the annual 
Hajj, the pilgrims and officials and their military attendants would express their 
protection with a ceremony from the imperial heartland to Makkah; a governor was 
based in the port of Jeddah on the Red Sea, but there was no official representation 
from Istanbul (Champion, 2003).  
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The local families in Arabia were recognised as holding the power. While in Al-
Hejaz, the head of the Al-Sharif family, who was the current ruler of Makkah, was 
charged with rulership for the Ottoman sultan. As a result, their authority was 
extended from Khaybar (an oasis some 95 miles to the north of Medina) to Tihamah 
(which borders Yemen and the eastern province in the south). An Ottoman governor 
was now in control of Al-Hasa and, because of the Portuguese attacks on Bahrain, he 
remained in charge until the Bani Khalid tribe expelled him in 1663 (Facey, Lunde, 
McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 113).  
The Ottomans maintained control of Al-Hejaz with the suzerainty of the Sharif of 
Makkah. However, the growing British maritime power to the east of the Arabian 
Peninsula challenged the Ottomans in the area, and throughout the 1600s the tribes of 
Al-Hejaz and Najd were on the move. By the beginning of the 1700s, an alliance was 
formed between the ruler of Al-Dariya in Najd, Muhammad ibn Saud, and the 
religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. As a result, the first successful 
movement against the Ottoman rule was launched, and out of this came the 
foundation of the first Saudi state (Champion, 2003). 
4.2.2 The Emergence of the First Saudi State and “Wahhabism”  
The Al-Saud family emerged as dominant within late Saudi Arabia’s history. Both the 
Bani Khalid rulers of Al-Hasa and the Al-Sharif of Makkah attempted to expand their 
control over Najd; however they both failed to conquer Najd and bring it into their 
realm. The Al-Saud family originated from Najd, a small town near Riyadh. Najd 
itself was not an attractive region because it only produced small volumes of dates 
and livestock. However, in 1727, a member of the Al-Saud family, Muhammad ibn 
Saud, became recognised as the town’s leader (Al-Rasheed, 2002: 15). The Al-Saud 
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family were recognised because they agreed with the teachings of the Muslim scholar 
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab.  
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab preached against leaders and traditions, in favour of 
returning people to the simple and right beliefs, without idols and fallacy worshiping; 
he ultimately believed that political power could be utilised to implement his 
theologies (Alsuud, 2002). His preaching mirrored the teachings of the well-known 
scholar Ahmad ibn Taimiya, who was inspired by one of the four founders of the 
Sunni school of Islamic jurisprudence, Ahmad ibn Hanbal. Their theology called for 
the strict application of the early Islamic laws which specified absolute unity of Allah 
(God) and the missions of his Prophet, Muhammad, while maintaining strict living 
without indulgences, such as smoking and music (Safran, 1985: 9).  
The followers of ibn Abd al Wahhab referred to themselves as “Al-Muwahhidun” 
meaning the people of unity or the believers in one God. His followers knew 
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab as “Almujaddid” which means the reformer 
(Champion, 2003). The common use of the term “Salafi”, meaning the Sunni Islamic 
movement which encompasses the above followers, only came into use during the late 
nineteenth century (Niblock, 2006).   
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, who belonged to a Najdi tribe called Banu Tamim, 
was not from a wealthy family.  However, they did produce many religious scholars. 
Following his forefathers’ path, ibn Abd al Wahhab travelled to Medina, Basra and 
Al-Hasa to study religious education, he then returned to his hometown of Uyaynah, 
where his father was a judge, to preach his new message (Al-Rasheed, 2002).    
102	  	  
However, by 1744 he arrived in Dar’iyya seeking new support after the ruler from his 
hometown had expelled him due to his reform actions. Here he found a new political 
partner in Muhammad ibn Saud; and together they established a state ruled according 
to Islamic principles (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 117). Their alliance 
was established based on Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab’s religious legitimacy, and 
Muhammad ibn Saud’s willingness to undertake jihad in defence of ibn Abd al 
Wahhab’s principles to extend his rule beyond Najd.  
The reformist movement, under the hegemony of Al-Saud, spread the religious 
message. Those who accepted Wahhabism were asked to swear allegiance and show 
their loyalty by agreeing to fight; in contrast, those who resisted were vulnerable to 
raids. The same procedure of recruitment was also used for the tribal confederation 
(Al-Rasheed, 2002). By the death of Muhammad ibn Saud in 1765, his forces had 
established the first Saudi state, with the help of ibn Abd al Wahhab, and with it Al-
Saud had political authority over most of Najd (Safran, 1985: 10).  
Muhammad ibn Saud’s son, Abd al Aziz, took over in 1765 and broadened the realm 
by controlling an area that is relative to that of the modern Saudi Arabia. It reached 
from the frontiers of Damascus to the north, to the Rub Al-Khali desert in the south, 
as far as the Red Sea in the west and, in the east, as far as the Gulf (Alsuud, 2002).  
The areas currently known as Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were, at 
this time, subject to the control of the Wahhabists under Saudi rule. Parts of Yemen, 
on the Red Sea coast, were also part of the Saudi dominion. Furthermore, the famous 
cities of Makkah and Taif in Al-Hejaz came under the Saudi sovereign in 1802 and 
1803, respectively (Champion, 2003: 26)  
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Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab died in 1792 and Abdul Aziz died in 1803, shortly 
before the capture of Makkah. However, Abdul Aziz’s son, Saud, who was the 
military commander and, subsequently, responsible for the majority of the invasions, 
became the ruler of the Saudi state that had initial been developed by his grandfather. 
Saud’s rule witnessed the establishing, to its widest extent, of the large first Saudi 
state which encompassed the taking of Medina, Yanbu, and Asir (Alsuud, 2002).  
The capturing of the holy cities motivated the Ottoman government, in 1811, to start 
recapturing Al-Hijaz from Al-Saud. With the help of the Egyptian forces, the 
Ottomans fought on behalf of the sultan, and by 1814, they had free control of 
Makkah and Medina. By late November 1818, the rule of Al-Saud was in demise, the 
Ottomans had seized Dariya, the centre of the Al-Saud rule, and destroyed local forts 
and all of Al-Saud’s defences, thus bringing an end to the first Saudi state. However, 
these events were significant in the reconstituting of the Saudi state in the twentieth 
century. This was especially prudent in developing military forces which re-partnered 
the religious and political elements (which had previously been established by 
Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab in 1744), this will be 
discussed further later in the chapter (Niblock, 1982: 12).  
4.2.3 The Second Saudi State (1824-1891) 
Following a five-year period of Egyptian intervention, in 1823, the second generation 
of Al-Saud ruler’s repossessed political control over the Najd region. The leader, 
Turki ibn Abd Allah rebuilt Riyadh and established it as the new centre of Al-Saud 
power (Alsuud, 2002: 42). It was here that Al-Saud successfully masterminded the 
rise of the second state and resisted the Egyptian attempts to regain a foothold in the 
region; they re-joined military resources and collected tributes, but they had less 
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ambition for territorial conquering than the first state (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and 
Pledge, 2006). 
During the second state, Al-Saud maintained their new power and avoided clashes 
with the Ottomans and Egyptians in the Al-Hejaz; however, with the increasing power 
of the British along the Gulf, they could only control Najd and Al-Hasa (Safran, 
1985).  
During the rule of Fasial ibn Turki (the grandson of Muhammad ibn Saud who 
founded the first Saudi state), the Al-Saud’s faced a dramatic move from the 
Ottomans who were in the process of regaining control of Najd. Concurrently, the Al-
Saud’s were experiencing internal conflicts with the rise of the rival Al-Rashid family 
of Hail. The Al-Rashid family received support from the Ottomans to gain control of 
Riyadh, which resulted in the Al-Saud’s being driven from Najd in 1891 – they 
temporarily resided in Kuwait and the Al-Rashid were declared to be the new 
governors of Riyadh (Niblock, 1982: 12). 
4.2.4 The Third Saudi State: Establishing a Modern State 
While exiled in Kuwait, King Abdul Aziz laid the foundations for the modern state of 
Saudi Arabia. Eleven years after the elimination of the second state he managed to re-
impose the rule of Al-Saud. It was in January 1902 that King Abdul Aziz led a small 
force and entered Riyadh secretly at night; they killed the Al-Rashid governor of 
Riyadh, and his guards, and secured a foothold in Najd. This was the first step in the 
conquest of the area and eventually led to the declaration of the modern Saudi state 
(Champion, 2003: 37). 
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Unlike most of the other Arab countries, Saudi Arabia existed independently of 
Western leadership. Upon capturing Riyadh, King Abdul Aziz cultivated his 
connections and established himself as the imam, the Al-Saud leader. King Abdul 
Aziz organised and was helped by the desert warriors to promote a unified state under 
the rule of Islam, using political, social, and military means (Pterson, 2002). 
Throughout the following 25 years, Abdul Aziz cautiously extended his authority. He 
gained control of most of the areas around Najd which ended with the conquest of Al-
Hejaz in 1924. With British support, the King fought many battles with the Al-Rashid 
tribes, the Ottomans and with other local tribes. After nearly 30 years, Al-Saud finally 
gained control of the majority of the Arabian Peninsula (Champion, 2003: 38).  
4.2.5  Social Threats and Challenges 
Despite Saudi Arabia having such a grounded and ancient history, it has, over recent 
decades, experienced rapid social changes that have never been recorded before 
(Lacey, 2009). During the visit of the French President to Saudi Arabia in 1965, 
Charles De Gaulle, asked whether Saudi Arabia was a nation or a collection of tribes. 
His ambassador responded: “It is a collection of tribes in the process of becoming a 
nation” (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 22). Perhaps this insight 
highlights the modern Saudi state: while the huge oil revenues have also generated 
social and economic evolution for the country. 
In the past, borderlines and boundaries were meaningless and sovereignty was based 
on a tribe’s commitment to search for areas with water; these bloodlines lived over 
the whole Gulf region (Long, 2005). However, with the emergence of the Saudi state 
and the discovery of oil throughout the Gulf region, boundaries became more 
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strategically important and many of these people, the Bedouin, moved into settled 
residencies. Some of the Bedouin remain nomadic, but they now use cars in their 
transportation and use government-sponsored watering points, they also visit 
government health clinics and send their children to government-funded schools, thus 
reflecting their allegiance to their tribe, but with a strong consciousness and allegiance 
to their Saudi nation (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006).  
The roles and rights of women are restricted by some people in Saudi Arabia due to 
certain cultural preferences, while others advocate more women’s rights and roles; 
generally speaking, the government is still cautious when implementing laws and 
having discussions that relate to women. Additional dilemmas rise at the international 
level. When the United Nations put pressure on the Saudi government to give more 
roles and rights to women, they do not consider the internal dimensions of 
social/cultural values and rules. Which shows how social security can be affected by 
external values, which can extend to form a political threat (which will be discussed 
later in section, 4.3).  
There are several factors that distinguish Saudi Arabia from its other Gulf neighbours: 
firstly, Saudi Arabia has never been under the control of a European power, whereas 
other states in the area have; and secondly, the first Saudi state, and the influence of 
Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, was more significant and had a greater impact in 
Saudi Arabia than in any of the other neighbouring countries.        
By the 1940s, oil revenues led Saudi Arabia to make huge developments in 
transportation and communication technologies, as well as in developing a new 
modern lifestyle. Sudden modernisation has caused rapid social change, yet this 
seems to have had a minimal effect on Saudi culture. Traditional values have been 
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preserved because of the strong links that the culture has to its powerful Islamic and 
Arabic roots (Long, 2005).  
The main unique feature of Saudi society is that it is tribal. Conservative origins and 
values of certain tribes significantly affect political interactions in Saudi Arabia (Al-
Habbas, 1999). Oil and modern systems of education created rapid social change as 
the social structures became more diversified. The rapid pace of modernisation, 
combined with oil revenues which have led to vast wealth, have threatened to affect 
the conservative nature of the Saudi society. It has also created a new middle class 
that includes newly educated elements and businessmen. These new elements have 
become interested in political participation and have caused pressure points for the 
government (Al-Habbas, 1999). Further discussion of the influence of cultural aspects 
on political decision-making is discussed in-depth later in this chapter.  
Another important social change has involved the urbanisation of the population. 
Regional and tribal discrimination could also be a source of social division (Pterson, 
2002). In terms of ethnicity, 90% of the Saudi population are Arab and 10% are Afro-
Asian (Congress, 2006: 7).  
Saudi Arabia’s conservative society is also influenced by external factors. Satellite 
television and the Internet have allowed citizens to absorb information from sources 
other than government-controlled media (Pterson, 2002). According to the 2010 US 
State Department’s annual report, Saudis currently have access to previously banned 
television broadcasts. The government monitors Internet sites for material that is 
regarded as pornographic, politically offensive, or anti-Islamic; although, Internet 
users in Saudi Arabia can access most of these banned sites by connecting through 
non-governmental monitored servers. In addition, the government has recently created 
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an appeals process, through the Internet, through which citizens can request that a 
particular website should not be blocked.  
Newspapers in Saudi Arabia are privately owned, however, they are financed and 
controlled by the government. The government owns and operates the official radio 
and television broadcasts in Saudi Arabia. The mass media is also censored to remove 
any material that is considered unpleasant or offensive by the standards of Islam, this 
includes references to alcohol and sex. The Basic Law states that the role of the media 
is to educate and encourage national unity. Although self-censorship continues to be a 
method of self-preservation for the Saudi media, government censorship appears to be 
decreasing (Congress, 2006).  
While the recent wave of protests and demonstrations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
has not changed the political landscape in the country as in other Arab countries, such 
as Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the Internet freedom landscape in the Kingdom has no 
doubt changed considerably over the past year. Inspired by the Arab Spring events in 
2011, millions of people in Saudi Arabia flooded social media sites, such as 
Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, and hundreds, if not thousands, participated in 
political campaigns to demand political, social, and economic reforms, encouraging 
the emergence of innumerable political activists on social media. Overall, the 
emergence of these political activists added more difficulties for the Saudi 
government by forcing the government to take immediate steps to respond to what it 
regarded as a national security threat.  
On the other hand, Shi’as in Saudi Arabia have protested against discrimination and 
for political rights numerous times before during the last few decades. But most of the 
past protests by Shi’as in Saudi Arabia arose in response to Iranian leaders. Since the 
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Iranian revolution, the Khomeini and other Iranian leaders have repeatedly called for 
revolution in the Gulf to overthrow Gulf rulers. Khomeini and other Iranian leaders 
publicly declared that the ruling families of the Gulf region were irreligious, corrupt, 
and pawns of the West (Byman, 2002).  Iran also beamed a radio signal into Saudi 
Arabia, encouraging Saudis to revolt against Al-Saud. In response, local security 
forces in the Eastern Province began detaining Shi’as suspected of coordinating with 
Iran.  All of this strengthened the role of the Shi’as in Saudi Arabia and, as a result, 
they reformed their earlier modest political objectives and embraced revolutionary 
politics: the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (OIR). 
Since its establishment in late 1979, through the late 1980s, it has called for the 
overthrow of the House of Saud (Jones, 2009: 15-17). However, the 2011 Arab 
Spring uprisings gave new impetus to such movements. Saudi Arabia now faces a 
new wave of protesters in the eastern city of Qatif. Despite bans on demonstrations, 
Shi’a Muslims in the eastern part of the country have continued to stage protests, 
demanding political changes. 
The majority of the country’s population are Sunni Muslims, as are the majority of 
Muslims worldwide. Despite this, a significant Shi’a community, of approximately 
1.5 million, reside in the Al-Hasa region in the Eastern Province, and further Shi’a 
live in the small Shi’a community of Najran on the Yemen border (Long, 2005: 4). 
The presence of Shi’a elements in the social structure of the Saudi Sunni state means 
that political and social consequences will be inevitable. The Shi’a practices are 
considered misguided acts. The Shi’a have always shown their discontent; they have 
always felt that they have been discriminated against both politically and 
economically, which has caused riots and uprisings from time to time.   
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Islam is recognised as the country’s official religion, and as a result Islamic law has 
shaped the basis for the legal codes within the country. The two holy sites of Islam, 
Makkah (Mecca) and Medina, make Saudi Arabia the most valued nation on earth to 
the Muslim world. The Saudi Ministry of Hajj (pilgrimage to Makkah is the largest in 
the world)2 is a major element in why Saudi Arabia claims to be the leader of the 
Islamic world. Consequently, Islam has been vital to the Saudi royal family’s 
legitimacy. The King proudly carries the title of “the custodian of the two holy 
places”.  
The religious establishment holds a significant central role and influence in Saudi 
Arabia; the government must often engage with the Council of the Senior Ulama in 
order to get their approval when introducing new innovations. But the emergence of 
anti-government and radical Islamists has created a divergence between the 
government and the religious establishment (Pterson, 2002: 47). On the other hand, 
pilgrimage usually engages over 2.5 million people and the annual pilgrimage is 
therefore very prosperous and a major part of the country’s regime (Marshall, 2006: 
90). The Saudi government allocates a large annual budget for providing the required 
infrastructure for the pilgrimage sites. This encourages the dissemination of Islam 
throughout the world, and helps with the establishment of welfare programmes and 
the construction of new mosques in the name of Islam. 
To summarise, the following list highlights some of the most notable social threats to 
Saudi Arabia:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The fifth pillar of Islam, the Five Pillars of Islam is the term given to the five duties compulsory on 
every Muslim. These duties are Shahadh (profession of faith), Salah (prayers), Zakah (giving of 
donations), Sawm (fasting, specifically during Ramadan) and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). 
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1. Rapid social change: the discovery of oil and a climate of modern education 
introduced rapid social change as social structures became more diversified. 
The rapid pace of modernisation combined with oil revenues threatened to 
affect the conservative nature of society. It also created a new middle class 
that included newly educated people and businessmen who became interested 
in political participation and caused pressures for the government. 
2. Urbanisation of the population: urbanisation is another important social 
change that could be considered a risk to the cultural identity of Saudi Arabia.  
3. Social division: this is an important social threat. The division of the Saudi 
nation into regional, tribal, and ideological sects has caused many social 
difficulties that extend to the government in terms of making policies. 
Difficulties such as discrimination and ideological conflicts between the 
conservatives and liberalists are the most apparent (these conflicts are further 
discussed under the political structure category due to their extended influence 
on state politics). Society, in general, depends on a multiplicity of ideas and 
sects and such a variety is common in many cultures; the problem here arises 
from the attempts by each group to oust each other – this is what threatens 
these naturally diverse identities. 
4. Elements that can generate a culture of extremism: factors such as opening 
up or making transformations to society or state politics are seen by some to 
be a threat to religious and social principles. This may be at the individual 
level, such as giving women greater roles in the labour market, or at the state 
government level which could involve women mixing with men and appearing 
in the media, or at the state level such as adopting Western policies that 
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involve aspects of Western values that would affect the religious and social 
values of the Saudi state. All of these could lead to extremist reactions from 
groups that use conservative/religious values as justification to establish 
extremist terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and other outlawed extremist 
groups (due to the impact of terrorism going beyond internal state elements, 
terrorism will be discussed in the following chapter as part of regional and 
international threats). This shows that in some cases the individual level can 
play an important role in Saudi security, whether or not the government or the 
state level approve.  
5. The influence of external factors on Saudi society traditions: Satellite 
television and the Internet has allowed citizens to absorb information from 
sources other than government controlled media. The mass media is also 
censored to remove any material that is considered unpleasant or offensive by 
the standards of Islam, this includes references to alcohol and sex. Many 
consider the Western values that are imposed through the media damaging to 
the conservatives values of Saudi society. 
6. The Shi’a component in Saudi Arabia and the impact of their loyalty to 
other states on Saudi social coherence: The majority of the country’s 
population are Sunni Muslims, as are the majority of Muslims worldwide. 
Despite this, a significant Shi’a community, of approximately 1.5 million, 
reside in the Al-Hasa region in the Eastern Province, and further Shi’a live in 
the small Shi’a community of Najran on the Yemen border. Shi’a elements in 
the social structure of the Sunni Saudi state will lead to inevitable political and 
social consequences. Sunnis consider the Shi’a practices to be misguided. The 
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Shi’a have always shown their discontent toward Sunni practices. This makes 
them feel excluded from the Saudi social structure and leads to them feeling 
more associations with Iraq and Iran, where similar religious beliefs are 
shared. This can and will always affect social security and can cause threats 
that extend as far as political security by forming political threats (the Shi’a 
influence on Saudi Arabian policymaking is discussed in the political section).  
7. The roles and rights of women: this issue is creating a divide within Saudi 
Arabia at the domestic level (conservatives and activists) that arises from 
social, cultural, and religious preferences and also at the international level 
(e.g. the United States). In general, it affects social and political security 
sectors at both domestic and international levels of security. 
8. The cultural effects of foreign workers: many Indian and Filipino workers, 
North Arabian teachers, and Asian nannies have introduced different cultural 
behaviours which are gradually becoming integrated within the culture and 
attitudes of the growing generation of young Saudis.  
4.3  Political Security 
According to the adopted framework, political security concerns the organisational 
stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them 
legitimacy. Hence, in this section, the political factors and difficulties that arise due to 
the foundation of the current Saudi state are discussed. The segment also provides a 
clear view of the political dynamics and the process of policymaking in Saudi Arabia. 
In addition, this section shows the most important players in Saudi politics and 
outlines the ideologies that give the state its legitimacy.  
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4.3.1  Early Creation of State Challenges 
In 1932, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia officially became a state (the current structure 
of the Saudi political system will be discussed later in this chapter); however it faced 
severe economic constriction during the late 1920s and early 1930s.  
The basic security concern that always faced King Abdul Aziz was how to maintain 
the empire that he had created out of the many diverse regions and tribes. According 
to Safran (1985: 59) “His only way to maintain intertribal peace and acquiescence in 
his rule was a strategy based on deterrence, diplomacy, and blandishment”. 
The most serious challenge for King Abdul Aziz was the hostility experienced from 
the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan (Jordan), who had been divested, by 
King Abdul Aziz, of their Al-Hejaz patrimony. Hence, King Abdul Aziz developed an 
intelligent strategy where he recruited the British to contain this Hashemite threat. 
When the British became less able and willing to continue their role, he utilised his 
recently discovered oil wealth to establish a security guarantee from the US, in order 
to gain diplomatic allies and to build up a new security instrument to deter internal 
and external threats (Safran, 1985).    
The importance of the US/Saudi partnership was reflected in the meeting on the 14 
February 1945, between President Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz. Most historians, 
and government officials, believe that the two leaders agreed an unconfirmed alliance 
(where the US would protect Saudi rule in return for a Saudi promise to uphold the 
US dominance on the Saudi oil fields) (Yeomans, 2004: 15-16).  
By the end of the Second World War (1945), Saudi Arabia had joined Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, as Palestinian people who wanted to found an Arab League 
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which would protect the individual Arab States (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and 
Pledge, 2006: 152).  
While creating a modern state, King Abdul Aziz remained a strong leader; he 
maintained public support through his open door policy with his traditional “majlis” – 
public receptions. He was supported because he developed and maintained a 
comprehensive welfare state, which still exists today. Upon his death in 1953, his first 
son succeeded him as King Saud; in contrast, his reign was largely characterised by 
wasteful state expenditures which placed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in debt. In 
1962, the royal family and the ulama (the Muslim scholars who were recognised as 
having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology), responded to the 
public’s discontent and, based on King Saud’s ill health, managed to depose Saud and 
appointed his half-brother Faisal as king (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 
154-158).  
King Faisal’s reign (1964-75) was known for its developments and modernisations 
with technologies from the West and with a rise in public education. He increased 
diplomatic relations within the Arab world and on an international level. He is well 
remembered for the Arab oil boycott, which he led against the US (Champion, 2003). 
In 1975, King Faisal was assassinated by one of his nephews, thus leading to an 
internal dispute over the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; his half-brother, Khalid, 
succeeded him and reigned until his death in June 1982. King Fahd followed and 
ruled until 2005. King Fahd then was succeeded by King Abdullah, the current king 
(Al-Rasheed, 2002). 
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4.3.2  The Political System 
4.3.2.1 State Constitution 
The establishment of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by ibn Saud set about a 
new political era. In 1953, King Abdul Aziz established the Council of Ministers. 
During its history the Council of Ministers regulated policies for the Kingdom while 
also formulating state policy regarding both domestic and foreign affairs. It also led to 
the execution of policies related to the national economy, education, social welfare, 
and most public affairs. Focusing on the needs of the Saudi citizens, Saudi 
governmental agencies experienced a great deal of expansion during the 1980s. The 
Council of Ministers consists of the King, who is also the Prime Minister, the Crown 
Prince who is Deputy Prime Minister, the Second Deputy Prime Minister and Cabinet 
ministers (Ansary, 2008).  
According to Alshamsi (2011), until 1992 Saudi Arabia was without a written 
constitution. In March 1992, a committee was formed in order to prepare a new 
constitution. Then, King Fahad announced three fundamental laws which changed the 
domestic political environment, these are:  
• The Basic System of Governance 
• The Consultative Council Law 
• The Regional Law 
The Basic System of Governance or the Saudi Basic Law is the most important 
constitutional document of the three fundamental laws launched in 1992. It articulates 
the government’s rights and responsibilities and places state legitimacy on a Sunni 
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Islamic foundation (Alshamsi, 2011). The Basic Law is a constitution code that is 
divided into nine chapters, consisting of 83 articles. The law covers the following: the 
law of governance, the values of Saudi society, and the financial affairs of the state. 
The royal decree asserts that Saudi Arabia is a fully sovereign Arab Islamic state, its 
religion is Islam, its constitution is the Book of God, its language is Arabic and the 
city of Riyadh is the capital. It also states that the system of governance in Saudi 
Arabia is a monarchy based on the Shura Council, according to Islamic Shari’ah. It 
covers authorities in the state which consist of executive authority, judicial authority 
and regulatory authority. The King is the supreme governor of these authorities, and 
councils headed by the King and Crown Prince are open to all citizens. It also denotes 
family as the nucleus of Saudi society and considers that its members should be 
brought up on the basis of the Islamic creed and its requirement of allegiance and 
obedience to God, to His Messenger and to those in authority. It also deals with the 
economic principles, and the state’s financial affairs (The US Department of State, 
2011). 
Although Saudi Arabia has hereditary succession, in October 2006, King Abdullah 
created an Allegiance Commission, which is a new succession law that amends the 
1992 Basic Law. The Allegiance Commission is a committee of princes that decide 
who will play a role in selecting future kings – it is composed of some 35 sons and 
grandsons of ibn Saud (Cordesman, 2009: 9-10). 
4.3.3  Authorities of the State 
According to Article 44 in the Basic Law of Governance, the authorities of the State 
consist of: 
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• The Executive Authority 
• The Regulatory Authority 
• The Judicial Authority 
4.3.3.1 The Executive Branch 
The executive branch consists of the King, the Council of Ministers, local 
governments, ministry subsidiaries, and other public, independent and quasi-
independent agencies. The King is also the prime minister, chief of state, the head of 
government, and commander in chief of the military of Saudi Arabia. The King 
appoints the King’s Cabinet, or Council of Ministers, every four years. The Council 
of Ministers is the direct executive authority in the Kingdom. According to the Law of 
the Council of Ministers, the Council of Ministers is headed by the Prime Minister 
(the King) and has the power to deal with the nation’s internal, external, general 
affairs, financial, economic, educational, and defence policies. It has final authority 
over the executive and administrative affairs of all ministries and other government 
agencies.  
Article 24 of the Law of the Council of Ministers states clearly that the Council of 
Ministers also has the authority to monitor the implementation of regulations, by-laws 
and resolutions while following up on the implementation of the general plan for 
development. Article 24 also states that the Council of Ministers has the power to 
form committees that oversee the ministries’ and other governmental agencies’ 
conduct of business, or other governmental agencies, or any specific case which 
might be brought to its attention.  
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Regional Law was also launched in 1992 and divides the country into 13 regions that 
take into consideration the population, geography, security, environment and means 
of transportation. The Regional Law declares in Article 1, that the aim of the Law of 
Regions is to improve the standard of administrative work and development in the 
Kingdom. It also aims to preserve law and order, the rights of citizens and their 
freedom within the framework of Islamic Shari’ah. The law also indicates that each 
region should enjoy considerable financial and administrative independence.  
4.3.3.2 Legislative (Regulatory) Branch 
This is made up of Majlis al Shura (Consultative Council), which according to Majlis 
al Shura Law is entitled to propose new laws and amend current laws. It also has 
authority to approve international treaties, agreements, regulations and concessions. 
Article 44 in the Basic Law of Governance identifies that the King has the ultimate 
authority over all state authorities, including the legislative authority.  
King Fahad decreed the by-laws of the council and their supplements on 22 Aug 1993 
(Alsuud, 2002: 9). The first period council (1993–1997) had 60 members. The 
membership of Majlis al Shura was increased by 30 members in each of the second, 
third, and fourth terms. In the second term, the council consisted of a speaker and 90 
members. In the third term, the council included a speaker and 120 members. In the 
fourth term, the council consisted of a speaker and 150 members (Majlis Ash-Shura, 
2011). The Consultative Council has 12 committees that deal with human rights, 
education, culture, information, health and social affairs, services and public utilities, 
foreign affairs, security, administration, Islamic affairs, economy and industry, and 
finance (Ansary, 2008). 
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According to Shura Council Law the number of newly selected members shall not be 
less than half of the current council, which must be changed every four years. Shura 
Council Law states that meetings of the Shura Council shall not be valid and will not 
be able to approve a legislative proposal or amendment without a quorum of at least 
two-thirds of members, including the speaker or whoever deputises. Resolutions shall 
not be considered valid without a majority approval. The law also states that the 
resolutions of the Shura Council are subject to review by the King, who decides 
which resolutions will be referred to the Council of Ministers. If the views of both the 
Shura Council and the Cabinet are in agreement, the resolutions are issued once the 
King has granted his approval. The two Councils and the King must approve every 
legislative proposal or amendment which becomes law. 
4.3.3.3 Judicial Branch 
The current Saudi court system is governed and justice is administered according to 
Islamic Law (Shari’ah) and comprises the Supreme Judicial Council, Courts of 
Appeals, and First-Instance Courts (General Courts and Summary Courts). Saudi 
Arabia also has an administrative judicial body known as the Board of Grievances. 
The Board of Grievances stands at the side of the Courts System and is associated 
directly with the King. Each of these judicial bodies has jurisdiction over cases 
brought before it in accordance with the law. In addition, the Saudi legal system has 
several administrative committees that adjudicate civil, commercial, administrative 
and criminal cases. The judicial jurisdiction of each committee is always determined 
by the decree which constituted it.  
Justice is administered by a system of religious courts whose judges are appointed by 
the King on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council. Law protects the 
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judiciary independence. The King acts as the highest court of appeal and has the 
power to pardon. In 2007, a royal order approved changes to the judicial system. The 
changes included the establishment of a Supreme Court and special commercial, 
labour and administrative courts. The new regulations abolished the existing Courts of 
Appeal and established new Courts of Appeal in the Kingdom’s provinces which 
exercise their jurisdiction through labour, commercial, criminal, personal, and civil 
circuits. Moreover, First-Degree Courts were established in areas, regions and centres, 
according to the needs of the system, and exercise their jurisdiction through 
specialised criminal, commercial, labour, personal, and general courts. Some of these 
courts oversee disputes that had previously been addressed by special administrative 
committees (Ansary, 2008).  
4.3.4  Political dynamics and state nature 
According to Alshamsi (2011), the Saudi political system consists of institutions, 
trends and key powers, and include: 
1. The Royal House 
2. The Council of Ministers 
3. Majlis al Shura (the Consultative Council) 
4. Hay’at Kibar al Ulama (the Council of the Senior Ulama) (Muslim scholars 
specialising in knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology) 
These four influential and central components of the Saudi political system (and their 
inherent system ideologies) revolve around Islamism, nationalism and liberalism, 
which influences the Saudi political system and Saudi society.  
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The royal family, however, places their own protection among the highest priorities, 
in addition to protecting their citizens, and they are regarded as the only guarantor for 
state security. Saudi Arabia has no parliament, though it does have a consultative 
assembly consisting of citizens represented by the Majlis al-Shura.  
The specific political and social nature of the Saudi state and that of the King affect 
the state’s political system. Given the state and the King’s religious and traditional 
role in policymaking, as well as the conflict between conservatives (Islamists) and 
liberalist (reformers) in Saudi society, the King must be in charge of the royal family 
and Saudi society and is the supreme authority in the country. His duty is to make 
decisions while ensuring the distribution of national wealth. The King derives his 
authority from the Holy Book (Quran) and Sunna (the traditional portion of Muslim 
law based on Muhammad’s words or actions) and, therefore, all powers of the state 
are under his control. Saudi Arabia levies no taxes on its citizens, apart from the 
religious tithe known as “zakat” (a 2.5% annual donation of private capital to charity 
and other public purposes). Hence, Islamism remains part of state policy. Official 
domestic Islamic policy can be advanced in the Council of Ministers through Islamic 
Ministers in charge of Islamic affairs. The Islamic voice is also heard in the Saudi 
Consultative Council where Islamic figures are members of the Council, and through 
the Council of the Senior Ulama, which also can influence Saudi politics. However, 
Alshamsi (2011) asserts that Saudi nationalism can be developed not only within the 
frameworks of Islamism, but also within other ideological frameworks where 
royalists, Islamists and liberals all speak of nationalism.    
Tensions in Saudi Arabia arise from political and religious differences as well as 
regional variances. The Saudi regime can and has experienced conflict, differences 
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and tensions with the Islamic reformists within Saudi society, but they have also 
become strong allies. However, four major domestic players can also be identified as 
having an influence on Saudi politics:  
1. Sunni political activism (which itself takes on many forms, from moderate 
voices, conservatives, to militant Jihad ideologies) 
2. Liberals 
3. Shi’a minorities 
4. Tribal and regional politics. 
4.3.5 Political Threats  
Islamist reformist groups would like to see Saudi political and socioeconomic aspects 
transformed to be more in line with Islamic values. The liberals seek for more 
attention to be paid to the problems with the regime, which some may regard as being 
in line with Western-style human rights and greater political representation. The 
liberals also object to the revered alliance between the ruling family and the ulama 
that has lasted since the establishment of the first Saudi state. The Shi’a, as discussed 
earlier, would like full recognition of their status and integration into the political 
landscape. These groups often have criticisms and grievances, not only with the 
regime, but also with each other (Beranek, 2009).  
The presence of the Shi’a minority in Saudi Arabia could create internal problems, 
especially with their great loyalty to Iran, which in turn could weaken their allegiance 
to Saudi Arabia, and could have a negative effect on social cohesion; this will not 
serve in the best interests of Saudi Arabia.  
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Satisfying each parties’ policies and agendas, creates extra demands for the state and 
make the Saudi government more cautious when policymaking; this also affects the 
Kingdom’s domestic and international behaviour. For many decades, the Saudi 
government has had to struggle with tensions between religious conservatives and 
social customs, and liberals and the need for change. During the 1990s, the Saudi 
Islamic movement started identifying official liberal influences within the Saudi 
political system. But, after 9/11, the Saudi Islamic movement started viewing liberal 
trends as representing interests associated with external and international players, 
such as the US government. This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that the 
US government has supported liberal trends in the Islamic world as a means through 
which to lead change and reform. On the opposite side of the fence, the Saudi liberals 
view Saudi Islamic conservatives as being “extremist” and provoking terrorism 
(Alshamsi, 2011: 20).  
An examination of the politics of Saudi Islamism and Saudi liberalism is relevant to a 
theory that suggests that there is an essential influence of both trends on the whole of 
the Saudi political sphere. The conflicts between the conservatives and liberalists can 
take many forms and mainly take place in the media and the social arena, but Saudi 
royalist leaders tend to take a neutral position. However, sometimes they aim to apply 
containment policies to both, by applying some Islamic policies which will satisfy 
conservative voices, or sometimes applying policies classified as liberal by 
conservatives.  
This, by itself, raises the dilemma of the Saudi monarchy that involves maintaining its 
position as an ally to the West, while maintaining its legitimacy based on Saudi 
Shari’ah Law and the Islamic identity. This has always been a major obstacle for 
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those involved in Saudi politics and policymaking, and is one of the main influential 
issues that affects political behaviour and the whole Saudi political arena. It also 
forces the Saudi monarchy to move slowly and carefully, as it must constantly express 
its religious legitimacy and commitment to Islam, while still advancing reform 
policies; this produces a certain series of challenges and resistance. The Saudi 
government must be cautious in making reforms and must limit any sudden waves or 
popular demands for secular reform (Cordesman, 2011). 
Nonetheless, the legitimacy of the Saudi government (which is dependent on a mix of 
social, religious, and political views formed during the establishment of the third 
Saudi state), depends also on the economic and social well-being of the citizenry, due 
to the rapid growth of the population and the spread of social media. The government 
is facing a complex and urgent situation. Thus, the Saudi government must be 
cautious about immediately responding to and meeting public demands. The dilemma 
within the Saudi political and social arena has already caused many internal threats, 
including the Al-Qaeda establishment, along with many other domestic pressures on 
the Saudi government (discussed further in Chapter 5). But in fact, the real political 
power is in the hands of key members of the Royal House and the Council of 
Ministers (the Executive Branch), whereas the Consultative Council and the Council 
of the Senior  Ulama are less powerful (Alshamsi, 2011). 
Oil is also one of the main driving factors in the formulation of the Kingdom’s 
policies and the significance on Saudi policies and politics will be discussed in more 
detail in the following section (economic security).  
Generally speaking, these issues necessitated the Saudi government developing and 
deploying one of the most influential and important security forces in the region with 
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huge responsibilities and duties in one of the most volatile regions in the world, in one 
of the most complicated regions for policymaking (Saudi security forces will be 
further elaborated upon later in this chapter). 
Returning to Buzan, he considered anything that might affect the political entity or the 
legitimacy of the state as a political threat, but he carefully separated politics from 
those aspects that could be considered a military threat. The political threats can be 
summarised in the following points: 
1. Pressure caused by the demands of Islamic reformers and liberalists: 
Islamist reform groups want Saudi political and socioeconomic to reflect 
Islamic values. The liberals seek to change the regime to be have greater 
political representation and attitudes that are favourable to women (arguably 
regarded as Western-style human rights). The liberals also object to the 
revered alliance between the ruling family and the ulama which originated 
from the establishment of the first Saudi state.  For many decades the Saudi 
government has struggled with the tensions between religious conservatives 
and liberals, and social customs which often contradict the need for change. 
To deal with this, the Saudi royalist leaders tend to maintain a neutral position 
and make decisions which sometimes will satisfy the conservatives and 
sometimes the liberals.  
2. Shi’a demands: Shi’a Muslims demand full recognition of their status and 
would like proper integration into the political landscape. However, this 
pressure is creating a threat to the regime. The presence of the Shi’a minority 
in Saudi Arabia could create internal problems, especially in terms of their 
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great loyalty to Iran, which in turn could weaken their allegiance to Saudi 
Arabia, and can have a bad influence on social cohesion.  
3. Internal demands and population expansion: with the rapid growth of the 
population and the spread of social media, public demands for new policies 
and practices have risen which could threaten the state legitimacy and national 
security. 
4. Political dilemmas concerning internal legitimacy and external pressure: 
the monarchy of Saudi Arabia is torn between maintaining its position as an 
ally to the West, and the need to maintain its position based on Shari’ah Law 
and Islamic identity. This dilemma has always been a major obstacle in the 
Saudi political sphere and is one of the main issues affecting Saudi politics 
and policymaking both domestically and internationally. The Saudi monarchy 
moves slowly and cautiously when making reforms to try to alleviate 
challenges and resistance.  
5. Terrorism: terrorism is one of the issues that spreads across social, economic, 
and political threats. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, have posed a serious 
threat to state politics and security. However, the impacts and causes of 
terrorism stretch beyond internal state elements, terrorism will be discussed in 
Chapter 5 as part of regional and international threats.       
4.4  Economic Security 
Economic security concerns access to resources, finance and markets necessary to 
sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. In this section, the structure of 
the Saudi economy, including its history, will be identified due to the complicated 
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involvements from external powers that it has gained throughout its history. It is 
important to expand this section to include an overview of the history of the Saudi 
economy as in addition to the external influences, it also witnessed an internal 
dimension that comprised social and political transformations caused by massive 
levels of oil discovery and subsequent production. Most of these influences are still 
present today and require careful explanation to gain a full understanding of the Saudi 
national security dynamics. 
4.4.1 Saudi Economy: An Overview of the Historical Dimensions 
The Arabian Peninsula’s environmental condition has fundamentally shaped the 
area’s economic pursuits for a significant period of its history. The economy, which 
was based on subsistence farming and stock rearing, faced state revenue restrictions 
from customs duties and charges on pilgrims. Modernisation began to occur in the 
1930s with the development of aircraft, motor vehicles, radios and telephones, which 
emerged in the large cities such as Riyadh. However, the country was very large and 
had few financial resources; and things became even worse with the world financial 
crisis of 1929 (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006: 142).      
Since oil was discovered in the late 1930s, life in Saudi Arabia has changed 
significantly (Broberg, 2002). In 1933, the Standard Oil Company of California 
(SOCAL) started searching for oil in al-Hasa (Eastern Province) in Saudi Arabia, with 
a sixty-year concession (Yeomans, 2004: 16). Although the first debate about 
prospecting for oil in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia goes back as far as 1923. When a 
New Zealander, Major Frank Holmes, visited King Abdul Aziz in 1923, he insisted 
that there must be oil on the Arabian Peninsula (Simmons, 2005: 25-26). Holmes not 
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only obtained the Saudi concession, he additionally secured the concession in Kuwait 
and Bahrain.    
Holmes then borrowed money from King Abdul Aziz, moved to Bahrain and obtained 
an oil concession from the Sheik of Bahrain, which by then was a British protectorate. 
Thus, the British were well placed to control any oil that might be found in Bahrain, 
but with British Petroleum (BP) having enough oil in Iran and in Iraq they showed no 
interest in the prospect of oil in Bahrain. They did not accept Holmes’ offer. So 
Holmes went to the United States with the Bahrain concession, where he offered the 
rights to Exxon for $50,000, but it was rejected. He then moved towards Gulf Oil who 
paid $50,000 and sent their geologist, but Gulf were not able to start on their own, as 
they were a member of the Iraq Petroleum Company, where they had recently agreed 
not to explore inside a certain area, the Red Line, without the other members 
(Sampson, 1975: 88).  
Another member of the Iraq Petroleum Company, BP, still insisted that Bahrain 
would not gain oil. So Gulf Oil offered their Bahrain concessions to SOCAL. SOCAL 
were not involved in the Red Line Agreement, hence SOCAL bought the concessions 
for $50,000 and by May 1932, SOCAL had struck oil in Bahrain (Yergin, 1993: 283).  
Two years later Bahrain was exporting oil to the world market. But Bahrain in fact 
was never to become a major oil producer; instead it remains a centre for trading and 
banking, rather than oil. For SOCAL, their major move involved going twenty miles 
across the water to the mainland of Saudi Arabia (Sampson, 1975: 88-89).      
In 1930, King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud was desperate for new revenues, which made him 
start thinking about Holmes’ prospect. Unlike the Sheik of Bahrain, King ibn Saud 
was not under any British protectorate – he was in a position of independence. One of 
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his principal advisers, Harry St. John Philby (who had left the colonial service after a 
row, embraced Islam and later became close to the King), suggested that money could 
be found by exploiting the country’s mineral resources. However, the King was much 
more interested in exploring for water than oil (Yergin, 1993: 286-288).    
Philby arranged a meeting with the American philanthropist, Charles Crane, who in 
turn arranged for an American geologist, Karl Twitchell, to visit. Twitchell was 
encouraged by what he saw and tried to interest American oil companies. In the 
beginning he went to Texaco, who showed no interest. He then went to Exxon. After 
that he went to Gulf Oil, who again turned him down because of the Red Line 
Agreement. He was then approached by SOCAL, who were already moving their 
attentions across the water from Bahrain towards Saudi Arabia (Sampson, 1975).     
On May 29, 1933, 10 years after Frank Holmes first suggested that oil must be under 
the land of the Arabian Peninsula. King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud read the last draft of the 
agreement, he turned to his finance minister, Abdullah Sulaiman, and said, “Put your 
trust in God and sign” (Yergin, 1993: 291).  
SOCAL and King Abdul Aziz signed the first oil concession for Saudi Arabia with an 
outside party. SOCAL was committed to loaning the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the 
equivalent of sterling £50,000 in gold and agreed to pay £1 per ton for all oil that was 
produced, as well as rentals of £25,000 per year. They were also promised to receive a 
£50,000 advanced as soon as any oil was found and within less than a decade, it 
became clear to SOCAL that with this ordinary but risky agreement they had 
guaranteed their rights to explore and produce in an area with extraordinary oil 
potential (Simmons, 2005: 27).  
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In fact, two considerations fascinated SOCAL. Al-Hasa appeared to be encouraging 
as it shared many of the nearby features that Iraq and Iran possessed, where oil had 
been already discovered. In addition, oil had not yet been plotted by the European oil 
companies, as it had in other nearby countries. Escorted by an al-Hasa concession, 
SOCAL had exclusive rights to search and produce oil in the whole Eastern Province 
and became the first American company to take control over a major Saudi oil zone 
(Klare, 2004: 30-31).  
By March 1938, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were on the road to fortune, as oil was 
discovered under its desert, but at that time the United States produced almost 62% of 
the world’s oil (McNaugher, 1985: 3-4).  Saudi Arabia was, however, a country under 
construction, with limited education and health infrastructures in place. The rapid 
growth in the country’s revenue during the early 1950s, allowed them, with the help 
of the US’s technical support, to launch new development programmes with long-
term plans. By July 1947, the government announced its plans to spend $270 million 
on road building, schools, hospitals, and in installing power generation plants and 
irrigation projects (McNaugher, 1985:152-153).  
Until 1941, the United States was the world’s leading oil producer. As the Second 
World War started, it was estimated that the United States possessed around 20 billion 
barrels of oil, but the nation was consuming around 4 million barrels per day. Which 
in turn produced some concerns within the Roosevelt administration with regards to 
the future of American oil. Hence, the Roosevelt administration undertook the 
nation’s first systematic study which suggested that if the United States continued to 
use its domestic oil at its current rate (at that time) there would be only a little left for 
the future. So, from the American officials’ perspective, the development of newly 
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discovered oil resources in the Middle East – where American oil companies were 
already active and the local rulers were considered friendly – improved their US 
security by reducing pressure on the US and Latin American oil (Klare, 2004: 29). 
But by doing so the United States would become vulnerable to any effect that might 
interrupt these new supplies.  
The US oil concerns were again raised in June 1943, by William Bullitt, the Under-
Secretary of the US Navy, in a letter to Roosevelt, indicating that observing petroleum 
reserves outside the United States had become a vital interest. Bullitt also reported 
that SOCAL and Texaco were worried that the British could convince the Saudi King 
to replace their concession with them. Thus, Bullitt argued that the Americans should 
get a direct American government interest in their concession and buy a controlling 
interest in the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) (Sampson, 1975: 95-96).       
It thus became a new US strategy to search for oil in the Middle East, where the 
domestic governments were considered agreeable to US exploitation. The US started 
to rely primarily on one nation that would suit all their requirements – Saudi Arabia – 
and up until 1939 the United States did not see fit to set up formal diplomatic 
relations with them. It was only in 1943 when a resident ambassador was posted there 
that this occurred, although the United States recognised the government of King 
Abdul Aziz more than 12 years earlier in 1931 (Klare, 2004: 31).  
By the end of the Second World War, the vast exploitation of oil in Saudi Arabia 
became a major foreign policy object for the United States, and the importance of the 
US/Saudi partnership became absolute vital. King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud started to be 
considered an important element in international arenas (Sampson, 1975).  
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The United States oil consumption in the aftermath of the Second World War rose 
dramatically. From 1.8 billion barrels a day in 1946 to 5.4 billion barrels in 1971. 
Much of it came from US domestic sources (Klare, 2004: 37). But US oil production 
peaked during the early 1970s. At that time, Saudi Arabia’s production was only 
exceeding three million barrels a day. There were several hundred high-volume oil 
wells at Saudi Arabia’s three most productive fields – Ghawar, Abqaiq, and Safaniya 
– collectively they produced 88% of the total daily output and were the nerve centre 
of the Kingdom’s oil output (Simmons, 2005: 47). 
In the same way as Saudi oil production increased rapidly, US oil production 
slumped. The US oil production decline enabled Saudi Arabia to take advantage, 
especially in light of its potential resources. In fact, Saudi Arabia had the opportunity 
to increase its oil output to supply the new demand.          
The major event and the turning point in OPEC oil politics came during the 1973-74 
Arab-Israeli war and the oil crises. The Palestinians and neighbouring Arab states had 
been in deep-rooted conflict with Israel for many decades, ever since Israel declared a 
Jewish homeland in Palestine in 1948 after expelling the British from there (as will be 
discussed later in more detail) (Campbell, 2005). On 6 October 1973, a joint 
Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel began in what became known as the Yom Kippur. 
On 17 October 1973, Sheik Ahmed Yamani announced OPEC’s intention to set new 
prices exclusive of any outsider consulting (Yeomans, 2004: 24),  
The Arab oil embargo caused a sharp increase in oil prices. As OPEC first raised the 
price of oil by 70%, prices raised to $5.11 a barrel. This was followed by a Saudi ban 
on oil shipments to the United States and the West.  The prices hike, combined with 
the oil embargo created a real panic around the world (Yeomans, 2004: 25-26). Iran 
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worked actively to stabilise the oil market during the embargo by increasing its oil 
output and the embargo cutback only a small percentage of global production and 
lasted for few months; yet, the prices increased by nearly 400% between October 
1973 and December 1973, finishing the year at $11.65 per barrel (Simmons, 2005: 
54-55).  
The oil boycott revealed that the oil producing countries had started working together 
in an effective way. As the war launched on 6 October 1973, Sheik Ahmed Yamani 
(the Saudi oil minister) announced OPEC’s intention to set new prices. The King of 
Saudi Arabia at that time, King Faisal, became annoyed in late October when the 
Nixon administration announced that it was about to re-arm Israel, this increased 
frustrations with the US administration’s intentions towards Israel (Simmons, 2005).  
Saudi Arabia was now the only country that had enough excess oil producing capacity 
to run oil production. King Faisal responded by pulling out his oil embargo, a threat 
that he had infrequently made in the hope of encouraging a more useful US policy 
with regards to the Middle East. Hence, a day or two later, ten Arab oil ministers met 
in Kuwait and immediately agreed to reduce their collective oil production by 5% per 
month until the Arab-Israeli conflict was resolved. The following day, Saudi Arabia 
announced a 10% reduction in its oil production and a total ban on oil shipments to 
the United States and Rotterdam, Netherlands, as this was the main Western port used 
to receive Middle Eastern oil (Simmons, 2005: 53-54).   
Hence, the United States started questioning their control over oil supplies in the Gulf 
area. Mainly in terms of the length of time that the military needed to move into 
position (Rogers, 2008). Indeed, since 1973 the economic interests of Saudi Arabia 
and the United States have become so closely linked that the security and the stability 
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of the Saudi government has been considered a major US security interest. It also 
became obvious that any temporary disruptions to the Gulf oil supply, or raises in oil 
prices, could cause damage to the American and global economy (Remnek, 1980).  
In addition, prices had grown fourfold to $12 a barrel, which increased Saudi Arabian 
oil revenues to $35 billion, an almost 16-fold increase. This represented an explosion 
of wealth in such a brief period that perhaps no other population had ever experienced 
(Simmons, 2005: 56-57). Oil and the petrochemical industry has dominated the Saudi 
economy for the past three decades (Simmons, 2005: 17). Since the mid-1990s, Saudi 
Arabia has attempted to diversify its sources of income and employment, mostly 
comprising partial privatisation of key industries, such as telecommunications and 
electricity (as reviewed later in this chapter). But as yet it is too early to identify their 
full impact (Cordesman, 2009: 14).  
The explosion of wealth that occurred in the early 1970s marked a new phase in the 
development of the Saudi economy. The tremendous increase in oil revenues 
announced a new era of economic and social development. In response, Saudi Arabia 
decided to start a series of massive development plans represented by its cycles of 
Five-Year Economic Developments Plans that were launched in 1969. 
4.4.2  Development Plans 
The Saudi Arabian development process has been carried out since 1969 under the 
guidance of a series of Five-Year Development Plans, with the aim of developing and 
mobilising available human and material resources and utilising them to achieve 
several socio-economic objectives. These objectives included raising the standard of 
living of citizens, completing a basic infrastructure, diversifying the economic base, 
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developing human resources and encouraging the private sector to assume an 
effective role in development (Al-Habbas, 1999: 101). 
The development process can be divided into three stages. The first stage (1970-1985) 
which included the First, Second, and Third Development Plans, focused on 
infrastructure, public facilities and services, and support to the private sector through 
the provision of concessional loans, along with direct and indirect subsidies to 
industrial and agricultural projects. The second stage (1985-2005) included the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Development Plans. This stage witnessed a decrease 
in oil revenues caused by the instability of world oil prices. The plans focused on 
rationalising public expenditures, improving performance of public institutions and 
diversifying the economic base (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2011: 4). 
The third stage (2005-2025) started with the Eighth Plan (2005-2009) and will include 
the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Development Plans. The Eighth Plan witnessed high 
oil revenues as result of the relative increase in world oil prices. The Eighth Plan 
represents the first stage in a long strategic phase of twenty years in four continuous 
five-year campaigns. This phases focuses on accelerating growth, diversifying the 
economic base, balancing regional development, and increasing expenditure on 
education. According to the Ministry of Economy and Planning, this phase aims to 
prepare the national economy to move towards a knowledge economy, to enhance its 
competitiveness, and to position it to deal in an effective and flexible manner with 
national, regional and international challenges (Ministry of Economy and Planning, 
2011: 5). 
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4.4.3  Natural Resources 
Saudi Arabia has the biggest oil reserve in the world, which has helped to shape the 
country’s development to its current state. In addition, Saudi Arabia has wide natural 
gas reserves, as well as layers of coal, bauxite, copper, gold, silver, platinum, iron, 
phosphates, tungsten, uranium, and zinc, and other non-mineral resources including 
glass, stone, and limestone (Facey, Lunde, McKinnon and Pledge, 2006).  
The country has developed techniques to drill and ship oil from its natural reserves, 
but this has presented growing environmental threats to the country. The Gulf region, 
in particular the Red Sea, has suffered harmful environmental effects caused by oil 
spillages. The oil production process itself creates damaging environmental effects 
from the contamination of wastewater utilised in the production process, which has 
drawn attention from several international environmental agencies.   
4.4.4 Saudi Economic Structure 
4.4.4.1 Oil Sector 
The Gulf region contains over half of the world’s reserves of oil and one-third of the 
world’s reserves of natural gas (Korb, 2005: 2). Saudi Arabia alone has more than a 
quarter of the world’s total proven reserves; the second largest reserves are in Iraq 
with more than 10% of the world’s reserves, while each of the United Arab Emirates, 
Iran, and Kuwait hold about 9% (Byman, 2002: 3). 
Saudi Arabia’s economy is an oil-based economy. Oil still accounts for 45% of Saudi 
Arabian GDP, 70% to 80% of state revenues, and around 90% of total export 
revenues (Cordesman, 2009: 14). A stable oil supply will continue to be a major 
factor for the Saudi economy. The size of oil and gas reserves and production plays a 
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key geopolitical and economic role for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states as they are 
the region’s main resources. The enormous oil and gas reserves and levels of 
production have played a massive role in rapid socioeconomic development in Saudi 
Arabia and other GCC states (Joyner, 1990: 5). 
Oil from several states in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, has exceptionally 
low production costs, which allows them to make profits even if the price of oil 
plunges. That is because costs of oil extraction are higher elsewhere in the world 
(Byman, 2002: 3). Although oil represents a significant share of GDP, the oil sector 
does not require much manpower (Al-Asmari, 2008). According to Al-Asmari (2008), 
in 2000, 54,501 Saudis were working in Aramco (85% of ARAMCO’s total 
employees). 
4.4.4.2 Non-Oil Sector 
Saudi Arabia has sought over recent years to expand its economy beyond oil. 
Diversification of the state income mainly involves manufacturing, agriculture, 
construction and privatisation of key industries such as telecommunications and 
electricity.  
Industrial production in Saudi Arabia can be divided into two units: main basic 
industries and manufacturing. Basic industries depend mainly on oil to provide the 
crude materials. Basic industries are funded and functioned through the public sector 
due to the large size of its investments and technology. In 1976, Saudi Arabia Basic 
Industries Corporation (SABIC) was formed, to create a domestic petrochemical 
industry that was designed to augment oil export earnings and to use available 
domestic resources, particularly associated gas supplies (Simmons, 2005: 17). 
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Manufacturing consists of a diverse range of industries such as food, building 
materials and chemical industries, and different mineral industries. These industries 
are managed by the private sector, which receives a number of fiscal incentives and 
support from the state, such as: long-term, interest-free industrial loans, leasing of 
land for factories and workers’ housing in industrial zones equipped with full 
facilities and services at nominal prices, preference for national products when state 
institutions are making purchases, and the full exemption of all types of taxes, except 
for the Islamic Zakat which is calculated at 2.5% of the capital, if one year has passed. 
According to the Saudi Industrial Development Fund website, in 2010, there were 
4,645 factories producing goods in the manufacturing sector, investing about SR 404 
billion ($107 billion) and operating with 530,000 employees.  
In terms of investment size, the refined petroleum products sector took the leading 
position among the other industrial sectors, with SR 154 billion, representing 38% of 
total investments of operating factories, followed by the non-metallic minerals sector 
with SR 57 billion, representing 14% of total investment of operating factories (Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund, 2010). 
4.4.5  Economic Threats 
In several Gulf States economic problems may increase in the coming decade.  
Despite huge income and wealth from oil, a declining standard of living faces citizens 
and unemployment rates are rising. In fact, the dependence of the Saudi economy on 
oil presents one of the major economic difficulties. As mentioned earlier, Saudi 
Arabia’s economy is an oil-based economy. Oil still accounts for 45% of Saudi 
Arabian GDP, 70% to 80% of state revenues, and around 90% of total export 
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revenues. Developing the Saudi economy beyond oil still presents a major challenge 
to Saudi Arabia.  
A rapid growth in population, and not being able to transform the economy beyond 
oil, will make it difficult for Saudi Arabia to remain a welfare state. Saudi Arabia’s 
population growth has averaged more than 3% per year during the last two decades 
and living standards in Saudi Arabia have remained at the same level in recent years. 
From 1980 to 1998, the Saudi economy grew at an average of only 0.2% a year 
(Byman, 2002: 47-48). Since 2004, the Saudi economy grew by an annual average of 
6.5 percent which is three times higher than the average recorded during the two 
preceding decades. The average growth rate of the non-oil sector grew by an annual 
average of 7.8 percent that is around four times higher than the average recorded the 
preceding two decades (Rasooldeen, 2014). Yet, corruption in all forms has become a 
growing issue at all levels of society and needs to be reconsidered seriously (Pterson, 
2002).    
Saudi Arabia is facing a rapid growth in the population in conjunction with high 
unemployment rates and a struggling Saudisation programme that started in the early 
1990s and aimed to encourage employment of Saudi nationals in the private sector. 
Yet, unemployment rates range from 15% to 25%, and given the rapid youth 
explosion, the government will have to create hundreds of thousands of new jobs 
every year (Simmons, 2005: 18).  
Education systems are still insufficient and do not produce large numbers of skilled 
workers and therefore Gulf countries face a lack of comprehensive education systems. 
Although, young Saudi males and females are currently highly educated by global 
standards and are accustomed to high living standards, education systems do not 
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produce young men or women who are ready to work and have the required work 
ethics. Moreover, many Saudi women and men are working at jobs with no useful 
economic output (Cordesman, 2009). 
The poor education system has created difficulties for Saudi efforts to replace highly 
skilled foreign labourers with local citizens. Meanwhile, expatriates in Saudi Arabia 
account for 25% of the population, which has a genuine effect on the Saudi identity 
(Pterson, 2002). For example, Indian waiters, Filipino workers, north Arabian 
teachers, and Sri Lankan nannies are all mixed within the culture and have an 
influence on attitudes of the growing generation of young Saudis. Public roles for 
women still have some restrictions and have become a focus for the struggle between 
liberals and Islamists, but those restrictions have eased significantly, especially 
among younger and more educated men (Pterson, 2002).  
Unemployment presents one of the major economic problems facing Saudi Arabia. 
Despite the global financial crisis that begun in 2008, the Kingdom did not decrease 
its development and job creation programme in the 2009 budget, nor in the 2010 
budget.    However, Saudi Arabia introduced “the education plan” to resolve the job 
market needs by bolstering up the educational system to meet job market 
requirements (Marshall, 2006). King Abdullah has also approved the construction of 
six new economic cities. The six economic cities are expected to be finished by 2020 
and will provide $150 billion in contribution to GDP growth; they are also expected 
to create 1.3 million jobs and accommodate 4.8 million people (Qust, 2007).  
Another key economic reform strategy that Saudi Arabia has undertaken since 2002, 
is the privatisation of nearly all of its state controlled assets. If the privatisation 
strategy is successful, the Saudi programme will be one of the most ambitious of any 
142	  	  
privatisation programmes ever announced in the world. In GCC (Gulf Cooperation 
Council) countries, privatisation has been used as a means of diversifying the 
economic base of the region, as well as a means of wealth distribution for a larger 
section of society by creating a shareholding class. The Saudi privatisation 
programme has already partly privatised some of the government corporations such as 
Saudi Telecom Company (STC) and Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) 
(Ramady, 2006). 
Saudisation is another key economic strategy for the Kingdom to ensure certain jobs 
for local citizens, reduce the country’s dependence on a foreign expatriate workforce, 
and reduce the unemployment rate in the Kingdom. Although the programme has 
faced many difficulties since it started, the Saudi government is still trying to 
persuade the private sector to comply with the Saudisation programme. Saudi Arabia 
also launched an initiative to support the unemployed financially, by introducing an 
unemployment benefits programme in late 2011 (Gause III, 2011). 
The Saudi economy faces many difficulties and threats that can be summarised in the 
following points: 
1. The need to modernise the oil industry and diversity the economy: Despite 
huge oil income and wealth, a declining standard of living faces citizens and 
unemployment rates are rising. In fact, the dependence of the Saudi economy 
on oil presents one of their major economic difficulties and developing the 
Saudi economy beyond oil is a significant challenge to the Saudi state.  
2. The need to grow the economy: Rapid growth in population and not being 
able to transform the economy beyond oil will make it difficult for Saudi 
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Arabia to remain a welfare state. Saudi Arabian population growth has 
averaged more than 3% per year during the last two decades while living 
standards in Saudi Arabia have remained at the same level over recent years. 
From 1980 to 1998, the Saudi economy grew at an average of only 0.2% a 
year. 
3. Unemployment: Saudi Arabia is facing a rapid growth in population, high 
unemployment rates and a struggling Saudisation programme that aimed to 
encourage employment of Saudi nationals in the private sector. 
Unemployment rates range from 15% to 25%, and given the rapid youth 
explosion, the government will have to create hundreds of thousands of new 
jobs every year. 
4. Poverty: as mentioned earlier, unemployment rates are increasing in Saudi 
Arabia, hence, there is a chance that a section of people will experience 
poverty levels in the near future. This raises huge concerns for the government 
since there is a strong positive correlation between poverty and terrorism.  
5. The inability of the education system to produce skilled workers: 
education systems in the Gulf are still insufficient for preparing young Saudis 
to work and do not produce large numbers of skilled workers, this is despite 
the fact that education standards are high by global standards.  
6. Huge dependence on foreign expatriate workers: the poor education system 
has created difficulties in terms of trying to replace high-skilled foreign 
labourers with local citizens. Foreign expatriates in Saudi Arabia account for 
25% of the population, which has a genuine effect on the Saudi identity.  
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4.5  Military Security 
Military security comprises the very basic duty of a state to protect its citizens. In 
Saudi Arabia there might not be direct threats in terms of an external invasion, 
however the ability to protect the country does incur some concerns and security 
challenges. This part of the chapter discusses the current state of the defensive and 
offensive capabilities of Saudi Arabia. 
4.5.1  Historical Origins 
The historical origins of the Saudi military force go back to the 1920s. King Abdul 
Aziz relied on tribal fighters (Ikhwan) to conquer Hail and Hejaz (Western) regions. 
By 1925, Abdul Aziz and the Ikhwan succeeded in their mission and conquered what 
is now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, the Ikhwan insisted on 
Abdul Aziz conquering more areas to the north and north east, which were controlled 
by the British. King Abdul Aziz’s reluctance was understood by the Ikhwan to mean 
that he had a deal of peace with the British (Lacey, 2009: 15). As the Ikhwan 
interference increased, King Abdul Aziz started to recognise the need to have a more 
conventional and disciplined army, which he achieved by relying on the Hejaz army 
(which he inherited after overthrowing Hejaz) and on British assistance (Al-Habbas, 
1999).  Therefore, when the Ikhwan revolted against King Abdul Aziz in early March 
1929, he was able to defeat them and achieve a crucial victory. The Ikhwan who 
stayed loyal to Abdul Aziz were then regrouped to form the White Army, which later 
became known as the National Guard (Lacey, 2009: 16).   
Saudi oil was starting to become a significant concern for American leaders, as such, 
American policymakers considered access to Saudi oil to be a vital national security 
interest that must be defended; this demonstrates that economic security does overlap 
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with military security. It is, therefore, apparent why increasing oil reserves in Saudi 
Arabia extended the importance of Saudi state security for other foreign countries. In 
reality, during the 1950s, Saudi military forces were not equivalent to those of their 
heavily armed neighbours. Hence, the American administration sought to improve the 
defensive capabilities of Saudi Arabia. As a result, US military aid was quickly sent 
to Saudi Arabia. In addition, the United States also agreed to help Saudi Arabia create 
a modern army. This was formalised on 18 June 1951, in the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement, allowing the delivery of US arms and combat gear and the 
deployment of the US Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia (Klare, 
2004: 37-40).     
The US military aid programme was strengthened in 1957, following Gamal Abdul 
Nasser’s (Egypt president 1954-1970) actions toward the Western interest in the area 
(nationalising the Suez Canal) and his rising ties with the Soviets. In addition, the US 
Department of Defense started supplying arms and assistance to the Saudi Arabia 
National Guards (SANG), a force responsible for defending the royal family against 
internal revolt (Klare, 2004: 41).     
Since 2003, Saudi Arabia has devoted considerable resources to ensure the usefulness 
of its Saudi security forces, the National Guard (SANG) and Ministry of Interiors 
Security Forces, especially in term of dealing with terrorism and protecting oil 
facilities. To counter terrorism it was estimated to have allocated $8.5 billion, $10 
billion, and $12 billion in 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively, to increase the training, 
facilities, and professionalism of its counterterrorism forces. Even so, in order to 
further strengthen its borders, a complete overhaul of the Saudi security system was 
completed, whereby sophisticated measures were employed to protect its borders.  
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The violence experienced by the Kingdom in 2003 led Saudi Arabia to establish a 
Joint Counterterrorism Centre in the Ministry of Interiors (MOI), and a separated 
Counterterrorism Operation Centre in the Ministry of Defence and Aviation (MODA). 
Furthermore, the Saudi government established a National Joint Counterterrorism 
Command Protection Force (NJCC), headed by the Assistant Minister of Interiors for 
Security Affairs, Prince Muhammed bin Nayef (to later become the Minister of 
Defence in 2012), to improve the cooperation, and command and control capabilities 
among MOI, SANG, and MODA (Cordesman, 2009: 130).  
Saudi Arabia recognised the need to have more tactical power to deal with Iran’s 
growing capability, and the need to rapidly deploy forces to deal with terrorist threats 
to their population and critical infrastructure, especially with threats of attack from 
Yemen and the growing instability in the Horn of Africa.  Hence, the Saudi 
government set up a new arms deal with the United States; this brought about huge 
attention due to the total cost of the arms transfers being worth $60 billion over a 
period that may well take around 8 to 10 years, as the US Department of Defense 
notified to Congress on October 20, 2010 (Cordesman, 2010). 
The deal will include 84 new F-15 fighter jets, upgrades to 70 existing Saudi F-15s, 
190 helicopters and a wide array of missiles, bombs and delivery systems, as well as 
accessories such as night-vision goggles and radar warning systems (MacAskill, 
2010). 
According to Cordesman (2010), in his analysis on the Saudi-US arms deal:  
If one looks at the content of the proposed new sales, rather than the cost, it also 
becomes clear that they are part of an effort to enhance Saudi capabilities in 
ways that serve both Saudi and US security interests, and promote the stability of 
the entire Gulf region. This is reflected in a mix of ongoing arms transfers and 
upgrades that will give Saudi Arabia far stronger air capabilities and a major 
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increase in tactical mobility and strike power for dealing with any contingency 
involving Iran, terrorist elements, and threats from Yemen.   
Moreover, these same transfers are improving Saudi capabilities to secure 
facilities and shipping in the Gulf and Red Sea areas, deal with coastal and 
offshore attacks and infiltrations across Saudi Arabia’s borders, and to help 
other Gulf states in an emergency.   
As a result, the Saudi armed forces, which includes the Royal Saudi Land Forces 
(RSLFs), the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF), the Royal Saudi Navy (RSN), and the 
Royal Saudi Air Defence Force (RSADF), enjoys some of the best conventional 
military in the region. It provides them with significant advantages over Iran, one of 
their main rivals in the Gulf region (Russell, 2009). The overthrowing of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in Iraq has already removed a key military threat to Saudi Arabia’s 
national security. In addition, the newly proposed arms sales will develop the Saudi 
Air Force to such an extent that it will be more of a threat to Iran than Iran’s 
conventional missiles are to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, it will help Saudi Arabia 
create a combination of effective air and naval power that will improve security for 
tankers and other shipping resources in the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea. 
Furthermore, the new arms sales will provide the mobility and military capabilities 
against any terrorist attack (Cordesman, 2010).  
4.5.2  Saudi Security Forces 
The oldest unit in the Saudi armed forces is the Land Force, but as threats have 
become more sophisticated, the Kingdom’s defensive priorities have moved to air 
forces and air defence (Pterson, 2002). As Figure 4.1 shows, Saudi Arabia’s security 
structure is a complex mix of military forces in the Ministry of Defence and Aviation 
(MODA), a separate National Guard (SANG), and numerous internal security and 
intelligence services in the Ministry of Interiors (MOI) – all of which play a crucial 
role in helping the Kingdom counteract its challenges. Figure 4.1 also shows that 
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Saudi Arabia’s military forces form only one part of the Saudi security structure, 
which is divided into five major branches: the Army, the National Guard, the Navy, 
the Air Force, and the Air Defence. Saudi Arabia also has large paramilitary and 
internal security forces and a small strategic missile force (Cordesman, 2009). 
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Figure 4.1: The Saudi intelligence and security community  
Source: Adopted from Cordesman (2009) 
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4.5.2.1  The Saudi Armed Forces 
Saudi Arabia is one of the largest countries in the region, so defending a large country 
of about 2.2 million square kilometres presents a major challenge to the armed forces 
that comprises of a total of around 300,000 men (Cordesman, 2009: 122) – which is 
broken down as follows: 
4.5.2.1.1 The Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLFs) 
The army is the largest force, comprising around 125,000 men to defend the country; 
they are supported by the SANG (Cordesman, 2009: 123). Although possessing 
heavier equipment than the SANG, the Land Forces have serious problems with 
motivation, deployments, and training (Pterson, 2002). 
4.5.2.1.2 The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) 
The Air Force is a prime branch of the country’s national defence structure. Although 
it is smaller in number than that of Iran, it is the most capable air force in the Gulf 
region. Initially, the Saudi Air Force was oriented toward defensive operations, to 
defend the vast territory with an emphasis on protecting the onshore and offshore oil 
infrastructure, holy cities, and the country’s borders, with four major air bases 
Dhahran, Taif, Khamis Mushayt, and Tabuk (Pterson, 2002). The development of the 
Saudi Air Force has relied largely on American assistance; it started with a supply of 
fighters in the 1950s, then transport aircraft in the 1960s, and continued with 
purchases of F-5 and F-15 combat aircraft and AWACS radar aircraft in the 1970s 
and early 1980s. But when the Saudis tried to purchase F-14 and F-16 aircraft, 
political problems through a pro-Israeli US congress appeared. This forced the Saudis 
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to turn to Britain for Tornado aircrafts (Pterson, 2002: 28). More recently they have 
purchased 72 BAE System Typhoon multirole fighters (Wilson, 2009).  
4.5.2.1.3 The Royal Saudi Navy (RSN) 
The Saudi Navy has about 15,000 personnel, including 3,000 marines, and was 
initially formed as an adjunct of the army in 1957. Later, in 1969, it started 
functioning as a separate force (Pterson, 2002: 29). It is regarded as a powerful force 
by regional standards, but faces challenges when defending Gulf waters, the Gulf of 
Aden, and the Red Sea and sees a major challenge from Iran’s naval forces 
(Cordesman, 2009).   
4.5.2.1.4 The Royal Saudi Air Defence Force (RSADF) 
The Royal Saudi Air Defence Force was detached from the army in 1984 to form the 
fourth pillar of the country’s national defence structure, with 16,000 men with a wide 
range of batteries, including Shahine/Crotale missile fire units and Chinese ballistic 
missiles (Pterson, 2002: 29). The Air Defence Force’s six major group commands are 
supported by an Air Defence Operations Centre. Air Defence has control of the 
surface-to-air missile installations, largely to defend the Eastern Province and the 
capital of Riyadh. During wars, however, the command structure of the RSADF falls 
under the control of the Air Force commander (Pterson, 2002).  
4.5.2.1.5 Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) 
Saudi Arabia divides its land force manpower between the Saudi Land Forces and the 
SANG.  The SANG operates both as a defence force against external threats and as a 
security force against internal threats. SANG is a distinct force from the Saudi army 
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and their principle tasks include the protection of the royal family, counterterrorism 
and maintaining order and security by protecting the holy cities and oil infrastructure.  
SANG got their first real modern combat experience during the 1991 Gulf War. Since 
then they have steadily improved their readiness and training and have grown into a 
100,000 man force whose strength is steadily increasing towards 125,000 men. 
Around 75% of the total personnel of 100,000 are active and are equipped with large 
wheeled armoured fighting vehicles and armed personnel carriers (Cordesman, 2009: 
176-177) 
According to the official website of SANG, the SANG General Headquarters is 
located in Riyadh and directly controls the three regional sectors, the training 
facilities, and the King Abdul Aziz Independent Mechanised Brigade of four 
battalions. The three regional (Eastern, Central and Western) sectors each command 
one or more mechanised or motorised brigades. 
4.5.2.2 Internal Security Forces 
Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service and internal security forces are mostly under the 
control of the Ministry of Interiors and play the major role in counterterrorism and 
defending the country’s borders and critical infrastructure (see Figure 4.1) 
(Cordesman, 2009). The Ministry of Interiors is the largest employer in the Saudi 
government with more than 500,000 employees; including 160,000 directly employed 
in several security agencies (Pterson, 2002: 30). Cordesman (2009) provides the basis 
for the main internal security agencies under the command of the Minister of Interiors 
(MOI):   
153	  	  
• The Public Security Director (PSD): the PSD is under the control of the 
director-general of the PSD in the Ministry of Interiors, and controls the 
regular police forces that maintain security of the cities and the villages. 
• The Special Emergency Force (SEF): the SEF was created after the siege of 
the Grand Mosque in Makkah (Mecca) in 1979. It is under the control of the 
PSD and is estimated to have a total strength of 10,000 men. The SEF is 
considered to be one of the most mobile and capable forces in the Saudi 
counterterrorism forces and controls a fleet of helicopters.    
• The General Directorate of Investigation: this directorate is in charge of 
domestic intelligence gathering and analysis, counterintelligence operations, 
criminal investigations, and counterterrorism forces and controls the Saudi 
domestic intelligence service – the General Security Service (GSS). 
• The National Information Centre: the Minister of Interiors created this. The 
centre is considered to be one of the most sophisticated systems in the world 
and maintains comprehensive information on Saudi citizens and residents.  
• The General Intelligence Presidency (GIP): The GIP president reports 
directly to the King. Among its many responsibilities, it has foreign security 
functions, anti-terrorism functions, foreign liaison functions, strategic 
analytical assessments, and coordination of the foreign covert networks on 
Saudi Arabia.  
• Other agencies under the MOI: The MOI has a number of other agencies 
that are responsible for internal security, including: the Special Security 
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Forces, the Border Guard, the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Agency, 
the General Prisons Services, and the Civil Defence Force.  
4.5.3  Military Threats 
There are two levels of interplay that concern military security – armed offensive and 
defensive capabilities of states and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. 
Currently, Saudi Arabia maintains a status quo in terms of armed offensive and 
security defensive capabilities. Saudi Arabia has strong ties with the US and NATO, 
as well as being the biggest role player in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 
security wing (further details regarding the Saudi-GCC military role and security 
within the Gulf region are discussed in Chapter 5). Due to its current relationships 
with super powers of the world, Saudi Arabia intends to maintain a minimum profile 
in terms of investments in defensive and offensive mechanisms, since this affects the 
balance of relationships with other partners with regard to demonstrating intentions of 
the nation. However, Saudi Arabia is well equipped in defensive and offensive 
security capabilities when it comes to internal security of the country. Saudi Arabia 
has invested heavily to equip the defence sector to be able to fight terrorism and 
maintain and protect the sovereignty of the country by dealing with any factors heavy-
handedly, if it threatens the current governance in any way or form.  
Despite the considerable progress that the Kingdom has made in creating modern and 
effective forces, Saudi Arabian armed forces are dependent on external Western 
powers such as the US and the UK to quite a large extent, for example, the Saudi Air 
Force are equipped and trained by the United States and United Kingdom, and some 
other European states (Blanchard, 2009). Although Saudi Arabia’s internal security 
forces are much more independent from any external reliance, the Saudi armed forces 
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still face some problems in terms of organisation between military and other internal 
security forces – a traditional problem that all states face in organising and 
commanding large military forces. Additionally, Saudi security forces also suffer 
from a lack of manpower quality to deal with the demands of modern security 
technologies and tactics, which would be able to create an advanced forces structure 
to deal with both regional and external allies (Cordesman, 2009). 
Saudi Arabia must secure its oil exports, not only on its soil, but also in the face of the 
Iranian’s build-up of forces that could and has threatened maritime traffic through the 
Gulf. Saudi Arabia must also secure its oil exports in the face of piracy in Somalia 
and at other points along the flow of its exports. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia must 
protect its holy cities, the capital, the urban cities, and its long borders, all of which 
come under the responsibility of the Saudi security forces. Overall, this raises the 
issue of the importance of the security forces and highlights the challenges that the 
Saudi security forces face.  
Further military threats regarding each regional or external state are discussed in the 
next chapter, whereby regional and external power threats are discussed for the five 
sectors (social, political, economic, military, and environmental). However, the main 
internal military threats posed, from the perspective of organisational and security 
force performances are summarised in the following points: 
• Coordination between military and security forces: traditionally all states 
face problems in how best to organise and command large military forces.  
• Manpower quality and readiness to deal with the demands of modern 
security technologies and tactics: Saudi security forces suffer from a lack of 
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manpower quality in some fields, such as certain technologies and tactics of 
contemporary security demands. An ability to overcome this issue could create 
an advanced forces structure to deal with both regional and external allies. 
• SANG needs to adapt to more demanding security missions: and undertake 
better training to deal with developing internal and regional threats and duties. 
• Heavy reliance on arms and defence from foreign countries: mainly the 
United States. 
4.6  Environmental Security and Environmental Concerns 
Environmental threats such as millenarian groups and economic ideas can damage the 
physical base of a country to such an extent that it may threaten its ideas and 
institutions. Environmental concerns are not a major political issue in Saudi Arabia 
yet, since there is little political debate in the media, or on the global stage regarding 
any misconduct to the environment. This is despite the fact that current Saudi society 
is not considered the most environmentally friendly. People are not generally worried 
about environmental issues, however, due to technological developments and the 
advancement of social media, gradually people’s understanding of this phenomenon 
are expected to increase.  
Currently the main environmental concerns in Saudi Arabia are desertification, 
depletion of underground water resources, the lack of perennial rivers or permanent 
water bodies (which has prompted the development of extensive seawater 
desalination facilities), and coastal pollution from oil spills. The country has 
developed techniques to drill and ship oil from its natural reserves, but this has 
presented growing environmental threats to the country. The Gulf region, in particular 
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the Red Sea, has suffered harmful environmental impacts caused by oil spillages. The 
oil production process itself has many damaging consequences for the environment, 
including the contamination of wastewater utilised in the production process. This has 
drawn considerable attention from several international environmental agencies.   
4.7  Conclusion  
Adoption of the societal, political, economic, military and environmental security 
framework has enabled identification and understanding of Saudi Arabia’s national 
security, in respect of its structure, threats, dynamics, and interactions in a range of 
sectors. Although some threats, such as terrorism, poverty, and tribal roles do spread 
through more than one sector, examination of the interaction and variety of threats 
throughout the sectors (at all three levels of individual, state, and system) enabled 
identification of the most prominent threats at the internal/domestic stage.     
A review of these sectors has showed that in terms of Saudi security, social and 
political issues represent the most essential deep-rooted threats to internal security. 
These do interact with various other aspects, but they also show a high degree of 
socio-political cohesion. The social and political threats mainly involve: religion; 
tribalism; conservative and liberalist conflicts and demands/pressures; social division 
and Shi’a demands; and propensity to external sources, which all cause harm to the 
state’s social and political integrity and identity and can affect state security and 
policymaking.  
Analysis of economic security, on the other hand, revealed the seriousness of the huge 
Saudi dependency on oil and highlighted the fact that the country seems currently 
unable to transfer the economy beyond oil. This presents the most prominent 
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economic threat as Saudi Arabia has also experienced rapid growth in the population 
and has a subsequent need to create new jobs to avoid further associated threats, i.e. 
poverty, unemployment, and corruption. These associated threats could then extend to 
form social and political threats, and perhaps even military threats. Furthermore, oil 
dependence can be a threat to other aspects of military, societal and political security 
due to the vulnerability of the economy to oil and its global prices and future, which 
could affect state spenders and budgets.  
The review of the five sectors also showed that military security is not much less 
important than social and political security, although for a long time military security 
for the Saudi states has depended on Western allies, namely the United States and 
United Kingdom. It still faces problems with coordination between security forces 
and manpower quality, readiness, and seriousness to deal with a wide range of 
challenges that the massive country holds.  
Finally, environmental security was of less significant importance for Saudi security 
compared to the other sectors. Threats involved desertification, depletion of 
underground water resources, a lack of perennial rivers or permanent water bodies, 
and coastal pollution from oil spills. The country has developed techniques to drill 
and ship oil from its natural reserves, but this has presented growing environmental 
threats to the country.  
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Chapter 5 
 Saudi Arabian National Security: External Dimensions  
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5.1  Introduction 
The Gulf is one of the most strategic waterways in the world due to its importance in 
oil transportation around the world; Persian Gulf countries together hold more than 
half of the world’s oil reserves. There have been, and will continue to be, significant 
territorial disputes between Gulf countries as well as revolution, disruption, and 
extremism (terrorism) within the region. Those interruptions have led to serious 
international disturbances and will continue to do so due to the economic dependence 
on the Gulf’s energy resources and other matters which will be illustrated later in this 
chapter.  
Over several decades the Gulf region has been plagued by wars, revolution, 
disturbances, and extremism. This includes the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war in 
1980-88, riots and demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, a Shi’a Muslim coup attempt in 
Bahrain, the US-Iran naval clashes during the 1987-1988 re-flagging effort, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the United States war in Iraq under the war on terror, and 
the recent political changes that started in 2011 and are taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen; in addition to many other events causing political 
unrest in the region. In most crises or instances of political unrest occurring in the 
region, Saudi Arabia, one of the largest states in the region, has to get involved in one 
way or another. This puts Saudi Arabia in a difficult position in terms of maintaining 
its domestic and global role, and its security. Whether Saudi Arabia gets involved 
directly or indirectly in any of the crises, it can have a serious impact on national 
security and politics, and ultimately the security of the nation.  
This chapter will outline the threats and challenges that occur at the regional and 
international level under the pattern of amity and enmity. It will also examine the 
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extent of each threat on the three levels of security (domestic, regional, and 
international), by reviewing each of the regional/neighbouring states and external 
states involved in the region’s security, taking into consideration the position of each 
state in terms of Saudi national security ranging from friendship to hostility. By 
identifying the nature of the threats that go beyond the state boundaries under 
domestic, regional, or international level a security linkage can be made relating to 
these three levels. Threats such as terrorism (which extend beyond a state border) can 
be examined at the regional level to identify the origin of any causes and impacts, 
whether it holds international, regional or domestic aspects and involvements. In fact, 
identifying the regional security issues will fill the gap in security dynamics between 
the state (as already discussed in Chapter 3) and the international level.  
Hence, a number of issues need to be addressed to identify the external threats and 
challenges facing Saudi Arabia, and the impact of those threats on its regional and 
global position and security. The first subject to be considered is the security 
interdependence of Saudi Arabia at the regional level. The second issue involves 
identifying elements of “amity and enmity” among its main neighbouring states (Gulf 
regional context). The third topic will examine the nature of external power 
interventions on regional politics and consequences and indicators about the nature of 
the global system (anarchy/polarity). All of these will be examined through reviewing 
each regional/neighbouring state and other external powers involved in regional 
affairs and external threats (such as due to terrorism) under the three elements. 
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5.2  Saudi Arabian External Threats, Dynamics and Policies/Diplomacy 
5.2.1  Iran 
For decades Iran has been a source of security concern to Saudi Arabia. Although 
relations during the reign of Shah Muhammad Reza were good, and both countries 
were foundations for the United States’ regional allies, old sensitivities remained. The 
ancient Arab-Persian suspicions in the Gulf, combined with ancient Sunni-Shi’a 
mistrust remains active, despite the fact that it stretches back to the early days of 
Islam in the seventh century AD, through the war and conflict occurring between the 
Ottoman Empire (mostly Sunni persuasion) and the Persian Safavids Empire 
(espoused by Shi’as) (Buzan and Weaver, 2003).    
In 1979, a revolutionised Iranian power emerged from the ashes of the coalition that 
overthrew the Shah in 1978 (Jabber, 1989: 4-6). Ayatollah Khomeini managed to 
control the revolutionists against Iran’s ruler Shah Reza Pahlavi and bring into 
existence the first Islamic government of the modern age. The 1979 Iranian revolution 
represented a major turning point in the politics of the region and in the Western view 
of Islam as a political power. The merging of the Shi’a fundamentalists and 
nationalists led to the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, causing a threat to 
all other political systems in the region. The threat partly originated from the 
ideological underpinnings and from their position and objectives in the war with Iraq 
(ibid). 
From Iran’s point of view, Iran’s foreign policy is an expression of its revolutionary 
and Islamic incentive for national security. Iran’s leaders view the Saudi government 
as clients of the United States. Iran’s leaders also believe that the Saudi government 
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takes instructions from Washington. The Iranian government’s claim to speak for a 
supposed widespread Islamic authority, has been seen as a clear challenge to the 
Saudi government, which sees its legitimacy as being attached to its role of protector 
of the holy places (Chubin and Tripp, 1996).  
This revolution, however, appealed even to the non-religious Shi’a. Iran attracted the 
Gulf region’s Shi’a Muslims, who constitute roughly 70% of Bahrain’s population, 
about 25% in Kuwait, and 5% to 10% in Saudi Arabia. This Shi’a community is 
concentrated in areas such as al-Hasa, where much of Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves are 
located (Byman, 2002: 43). In 1980, Ayatollah Khomeni instigated Shi’a 
demonstrations in Bahrain, which unsettled the area and which was followed by an 
attempt to overthrow the government in December 1981. Iran gave assistance to 
organise the group and offered naval support in the event of a successful coup. In 
response to the Iranian revolution, demonstrations took place also in Kuwait. On 
another occasion, Shi’a groups linked to Iran blew up the United States Embassy in 
Kuwait and tried to assassinate the Emir of Kuwait. Also, in 1979 and 1980, in 
response to Khomeini’s return to Iran and calls for revolution, rioting took place in 
Saudi Arabia (Byman, 2002: 43-44).  
More recently, in association with the Arab Spring, thousands of Shi’as demonstrated 
in Bahrain to demand democratic reforms. Saudi Arabia also witnessed a wave of 
young Shi’a protesters claiming they had suffered anti-Shi’a discrimination and 
wanting more equal rights. But, as discussed in the previous chapter, whether or not 
these disputes are connected directly with Iran, they still create pressure for the Saudi 
government and form a threat to the political and social identity of the Saudi state. 
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5.2.1.1 The Impact of the 1980-88 Gulf Wars  
The greatest danger in the near past derived from the Iran-Iraq War, where the two 
states fought over the Shatt al-Arab waterway.  Iran and Iraq fought a brutal eight-
year war with each other from 1980 until 1988, which became known as the longest-
running conventional war of the twentieth century, with an estimated death toll of 
850,000 to 1 million people (Baxter, 2008: 109). This war highlighted the geopolitical 
interests at risk. It also led to disruptions in the flow of oil, destabilised the region and 
threatened the long-standing arrangement of Western states which aimed to preserve 
friendly relations with Gulf states through a stable balance of power and maintaining 
regional security. Together this created a greater opportunity for Iranian hegemony to 
spread throughout the Gulf (Joyner, 1990).  
Iran viewed the outbreak of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War as an attempt by Iraq and its 
allies, Saudi Arabia and the West, to quell the Iranian revolution. Iranians viewed the 
silence of the UN with regards to the Iraqi attack, the other Arab Gulf states’ support 
for Iraq, and the United States’ entry into the war on Iraq’s side, as evidence to 
support the theory that the war’s aim was to eliminate the Iranian revolution (Chubin 
and Tripp, 1996: 10). To Iran, the Iraqi attack was unprovoked and therefore see Arab 
support for it as evidence of hostility. Furthermore, Iran saw itself as the aggrieved 
party (ibid).  
This war also led the Soviet Union to become much more involved in the region, both 
politically and militarily. Such involvement had the potential to alter the balance of 
power in the region, threaten local Arab governments, and risk the access to Gulf oil 
for Western states. To continue the chaos, Iran tried to bully Kuwait and other 
regional states by attacking their shipping, especially their oil tankers, which became 
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known as the Tanker War. However, the war underlined the high-cost of political, 
social, and economic dislocations as a result of personal animosities and historical 
antagonisms in the Gulf (Joyner, 1990). 
Since then, other low points have been reached in relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. As a result of the hostile relationship between the two countries, in one event in 
1984 Saudi Arabia shot down an Iranian F-4 combat aircraft, and the Iranians 
attacked  Saudi shipping lines (Pterson, 2002: 15). Iran, however, tried to intimidate 
Kuwait and other regional states by weakening their support for Iraq by attacking 
their shipping, particularly their oil tankers. The “Tanker War” did not slow the Saudi 
oil exports, but it damaged ships and created a high tension situation. All these 
activities led Saudi Arabia to build a new alternative oil pipeline under the Red Sea 
(Karsh, 1989).  Again the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran reached a 
critical point during the Iranian demonstration in the 1987 Hajj (the Muslim 
pilgrimage to Makkah) that left hundreds dead, followed by a bombing set by Iranian 
agents during the 1989 Hajj (Moller, 2001).  
5.2.1.2 The Impact of the Second Gulf War and 2003 US Invasion 
The defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War changed the balance of power in the area, as 
Iraq had previously been considered the dominant power in the Gulf (Cordesman, 
2009: 74). The losses in Iraq allowed Iran to extend its control and influence in the 
region to fill the power vacuum caused by Iraq’s diminishing political power in the 
region. Despite the destruction of a large part of Iraq’s army in the 1991 Gulf War, it 
still had considerable power, but the 2003 US war in Iraq officially dissolved the Iraqi 
army and meant that Iraq’s army were no longer a great power. Thereby, insurgency 
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groups and militia groups were able to gain a greater role in Iraqi state security and 
politics.  
The seriousness of the problem has been highlighted by many studies and reports, 
such as Cordesman (2009), Henderson (2009), and Beehner and Bruno (2008). It has 
been noted that Iran has been accused by Iraqi officials, the United States, and by 
Saudi Arabia of using its military and intelligence assets to support Shi’a militia 
groups, such as the Mahdi Army, to expand Shi’a power in the south of Iraq and to 
form a major political force that could directly influence the shape of the future in 
Iraq. Analysts note that the Shi’a-led country is filled with influential figures such as 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who spent time during Saddam Hussein’s tenure 
exiled in Iran. Some even fought in Iranian-armed military units against Iraqi forces 
during the long, bloody Iran-Iraq War. Evidence of Iranian tactical support being 
supplied to the Iraqi Shi’a insurgency is worrying the United States and other regional 
states. Hence, Iraq is no longer a significant body against Iran’s revolution agenda and 
their intentions to spread their principles in the region. In fact, it has become a new 
starting point through which to spread the principles in other countries. Despite the 
threat that Iraq previously formed to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states, the loss 
of an important state such as Iraq, and Iran’s control over politics – plus their 
proclaimed intention to spread their ideologies in the region at the expense of the 
regional countries – pose uncountable threats and could cause serious threats to Saudi 
Arabian security in a number of security sectors, namely political, social, economic, 
and military threats. 
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5.2.1.3 Current Situation 
Despite a healthy trend in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran that lasted 
during most of the 1990s, Iran has showed aggressiveness in their intentions on a 
regular basis. This research runs up until June 2013, just before the election of 
President Hassan Rouhani.  
There is no general consensus in Iran with regard to foreign policy strategy or 
domestic-policy challenges of the country. Important moderate groups would prefer to 
have policies to transform Iran into a regional power by means of a process of social 
and economic reform, by integrating into the world’s economy through political 
dialogue with its neighbours and the West. In contrast, the hardliners or the extremists 
would prefer to stabilise the regime and Iranian supremacy in the Gulf through a mix 
of isolation and threatening policies. The hardliners in Iran also consider the army of 
the United States as bound to Iraq. They also believe that they are qualified to assume 
a political, economic and technological supremacy in the Gulf region. Additionally, 
they claim the United States and Israel are central threats (Hanelt, 2007).  
Iranian support for and interference in issues such as Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon 
through Hezbollah, in addition to its nuclear programme, are increasing the levels of 
fear among other Gulf countries. These issues all serve to feed religious and political 
confrontation between the Shi’as under Iranian leadership and the Sunnis under Saudi 
Arabian leadership. Internal and external perceptions of Iranian politics are far 
removed from each other; while many doubts occur regarding the United States’ 
political intentions, which results in the Iranians feeling threatened and giving highest 
priorities to the continuation of their regime. The option of nuclear armament is seen 
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as a threat to the region and world peace, which will be discussed in further detail 
later in the chapter.  
The Iranian navy also poses a significant irritation in the Gulf. To overcome the 
limitations of its surface forces, Iran relies heavily on alternative naval warfare 
through obtaining small submarines from North Korea and Russia (Ekovich, 2004). 
Iran is, thus, still considered to be an aggressor and a source of threat and irritation for 
regional and international security. Furthermore, in the ongoing US war on terror, 
which includes the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are serious controversial 
concerns that the Iranian’s are disrupting the United States’ role in their war in Iraq, 
which is undermining the US situation and creating a sort of breach in Iraqi security; 
this, in turn, will have a significant effect on security in the Gulf region (Hanelt, 2007: 
4).  
Yet, any military action that might be taken against Iran by the United States will 
most likely interfere with oil flows from the Gulf to the United States. As the Iranian 
Supreme Leader stated on 4 June 2006: “If the Americans make a wrong move 
toward Iran, the shipment of energy will definitely face danger, and the Americans 
would not be able to protect energy supply in the region.” (Henderson, 2008: ix). If 
such incidents take place, it will have serious consequences for the economy and 
security of the Gulf region and, in turn, will also affect the world’s economy and 
security.   
5.2.1.4  Iran’s WMD and Military Capabilities  
Iran’s nuclear programme is becoming a source of concern to political analysts 
around the world. Iran’s rapid development of a non-peaceful purposes nuclear 
programme became widely known after a recent confession by Abdul Qadeer Khan 
169	  	  
(Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist), that he and other scientists from his laboratory, 
along with a number of Pakistani diplomats and intelligence agents, sold nuclear 
weapon plans to states including Iran (Korb, 2005). Control of such proliferation of 
nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons, as well as long-range missile 
systems that can threaten far-off populations, has been a primary strategic priority for 
the United States for many years. The existence of such Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) in the Gulf and the Middle East is presenting a serious concern 
for Iran’s neighbours, and the US and its major allies.  
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran demonstrated its ability to deploy chemical weapons 
and is assumed to have accumulated fairly large stocks of chemical weapons and an 
active biological weapons programme. American analysts are uncertain whether or 
not Iran is capable of producing these weapons that can be delivered via ballistic 
missile warheads. To prove Iran’s claims, Iran has developed and tested the Shahab 
ballistic missile, which has a range of 1,300 km and can reach targets throughout the 
Middle East. Iran also has a range of shorter-range missiles (Korb, 2005: 9).   
According to Rogers (2010), some Israeli sources insist that Iran might only need a 
year or two to produce a nuclear weapon, whereas other sources suggest a much 
longer time. Rogers explicates that in theory, the low-enriched uranium could be run 
repeatedly through centrifuge cascades to enrich it towards the 85%+ level of 
weapons grade uranium. Iran has previously announced that it has enriched samples 
to 20% to supply a nuclear reactor used to produce medical and other isotopes; 
Rogers believes that this indicates that Iran could be close to a very limited nuclear 
weapons potential. In short, his arguments suggest that Iran is slowly developing a 
nuclear-related technology and personnel systems. Despite this, if Iran is really 
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planning to develop a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, then it will need a timescale 
of three to seven years (ibid). The existing literature sources on Middle Eastern 
security policies do not provide any solid evidence that such a decision has already 
been taken.    
American analysts do not believe that the Iranian government would transfer hard-
earned WMD materials to terrorist groups, yet, any possibility of such events taking 
place is enough to cause a major strategic concern for the United States and the Gulf 
region.  
According to Cordesman (2009: 81), “the two Iranian entities that pose a special 
threat to Saudi national security are the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
Quds Force, and the IRGC naval force”. 
Moreover, Iran has attempted to develop its ballistic missile force. Currently, Iran, 
with extensive help from North Korea, has deployed its Shahab-3 missile with a range 
of 800-1000 km (Rogers, 2010: 7). However, the greater concern is driven from the 
development of the Shahab missile into a longer-range Ghadr-1 missile, which ranges 
up to 1,600 km (ibid). Likewise, Iran’s long-term commitment to develop more 
powerful ballistic missiles, with much faster pre-launch procedures and that use solid 
fuel rather than liquid fuel, is also generating concerns to Israel and perhaps to Saudi 
Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia remains extremely concerned with Iran’s military potential. Tehran 
promises that Iran is not building a nuclear bomb. Saudi Arabia does not have much 
confidence in such promises, perhaps since Saudi Arabia continues to see the regime 
in Iran as essentially aggressive, due to the fact that the Iranian intention is to become 
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a supreme power in the Gulf region (Pterson, 2002). Undoubtedly, a nuclear-armed 
Iran would disturb the balance of power in the area and would probably force the 
Saudis and other major GCC states to develop their own nuclear capabilities and 
remain under the defensive umbrella of the United States. 
The military balance in the Gulf region is being shaped by a US effort to deter and 
defend against Iran by strengthening its military capabilities in the Gulf, and those of 
its partner countries on the Arabian Peninsula – particularly in the realm of air power, 
missile defence, and air-sea operations. The resulting partnership must deal with an 
array of threats that range from low-level attacks or clashes in the Gulf, to the 
possibility of closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or Iranian intervention in the Syrian 
civil war, or Iranian missile strikes. 
5.2.2 Iraq 
Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein was a nightmare for Saudi Arabia. But even 
without Saddam Iraq has become more complicated.  For more than half a century 
Saudi Arabia has viewed Iraq with suspicion. When Saddam Hussein was in power 
Saudi Arabia observed Saddam as an oppressor and a regional troublemaker (Gause 
III, 2003). But Iraq has become a power vacuum without Saddam, which has caused 
almost the same destabilising effect. Saudis saw the overthrow of Saddam as 
unavoidable but also unwelcome, and Saudi cooperation during the 2003 US invasion 
of Iraq was limited, especially when compared with the Saudi assistance in the 1991 
Gulf War (Gause III, 2003). 
When the Iranian revolution leaders took control of their country, Saddam Hussein 
played a massive role in facing the revolution (Byman, 2002). During most of the 
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Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states financially backed 
Saddam Hussein, as he was considered to be a great defender in the face of Iranian 
ambitions in the Gulf area. Saddam’s obsession with Iran blunted his ambitions to 
interfere in Arab politics, and he became known as a defender in the face of Shi’a 
Iranian revolution influences (Henderson, 2005).  
All other Gulf countries also sided with Iraq, hoping that Iraq would work as a 
bulwark against the Iranian revolution. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab 
Emirates financed Iraq with approximately $50 billion in loans (Sean, 2008: 45). The 
Iran-Iraq War further separated Iran from the Gulf states, brought the remaining Gulf 
states together and encouraged a shared security among them to fight against Iran; this 
ultimately promoted the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
Saudi Arabia’s alliance with Saddam Hussein’s regime during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
War occurred mainly because of the common interest that emerged as a result of the 
Iranian revolution and the Iranian’s intentions that together caused fear among the 
countries in the area. Yet, the Saudi-Iraqi alliance was surrounded with suspicion 
(Pterson, 2002).  
Saudi Arabia’s suspicion over Saddam Hussein’s regime revitalised in August 1990, 
with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia contributed a lot to freeing Kuwait by 
providing military assistance and access for the US-led coalition forces, as started to 
occur in January 1991. Iraq responded with a Scud missile against Saudi Arabia 
(Baxter, 2008). The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait brought Saudi Arabia even closer to the 
United States, since Saudi Arabia supported all United Nations (UN) resolutions on 
Iraq, including the sanctions regime and the no-fly zone over Iraq’s southern area 
(ibid). Saudi Arabia’s support for the last, in particular, caused a lot of difficulties. 
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The United States kept huge numbers of troops in Saudi Arabia in order to keep the 
no-fly zone over Iraq’s southern area and to prevent Saddam Hussein from taking any 
further action towards the Gulf oil states (Rogers, 2008). As a result, this foreign 
presence motivated an anti-American feeling between some sectors of Saudi society 
and gave fuel to the terrorist campaign that Bin Laden launched in 1990 – Al-Qaeda 
(Klare, 2004: 27).  
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, under the “War on Terror” campaign, produced a 
new challenge for the Gulf region’s security and has triggered debate regarding the 
United States in the Islamic world (Gause III, 2003). After the US invasion, Saudi 
Arabia became disappointed with the Shi’a dominance over the Iraqi government, 
which damaged the Saudi interests and gave a greater chance for Iran to control Iraq 
and the region (Henderson, 2007). 
Saudi Arabia’s policies have always aimed to safeguard the security and stability of 
Iraq. However, the fall of Saddam, the traditional defender against Iran, has changed 
the Sunni-Shi’a balance of power in Iraq and in the region. Increased Iranian 
interference or movement in Iraq means more influence of Iran in the area (Baxter, 
2008). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia is ready to put pressure on the Iraqi 
government to either make concessions to Iraqi Sunnis or to separate itself from Iran. 
Indeed, Saudi Arabia did not withdraw from the prospect of confronting Iran more 
directly, but with additional threats from Iran, it will be difficult to achieve a happy 
compromise between the two states (Henderson, 2007). 
5.2.2.1 Current Situation 
Currently, Iraq is facing several problems. This research covers the period up until 
June 2013, at which point, security in Iraq varies from region to region. The country 
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is facing the risk of breaking apart into separate ethnic-religious parts. The central 
government is weak and faces local and regional authorities and militia groups who 
also fight among themselves. Moreover, a climate of fear is being produced due to the 
spread of terrorism in the country that is forcing thousands of Iraqis to flee to 
neighbouring countries every day; this by itself is creating new problems. Iraq, 
therefore, represents a condition of uncertainty which is a core problem for Saudi 
Arabian national security. 
Iran has been accused of using its military and intelligence assets to support Shi’a 
militias to expand Shi’a power in the south of Iraq and make it a major political force 
in shaping Iraq in the future. Whereby, Cordesman (2009) argues that Saudi Arabia 
has a strong stake in curbing Iran’s influence and halting the creation of a Shi’a 
crescent between Iraq and Iran that could cause further Sunni-Shi’a conflicts in the 
Gulf and beyond. The real fear is that Iraq will become like Palestine or Somalia, and 
most likely become the central scene for American-Iranian conflicts of interest, or a 
land of selfish interests or Jihadists (Hanelt, 2007: 4). As a consequence of Iran’s 
intervention and involvement in Iraq in many areas, including military, political and 
economic aspects, Iraq can be seen as an extended territory for Iran. Beehner and 
Bruno (2008) argue that the United States alleges that Iran is involved in Iraq on a 
number of fronts:  
1. Military: through the Quds Force, a special operations wing of Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
2. Religious: by sending thousands of religious students and scholars to Shi’a 
holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, where one-third of them belong to Iranian 
intelligence units. 
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3. Economic: Iran has become one of Iraq’s largest trading partners, with Iranian 
exports to Iraq topping $1.8 billion in 2006. 
4. Social: Many powerful Iraqi Shi’a political parties made Iran their home base. 
All in all, these factors make Iraq a hostile force and a similar source of direct threat 
to Saudi Arabia’s national security as Iran, caused by their dependence and direct 
association with Iran. 
5.2.3 The Northern Arab States (Syria and Jordan) 
For few decades, the sort of threats that Syria and Jordan posed during the Nasser era 
of Egypt and Ba’athist ideologies of the 1950s and 1960s were low (Pterson, 2002: 
21). More recently, for most Arab states, an assumed alliance between Iran and Syria 
is seen as proof of a rising Shi’a crescent, demonstrated by the shared religious 
identity of the Shi’a governments, and therefore evidence of an emerging political 
order for a new Middle East. As explained earlier (Chapter 4), the Shi’a evolved as a 
powerful political movement in 680 AD, but as Shi’a Islam spread across the Middle 
East and into Syria in the first half of the eighth century, it developed a tiny sect today 
known as “Alawites” which means the “followers of Ali”. The Alawites represent a 
joint mix of Phoenician paganism and Christianity (Kaplan, 1993) and they 
incorporated Shi’a Islam into their belief system by deifying Ali, along with the 
Prophet Muhammad and Salman of Persia, to form a trinity reminiscent of the triune 
monotheism of Christianity (Proctor, 2008: 33-34).  
Syria fell into the French sphere of influence after World War I and the new colonial 
officials tried to forge a more inclusive, secular government in Syria by encouraging 
minority sects to fill government and military positions. Over the decades, the sect 
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slowly began to dominate the military (Corm, 2010: 109-110). The Alawite minority 
currently makes up around 10% of the Syrian population, but due to the assiduous 
French recruitment of minorities (especially Alawites) into the troups, the Alawites 
have gradually taken over the military from within. But it was the coup of 1970, 
which brought an Alawite air-force officer, Hafiz al-Assad (the father of Bashar al-
Assad) to power (Proctor, 2008: 35). 
As Hafiz al-Assad began to back up his regime, a new threat was to threaten his 
success. The Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Salifi movement which originated in 
Egypt, was growing in popularity. The movement wanted to restore the world 
dominance of Islam by establishing Shari’ah law as the foundation upon which Syria 
would be based. The Muslim Brotherhood found direct popularity with the majority 
Sunni population in Syria. The new Alawite regime was an easy target for the Muslim 
Brotherhood due to its apostasy from both Sunnis and Shi’as who had historically 
seen Alawites as heretical (Ulph, 2006).  A decade of violence with the Muslim 
Brotherhood culminated when Hafiz al-Assad ordered a massive military assault 
against the city of Hama in 1982 (a stronghold of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria), 
where between 10,000 and 30,000 residents were murdered (Zambelis, 2005: 100).  
As Assad tackled the Muslim Brotherhood at Hama, they started to develop a more 
tolerant form of Sunni Islam for Syria; however, the 1990s witnessed the rise of 
Salifist jihadism. This new strain of Salifism merged the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
desire for a return to governance by Shari’ah law with the terrorist tactics of 
Hezbollah (Proctor, 2008). Meanwhile, Hafiz al-Assad disliked Sunni-dominated Iraq 
and viewed it as a threat, as lots of its Sunni tribes were placed across the Iraqi-Syrian 
border. Thus, when Iraq was involved in war with Iran, Assad lined up with Iran. 
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Later, when Saddam Hussein was again under attack, this time from the US-led 
coalition, Syria participated in the break-up of Iraq’s army (ibid). 
Syria has had a constant presence in Lebanon since 1976, where Syria refused to 
officially demarcate the border and would not open an embassy in Lebanon, as it 
believes that Lebanon is part of a greater Syria. The Syrian government sent troops 
into Lebanon in 1976 to try to stem a civil war. However, under pressure from the 
United Nations, it withdrew 14,000 troops in 2005 after the assassination of former 
Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri. A UN tribunal is investigating allegations that 
Syria was behind that murder and those of other Lebanese politicians, but even after 
international pressure to leave Lebanon, they continued to maintain a small military 
presence, which, according to a report put together by the International Lebanese 
Committee for the UN Security Council Resolution 1559, claims that Syria maintains 
army camps in Lebanon, and dozens of smuggling passages to permeate foreign 
fighters and weapons. It adds that it allows members of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard and Palestinian militants allied with Syria to stay on Lebanese soil (Slavin, 
2007).  
It is worth noting that Syria under the Alawite regime became isolated and suffered 
from hatred from most of its neighbouring Arab states, either due to its ideologies or 
policies. Thus, Syria allied itself with Iran because Iran was the only country that 
would fully tolerate it. Furthermore, Syria was the only country to accept Iran at the 
regional level. Hence, Syria is Iran’s only supporter in the region and vice versa, 
which explains the Syrian position beyond the concept of the Shi’a crescent (Proctor, 
2008).  
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5.2.3.1 Current Situation 
The Syrian civil war, which started in 2011, created a major challenge for Saudi 
Arabian national security, as well as for other countries in the region. It also created a 
collision between Saudi Arabia and the United States, and Russia, in addition to some 
of the GCC countries. The current Syrian civil war also produced internal divisions 
between Sunnis, Alawites, Kurds, and Syria’s smaller minorities, and has launched a 
long-lasting anger and hatred between Sunni and Shi’a (Alawite) Muslims. The war 
has already spread to involve Lebanon and Iraq, unleashing a reawakening of 
sectarian tensions and conflict in each country. It has developed into a religious war 
within Islam that gradually positions Sunni against Shi’a, and religious extremists 
against mainstream Islam, across the entire Islamic world. The civil war has also led 
to Qatari, Saudi, Turkish, Jordanian, and UAE involvement, either through them 
providing money, training, or weapons to the opposition, or where Iran and Russia 
have supported Bashar al-Assad, along with Hezbollah. More than 93,000 people 
have been killed in the Syrian conflict so far (Black, 2013). According to Cordesman 
(2013), Saudi Arabia and the UAE were divided from Qatar in both Syria and Egypt 
because of Qatar’s willingness to support the Muslim Brotherhood and the more hard-
line Islamist elements of the Syrian rebels.  
Hence, the Syrian civil war is adding a possible political, economic, social, and 
military threat to Saudi Arabian national security at all three levels of state security 
(domestic, regional, and international) and will probably continue to do so in the near 
future.  
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5.2.4 Israel and the Palestinian Issue 
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is one of the most serious causes of 
instability in the Middle East. The US’s ongoing support for Israel has greatly 
complicated and continues to complicate the Arab-US relationship and the peace 
process (Baxter, 2008). However, in terms of Saudi Arabia’s relationships with Israel, 
neither have ever been in direct relationship or had direct connections. There has 
never been direct confrontation with Israel and it is unlikely to happen, given Saudi 
Arabia’s history of non-confrontation and the limited military threat that it poses 
(Pterson, 2002).  
Saudi Arabia, like many of the Arab countries, objected to the creation of Israel at the 
heart of the Arab world, but unlike Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Saudi Arabia’s 
participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict was small; where it was involved more in 
diplomatic and financial approaches than military (Bahgat, 2007). To briefly 
summarise, the conflict began in the nineteenth century. Palestine was under two 
administrative districts of the Ottoman rule which lasted four centuries (1516-1918), 
the ‘Sanjak’ of Jerusalem and the ‘Vilayet’ of Beirut. The Ottoman government did 
not consider Palestine’s districts as being important until the middle of the nineteenth 
century when the Muslim Sultan decided to protect the holy places of Islam, 
Christianity and Judaism as a political and religious obligation (Fraser, 2008: 2). By 
the beginning of the First World War (WWI), Palestine was inhabited by 650,000 
Arabs and 90,000 Jews (Ahmad, 2008: 7).  
During the First World War, the Ottomans joined the German camp against the allied 
powers of Britain, Russia, and France. Britain rushed to secure allies, and made 
promises to both the Arabs (in the 1915 McMahon commitment) and the Jews (in the 
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Balfour Declaration), whereby Arab nationalists and Jewish Zionists both aspired for 
the creation of their own homeland in Palestine (Thomas, 1999: 9-11).  
At the end of the First World War, the League of Nations established the British 
Mandate over the territory of Palestine as the governing authority. But the British 
appeared to be unsuccessful in appeasing the national aspirations of the Zionist Jews 
and Palestinian Arabs, hence, the United Nations voted in 1947 to partition Palestine 
into two states, Arab and Jewish (Ahmad, 2008: 8).  
Meanwhile, the British Prime Minister of the time, Lloyd George had some sympathy 
for the idea of creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine. In 1948, Britain experienced 
pressure from the “Lehi” Jewish terrorist group (the last organisation that referred to 
themselves as a terrorist group) – an armed group of Zionists who were a faction of 
Mandatory Palestine, and whose aim was to evacuate the British authorities from 
Palestine so that they could form a Jewish state (Rapoport, 2006: 10-11).  
The Jewish repossessed their right to this area as their homeland which was lost more 
than 2,000 years before and the British had to withdraw in 1948. Consequently, the 
State of Israel was proclaimed and it instantly started receiving aid from the United 
States. Since then, the Palestinians and neighbouring Gulf countries have been in 
deep-rooted conflict with Israel that has developed even further in recent years 
(Campbell, 2005). Despite the short history of Israel, wars have characterised most of 
its brief past.  The Suez war of 1956, the six-day war of 1967, the Yom Kipper war of 
1973, the 1982 Lebanon war, and the 2006 war in Lebanon (Baxter, 2008: 46-65).   
The 1967 war was a marker point, since Saudi Arabia got involved in the Arab-Israeli 
conflicts. After 1967, Saudi Arabia carried on being the leading state in designing 
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Arab policy for Israel and since then a major development emerged (Bahgat, 2007: 
50). As part of the Arab defeat in the war, Israel captured East Jerusalem, and united 
the entire city, including the holy site of the al-Aqsa Mosque, under Israeli 
sovereignty. Israel also captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to Syria’s 
Golan Heights and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under 
King Faisal, could not afford to be uninvolved, and King Faisal who had prayed at al-
Aqsa several years earlier, expressed his desire to pray again at al-Aqsa before his 
death, but his wish was never satisfied (Quandt, 1981: 31).  
	  
Figure 5.1: Map of the Gulf of Aqaba 
Source: Graphic Maps, from www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/infopage/gulfaqba.gif 
Another important factor in the 1967 war was the defeat of radical Arab nationalists, 
led by President Gamal Abdul-Nasser of Egypt. This is important because the threat 
to Saudi Arabia was then eliminated (Bahgat, 2007). Before the 1967 war, the Arab 
world was divided into two groups: pro-Western conservative regimes and radical 
socialist-nationalist states and this situation reached its peak in the proxy war between 
the Egyptian and Saudi armies in Yemen, as will be seen later in this chapter.  The 
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Egyptian defeat in the 1967 war ended its involvement in the Yemen conflict. Egypt 
became more concerned with liberating the territories it lost to Israel, rather than 
supporting Arab revolutionary movements. The loss of the Suez Canal also caused 
massive damage to the Egyptian economy. This condition made Egypt increasingly 
dependent on foreign aid and some of their major economic reliance came from 
labour remittances from Arab oil-producing countries (ibid: 50).  
After that, Saudi Arabia increased its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the early 
1970s, Saudi Arabia started offering financial and diplomatic assistance. Then in 
1981, Saudi Arabia offered its first peace plan for their vision of a comprehensive 
peace; this marked the first public Saudi attempt to play an active role in resolving the 
conflict (Cordesman, 2009: 43). However, during the 1956 war, Israel had occupied 
several unpopulated Saudi islands (Sanafir and Tiran) in the Gulf of Aqaba (part of 
the Red Sea see Figure 5.1), returning them later to Egyptian control. Saudi Arabia 
recovered them following the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979 (Bahgat, 2007: 
50). 
In 2001, King Abdullah, while Crown Prince, offered the second peace plan. He and 
the Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, actively supported the peace plan and it 
was reapproved unanimously by the Arab leaders at the Beirut summit on 2 May 
2002. Unfortunately, it was not fully accepted by the Israelis (ibid). Although many 
senior Israeli leaders expressed support for talks based on King Abdullah’s proposal, 
some of the details divide both sides. The emergence of the latest Saudi peace plan 
came about due to a common interest between Israel and the moderate Arab states 
with regard to Iran’s regional ambitions (Bahgat, 2007). 
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The continual Israeli construction of settlements in occupied territories is causing 
complications and difficulties for the peace process between Israel and Palestine. The 
ongoing expansion of existing settlements is often criticised as an obstacle to the 
peace process by the Palestinians and other parties, including the United Nations, the 
Arab League, the United Kingdom, Russia, the European Union, the United States 
and others.  
Israel’s nuclear programme is still posing a threat to Saudi Arabia and the Middle 
East and may possibly play a part in Saudi Arabia’s strategic perception. Israel is one 
of four nuclear-armed countries not recognised as a nuclear weapons states by the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the others being India, Pakistan and North 
Korea. Officially, Israel has never been approved to own nuclear weapons, instead 
repeating over the years that it would not be the first country to “introduce” nuclear 
weapons to the Middle East (Thowhidul, 2012: 71). Israeli nuclear capability was 
achieved in the late 1960s and it is believed that they have more than 200 nuclear 
warheads, ready to be delivered by aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles. 
Furthermore, Israel might also be developing nuclear warheads for submarine-
launched cruise missiles – Israel currently has four German-built Dolphin-class 
submarines (Rogers, 2010: 4). Although Israel believes nuclear capability is essential 
to its security, whether or not Israel or other countries in the region obtain nuclear 
weapons, the very idea will still pose a threat to the security and the peace of the 
region, in addition to any environmental consequences that such programmes hold.  
Israel mainly forms a political and military threat. Moreover, it is traditionally a 
hostile element to Saudi security as it comprises a series of ideological, territorial, and 
ethnic threats on a historical level. But, its threats are mainly limited to the regional 
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level, and to some extent the international level, caused by Israeli lobbying and 
support in and from the United States.  
5.2.5 Yemen  
Saudi Arabia and Yemen are the biggest and oldest countries – in terms of geography 
and demography – on the Arabian Peninsula. During the last seven decades their 
relationships have seen marked ups and downs with brief military conflicts, border 
disputes, and political differences. Yemen has been a source of concern to Saudi 
Arabia since the Yemeni revolution of 1962, when a successful military revolution 
brought about the establishment of a republican system which formed a serious threat 
to Saudi Arabian security and stability (Alsaud, 2000: 2-3).  
According to Alsaud (2000), the Soviet Union and its camp offered assistance in all 
fields to the new Yemeni government, in order to gain influence near the oil fields of 
the Arabian Gulf, thus putting the Western interests in danger. Alsaud argued that this 
development alarmed the Saudis and led them to side with the prior royalist ruler of 
Yemen, who started to regroup to remove the new government from power. Egypt on 
the other hand, under the rule of President Gamal Abdul-Nasser and some of the Arab 
states who supported revolutionary Arab nationalism (Nasserism) sided with the new 
regime by offering them political and military support. This all led to a civil war in 
1962 in Yemen, which lasted for seven years and involved a proxy war between the 
Egyptian and Saudi armies in Yemen.  
Saudi Arabia’s policy from 1967 until 1990, was balanced between supporting the 
moderate regimes in North Yemen and containing the Marxist regimes in South 
Yemen. As a result of the Soviet Union’s collapse, South Yemen merged with North 
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Yemen in 1990. Furthermore, the relations between the Yemenis and the Saudis 
between 1967 and 1990 were overshadowed by long territorial disputes and 
ideological differences that started during the civil war of the 1960s (Pterson, 2002: 
24).  
Currently, Saudi Arabia experiences friendly relations with Yemen. Saudi Arabia’s 
border disputes with Yemen were resolved in 2000, after the twentieth round of 
negotiations. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has stopped its efforts to turn Yemeni tribes 
against the central government and has also worked towards including Yemen as a 
member in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Yemen’s government does not 
support radical fundamentalists who are unfriendly to the Saudi government and has 
built far more positive relations with Saudis compared to the past (Cordesman, 2009).  
Yet, past tensions between the southern and northern regions of Yemen, which were 
shaped by sectarian cleavages and failures in power sharing, continue to pose 
challenges to the Yemeni government and to the Saudis as well. Yemen has been a 
major shelter for Al-Qaeda terrorists operating against Saudi Arabia in the Arabian 
Peninsula, where they have targeted the rugged and inhospitable Saudi-Yemeni 
border to pursue activities such as illegal immigration, importation of drugs and arms, 
and other types of smuggling.  
Counterterrorism experts suggest that the presence of Saudi militants in Yemen 
demonstrate that Al-Qaeda’s presence in Saudi Arabia has been significantly 
obstructed by Saudi security forces (Sharp, 2010), nevertheless, experts also suggest 
that Al-Qaeda has chosen Yemen as a safe place and potential long-term base of 
operations to conduct terrorist attacks internally and even abroad. Sharp (2010) 
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indicates that throughout most of 2009, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
were responsible for several attacks in Yemen and inside Saudi Arabia. 
In addition to the Al-Qaeda threat in Yemen, the Yemeni government faces other 
domestic insurgencies that pose a more immediate risk to government survival. The 
Al-Houthi conflict (its name originates from the revolt’s leaders, the Al-Houthi 
family, a prominent Zaydi religious tribe who claim to be descended from the prophet 
Muhammad), has been raging for nearly six years in the northern most governorate of 
Sa’dah, adding another element of instability to a country that is already facing a 
nationalist struggle in the south and global jihad movement (Atarodi, 2010). 
The significance of Yemen, as a field of struggle between regional powers, is 
growing. Since 2004, fighting has been going on in Yemen’s northern province of 
Sa’dah. Saudi Arabia was dragged into the fighting in November 2009 (Sharp, 2010: 
18). Although the war has ended, many lost their lives and more than 100,000 people 
were displaced by the clashes between government troops and the north western Al-
Houthi (or Houthi) rebels. Additionally, a regional dimension arose from the conflict, 
with the Yemeni authorities accusing Iran of backing the rebels, while the rebels 
accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the Yemeni government (Atarodi, 2010). 
The conflict not only threatens Yemen’s unity, it also generates a growing threat to 
Saudi Arabia over and above the whole region. According to Guzansky (2009), the 
fighting is turning Yemen into another arena of struggle (which is highly important 
because of its strategic location), between the pragmatic Sunnis seeking to include 
Yemen in their midst, and the radical Shi’a country of Iran, which is seeking to 
expand its regional influence and establish a presence in the Red Sea and Horn of 
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Africa area. Iran has already increased the presence of its navy in the Gulf of Aden 
area, claiming it aims to deal with the rising risk of piracy in the region.  
Returning to the subject of Al-Houthi, the leader of the family, Hussain Badr al din 
Al-Houthi, believed that Zaydi Shi’ism and the Zaydi community were becoming 
marginalised in Yemeni society for a variety of reasons, including government 
neglect of the Sa’dah governorate and Saudi Arabian proselytising in Sa’dah. Hussain 
Badr al din Al-Houthi formed a radical organisation called the “Organisation for 
Youthful Believers” as a revivalist Zaydi group for Al-Houthi followers to dispute the 
legitimacy of the Yemeni government; they were firmly opposed to the rule of 
President Saleh. However, Hussain Badr al din Al-Houthi was killed by Yemeni 
troops in 2004. His son, Abdul Malik Al-Houthi, is now the leader of the group, 
though there have been numerous government claims that he was killed during the 
war in December 2009. The Yemeni government claims that Al-Houthi rebels seek to 
establish a Zaydi theocratic state in Sa’dah with Iranian assistance (Sharp, 2010).  
Sa’dah remains one of the poorest areas of Yemen, and experts believe the Al-Houthi 
family focused upon the desperation of many of the province’s inhabitants to build a 
religious, insurgent movement capable of fighting in the region’s mountainous areas. 
The Saudis, on the other hand, connect Al-Houthi rebels with Al-Qaeda militants who 
are exploiting the circumstances in Yemen to destabilise the region. The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has been concerned with Yemeni fighting spilling over and concerned 
with the possibility that Yemen-based Al-Qaeda militants could take advantage of the 
tense situation by smuggling militant forces, arms and drugs across the difficult-to-
control border. In addition to the northern rebels, the government in Sanaa is also 
confronting a separatist movement in the south, which weakens the authority of the 
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government even further (Cordesman, 2009). None of these elements are in the best 
interest of the Saudis. Hence, Saudi Arabia became involved in fighting against the 
rebels, as this aspect has a vital impact on Saudi Arabia’s own national interests in the 
region. Any political instability in Yemen will have effects on the stability of the 
Arabian Peninsula and the flow of oil from the Gulf of Aden.  
The domestic political situation in Yemen is critically important to the security and 
stability of Saudi Arabia. Thus, Yemen poses a source of threat that stretches the 
regional, or external level and goes into the sphere of domestic security for Saudi 
Arabia; this affects Saudi Arabia’s political, military, economic and social security 
sectors.  
5.2.6 Horn of Africa and Other Red Sea Challenges 
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean poses a serious challenge to the 
security of the Red Sea lanes and the flow of Saudi exports. In 2008 alone, piracy in 
the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean was cited as being the cause of 80 attacks 
which involved a number of outside nations, including the United States, the Ukraine, 
Russia, India, and many other countries (Cordesman, 2009: 34-35). No international 
navy has been involved in any serious action against the pirates. It is unclear how 
Saudi Arabia or other regional states would deploy their forces to tackle piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.  
There is no clear evidence in the literature that suggests whether the political 
instability in Sudan, or tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, will affect the shipping 
flow through the Red Sea or Saudi Arabian security. But, it is almost certain that 
Saudi Arabia cannot rely on the security of the Red Sea or the Indian Ocean. The 
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Kingdom has already faced threats of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian 
Ocean. In November 2008, a Saudi super tanker (the MV Sirius Star), was hijacked 
by pirates from Somalia, while carrying some $100 million worth of Saudi oil 
(Cordesman, 2009: 34). The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, said his country 
would join international efforts to battle piracy after the seizure of the Saudi oil ship.  
According to Cordesman (2009), the local navies in Somalia and Yemen have little 
capabilities to parallel the naval assets required to enforce security in the area. 
Somalia has no real navy, and Yemen has small numbers of patrol boats. Oman on the 
other hand, must focus on defending the Strait of Hormuz, which makes Saudi Arabia 
the only southern Gulf state with naval assets capable of contributing to naval 
security, but the area is beyond its territorial waters. Altogether, the circumstances 
make it very difficult to form a permanent solution to the piracy issue in the Gulf of 
Aden and Indian Ocean.  
Perhaps threats coming from insecurity in the Horn of Africa region (which mainly 
involve piracy) will remain regional problems that do not extend to the internal or 
state level, however, they certainly extend to the international or global level due to 
the typical overseas destinations and high capacity for valuable loads that these ships 
carry, especially when the flow of oil from the Gulf region is considered. In terms of 
Saudi national security, these threats mainly present a danger to economic security. 
5.2.7 Oil Security and US Connections 
Oil security was discussed in Chapter 4 while discussing the economic security sector 
in Saudi Arabia and so it was addressed at the domestic level of security. However, 
oil is a global strategic commodity, and so it has constituted regional and international 
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challenges and threats to the Saudi state by involving external parties. This aspect will 
be examined in this section, primarily through examining the external risks and 
challenges that occur due to the existence of such a strategic commodity. 
One of the primary concerns for Saudi Arabia is the protection of its oilfields. Most of 
the Saudi oilfields are located in uninhabited areas and are easy to monitor. The 
protection of the oilfields, pipelines and terminals against any disruption is the 
responsibility of the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG), with the assistance of the 
Saudi ARAMCO oil company. The strategic job of protecting oil does not fall to 
Saudi Arabia alone. Ever since the Second World War, oil for the United States has 
become central to their foreign policy, a matter whereby oil has been considered a 
vital resource and access to it must be secured by all manners, including military 
action (Klare, 2004). In the aftermath of the Arab oil embargo, the United States 
placed the security of the oilfields in the Persian Gulf, and access to energy supplies 
in the region, as a major US security interest. Oil security became one of the main 
elements contributing to the establishment of the Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force 
(JRDTF), which was later devolved into a new unified military command, the US 
Central Command (CENTCOM), where their main responsibility is to protect the oil 
flow from the Gulf area. 
While Saudi Arabia was enjoying its rising control of the global oil market and new 
revenues, the US was becoming more and more concerned about three elements: oil 
security, Soviet involvement in the Gulf area, and its own military deployment within 
the Gulf region. All of which contributed to the United States undertaking a serious 
analysis study (done by the Congressional Research Service) which focused on the 
military deployment that might be needed to control foreign oil fields; this chiefly 
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looked at the main oil-producing countries in the Middle East and North Africa, 
especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria (Rogers, 2008). 
The Congressional Research Service analysis with regards to oil security focused on 
the intervention capacity of the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine corps. By 
1977, the huge need to secure oil had become evident. President Carter issued a 
Presidential Order I8 which required the US armed forces to engage in structured 
planning towards operations in places behind areas of US military operations, the 
emphasis being on the Gulf area (ibid). The Congressional Research Service analysis 
was followed by a period of planning and arguments which ended with the Chiefs of 
Staff agreeing to the JRDTF. It was established immediately at the end of the Carter 
presidency, but had only a little impact on crises at that time, such as the Iranian 
revolution and the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets (Rogers, 2008: 52).  
It was strongly argued by some that the JRDTF did not secure the Gulf region 
sufficiently. This contributed to the Reagan administration’s decision to upgrade the 
JRDTF force into a new unified military command, US Central Command 
(CENTCOM), which plays the “nerve centre” role for all US military operations in 
the Persian Gulf area and the whole Middle East. CENTCOM was established in 
January 1983 (Klare, 2004, p. 4). 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, at the end of July 1990, in what became known as the 
Gulf War, Saudi Arabia became involved in the war, and the United States showed 
that it wouldn’t hesitate to defend Saudi Arabia, confirming its commitment to 
ensuring the flow of oil through the Gulf region. This became evident when President 
George H.W. Bush, on 8 August, 1990, said on national television: “Our nation now 
imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic 
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independence. Hence, the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest 
to the United States” (Klare, 2004: 5).  
As a consequence, hundreds of thousands of US forces were deployed to stop a 
possible attack by Iraqi forces on Saudi Arabia, in which the American forces 
succeeded and the United States decided to embargo Iraq’s oil exports. This operation 
instantly removed more than five million barrels a day from the markets, and the 
threat of new record oil prices emerged again. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Saudi 
Arabia responded to this threat by raising its oil output from more than five million 
barrels per day in September 1990 to more than eight million barrels per day.  
The American intervention produced a new series of complications and consequences.  
After expelling the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the US kept large numbers of troops in 
Saudi Arabia in order to maintain the no-fly zone over Iraq’s southern area and to 
prevent the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein, from taking any further action towards 
the Gulf oil states. As a result, this foreign presence motivated an anti-American 
feeling between some of the sectors of Saudi society and gave fuel to the campaign 
that Bin Laden launched in 1990: Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden had previously been regarded 
as a CIA asset during the 1980s, when he was fighting against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (Rogers, 2008: 120-121).   
In the aftermath of the war, the United States placed vast quantities of arms and 
missiles at supply depots in Qatar and Kuwait, in order to allow faster deployment for 
the US troops in the area in case of any further attack. This strategy was the driving 
factor for the US-Saudi military relationship from the 1991 Gulf War which led to the 
attacks of September 2001 on New York and Washington. In fact, the Department of 
Defence used its command centre at the Prince Sultan Air Base outside Riyadh to 
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direct US air combat operations in the Gulf. Furthermore, vast quantities of modern 
weapons were sold to the Saudi military and the National Guard by the United States. 
Around $40 billion worth of arms and military services were directed towards Saudi 
Arabia through the Foreign Military Sales Program between 1991 and 1999 (Klare, 
2004: 53).     
Osama bin Laden viewed the Saudi royal family as being friends with the Americans, 
whereupon he called his followers to drive the Americans out of the country, 
declaring in 1998 (Klare, 2004: 54):  
… the United States has been occupying the land of Islam in the holiest places, 
the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating 
its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a 
spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples. 
He continued to make statements which highlighted that it was an individual duty for 
every Muslim to kill Americans and drive them out of all of the lands of Islam.       
Bin Laden then began attacking the US power in the region, especially military bases 
and embassies. He was responsible for the bombing of the Saudi Arabia National 
Guards headquarters in Riyadh, killing five Americans, followed by the bombing of 
Al-Khobar Towers (a residential complex occupied by US Air Force personnel in 
Dhahran) in 1996. Those attacks were then followed in 1998, by the bombing of the 
American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. Following 
this was the attack on the USS Cole, in Aden, Yemen, in October 2000, which was 
followed by the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington on 11 September, 2001 (Klare, 2004).  
As discussed earlier, the impact of the US presence became glaringly obvious through 
the attacks of 9/11. Analysts attributed a wide variety of motivations for the 
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September 11 attacks. Perhaps most famous, was the view that the 9/11 attacks 
represented the re-opening of a clash between the Islamic world and the West (mostly 
Christians). While others believe that it represented growing rage against economic 
globalisation, or against the continual American support for Israel against the 
Palestinians (ibid). 
Even so, the United States was acquiring more and more oil from the Gulf area. While 
it has tried to diversify its energy imports from regions other than the Gulf area, no 
other region has reserves large enough to satisfy the US and rising international 
demand. The six Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran jointly possess 64% of the world’s supplies or around 780 
billion barrels of proven reserves, and Saudi Arabia alone possesses 22% of the 
world’s supplies (see Figure 5.2). 
195	  	  
 
Figure 5.2: OPEC world crude oil reserves 
The attacks of 11 September, 2001 announced a turning point in US relations with 
GCC countries. The relationship was affected negatively, especially with the Saudi 
Arabians, as it was reported that most of the 9/11 attackers were from Saudi Arabia. 
Although in the aftermath many US and Saudi officials declared that Saudi Arabia 
and the United States still had excellent relations, the US military presence in Saudi 
Arabia became no longer useful for Saudi Arabia due to domestic opposition. 
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US military and political support for Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf states 
generated internal problems for citizens within these states. This is added to the US’s 
ongoing diplomatic and military support for Israel, which is generating negative 
attitudes across the Arab and Muslim world. Furthermore, there is wide belief within 
Arab and Muslim communities that the war on terror was essentially “a Zionist-
Christian crusade” targeted at the Arab World (Rogers, 2008).  
This view was given weight by the attitude of key US officials, including the 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and Deputy Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, who 
indicated their support for the regime change in Iraq before the attacks of September 
2001, in order to install a new regime that was friendly to the US interests. Vice 
President Cheney had for a long time affirmed both the strategic importance of Gulf 
energy for the United States and the need to deploy forces in the Gulf area (Yeomans, 
2005). 
Saudi cooperation during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was limited, when 
compared with the Saudi assistance in the 1991 Gulf War (Gause III, 2003), and by 
April 2003 the American troops, that in the 1990s had been responsible for ensuring 
the no-fly zone in the southern part of Iraq, began to leave and by the end of 
September 2003 they were gone (Klare, 2004: 90).  
The withdrawing of troops from Saudi Arabia does not means that the US is 
downgrading its commitment to protect the Saudi oil fields. The military training 
missions and the US facilities remain the same and will also be available in the event 
of attacks on Saudi Arabia. Indeed, due to the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Gulf 
region currently hosts the largest concentration of US troops in the world; hence, the 
area is central to US security strategy (Korb, 2005).  
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The Gulf region is also crucial for the transportation of energy supplies. More than 
90% of the Gulf’s oil exports (at least 40% of the world’s oil exports) pass through 
the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis (Korb, 2005: 4), which makes it a critical 
maritime area for the world’s economy. This is primarily because oil-shipping 
alternatives are not comparable, for example, pipelines or trucks are inflexible and 
more expensive, and would impose serious economic costs. Thus, it is very important 
that maritime navigation in the Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz is free of 
disruption.  
Access through the Strait of Hormuz to the Gulf is also important to the US military 
presence and power protection within the region, which significantly depends on the 
ability of carrier battle groups to launch air and cruise missile strikes, and the ability 
to rapidly resupply troops using sealift. Therefore, maintaining access within the Gulf 
presents a special challenge (Korb, 2005). On the other hand, many believe that the 
United States should limit its reliance on Gulf oil, especially from Saudi Arabia. For 
example, the former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, Stuart E. Eizenstat (in a 
speech to congress in 2002) said: “our dependence on Persian Gulf oil in general and 
Saudi oil in particular leaves us vulnerable to attack, both abroad and at home” (ibid: 
20).  
Some of the previous and current strategic US choices within the Gulf and 
surrounding regions has been acknowledged by some US analysts to have played a 
serious role in the rise of terrorist networks and extremist religious ideologies. Along 
with other factors, the costs of various policies to support stability in the region and 
secure energy sources in the Gulf have fuelled these ideas. Certainly, in the aftermath 
of the September 11 attacks the United States recognised that securing the region’s 
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energy supplies, especially in religious sites such as Saudi Arabia can produce a 
significant cultural and political reactions (Gause III, 2003). 
At the present time, CENTCOM is playing a crucial role in the war on terror 
including the war on Afghanistan and the operations in Iraq. During the last two 
decades CENTCOM has developed to the point where it is considered to be in a 
suitable position to secure US interests in the Persian Gulf region using extensive 
force (Rogers, 2008). The US security strategy in the region is primarily motivated by 
the three permanent elements of interest: access to oil, Israeli security, and the 
stability of the region (Hajjar, 2002: v). With the ongoing wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it is getting harder to distinguish US military operations intended to fight 
terrorism from those intended to protect energy resources (Klare, 2004).       
Since the attacks of 11 September, 2001, US conservative policy towards Saudi 
Arabia has changed. In the past both neo-conservatives and the religious right had 
accepted the close Saudi-American relationship on a strategic basis. Nevertheless, 
there was a shift in the Saudi’s public opinion of the American military presence, not 
only from a religious perspective, but also from a political point of view, as it implies 
a lack of independence (Gause III, 2003). 
US dependence on imported oil has declined since peaking in 2005, as a result of a 
variety of factors, including a decline in consumption and shifts in supply patterns 
(US Energy Information Administration, 2011). In spite of that, Gulf countries will 
remain leading oil exporters in the next decade, though their dominance will depend 
heavily on the price of oil.   
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Oil obtained from several states in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, has 
exceptionally low production costs, which allows these states to make profits even if 
the price of oil plunges. That is because costs of oil extraction are higher elsewhere in 
the world (Byman, 2002: 3). But, since the discovery of oil in the Gulf region, many 
economic and social problems have challenged those states, where many Gulf 
countries have failed to diversify their economies beyond oil, reduce unemployment 
or create new jobs (Simmons, 2005).  
Despite the fact that the United States’ policies towards the Gulf may differ in many 
aspects, there is general agreement that the United States wants to ensure that there is 
no rival power in the area that would want to control the region and its energy 
supplies. A number of issues may increase tensions between the United States and the 
Saudis, including different positions on Iraq, the Arab-Israeli issue, control of oil, and 
the conduct of the war on terror (Gause III, 2003).  
Saudi Arabia has also faced a series of threats to its oil facilities. On 24 February, 
2006, Saudi security blocked an attack against one of its largest oil facilities at 
Abqaiq, consequentially oil prices jumped by more than $2 a barrel. According to 
Cordesman (2009), threats on this scale not only present a threat to the physical 
security of key oil facilities, but also add to the “security premium” in the global oil 
market.       
Hence, Saudi Arabia must secure its oil exports, not only on its own soil, but also in 
the face of the Iranian build-up of forces that can and has threatened maritime traffic 
through the Gulf. Saudi Arabia must secure it oil exports also in the face of piracy in 
Somalia and at other points along the flow of its oil exports. Overall, the above 
discussion demonstrates that oil poses a threat at all three levels of security (domestic, 
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regional and international) and through all state security sectors: social (American 
presence and involvements); political (global vital commodity and powerful state 
interest); economic (reliance on oil and inability to diversify); military (protecting oil, 
powerful state interest, and arms race in the region); and finally, environmental (e.g. 
damaging oil production processes).    
5.2.8 Global Terrorism, Religious Extremism and US Presence 
Terrorism was discussed in Chapter 4 with regard to social, political, and economic 
security sectors in Saudi Arabia; this dealt with the internal level of security. As the 
effects of and motivations for terrorism involve other regional and international 
players, terrorism and its causes and effects will be further investigated in this section 
on all three levels – state, regional, and international – in order to fill any gap that 
might occur if the issue was studied at one level only.     
The Gulf area plays a crucial role in that it is the main environment within which the 
struggle against terrorism is fought. The area comprises the historical and cultural 
centre of the Muslim world, and due to a mix of social, cultural, religious and 
economic reasons, the area could possibly serve useful for enrolling terrorists or 
funding terrorism (Gause III, 2003). For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Al-Qaeda on 
the Arabian Peninsula is the first major internal threat that Saudi Arabia has 
experienced. Although Saudi Arabia has faced a long series of internal challenges 
from Islamic extremists, since the Ikhwan (Islamic religious militia that rebelled 
against King Abdul Aziz when he forbade them to neighbouring states) in the late 
1920s, as well as from revolutionary Arab nationalism movements, or the Nasserists 
and the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s (Cordesman, 2009). 
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It is worth noting that the term Al-Qaeda only came into use in the late 1990s; it was 
originally used in the early 1980s to describe a hostel of young Arab jihadists in 
Peshawar, Pakistan, who were preparing to aid fighters (the mujahideen) in the fight 
against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The hostel was established by Osama bin Laden 
who arrived in Pakistan in the early 1980s, and was closely linked with the Pakistani 
Inter-Service Intelligence and the CIA (Rogers, 2008: 120). The Soviet war in 
Afghanistan brought Pakistan into the Cold War, through which it gained support 
from the United States, along with Osama bin Laden, who was regarded as a CIA 
asset. They received significant aid and armaments, which were flown from the CIA 
and other US agencies through Pakistan into Afghanistan (ibid: 120). 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan encouraged Saudi Arabia to join the Western 
powers, where the transnational Islamic organisation issued calls for jihad against the 
Soviet occupation, relying on the idea of Muslim unity summarised in the Qur’an 
(Islam holy book) as the unity of “ummah” (the community of believers) 
(Hegghammer, 2010). Saudi Arabia funded the Afghani jihad and cooperated closely 
with the CIA and the Pakistani intelligence by sending financial aid, which came 
mostly from semi-official organisations, such as charities and religious organisations. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia also funded the Muslim guerrillas in Bosnia, Chechnya 
and elsewhere, and this Saudi involvement unconsciously gave birth to the first wave 
of Saudi jihads that differed significantly from the following waves (ibid). 
In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the foundations of new extremist movements 
that were hostile to any US or Western military presence on Saudi territory began to 
be built. As mentioned in the previous section (5.2.7 Oil Security), this hostility 
towards the US arose as a result of the American strategy to keep the no-fly zone over 
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Iraq’s southern area, which provided a stimulus to the Al-Qaeda movement. But until 
the early 1990s Al-Qaeda did not have a clear agenda, mainly because it was 
ideologically divided into two groups with different mid-term objectives. The first 
was mostly made up of Egyptians that had a revolutionary point of view and wanted 
to use Al-Qaeda to overthrow Arab governments. While the other group, which 
involved people such as Osama bin Laden, had a more “classical jihad” outlook and 
saw their role as an elite reaction force to be used against invaders (ibid: 101). From 
1992 onwards, both revolutionary and classical jihadists utilised the idea of an anti-
American jihad. They were mainly motivated by the ongoing US military presence in 
Saudi Arabia, and were motivated also by the US deployment in Somalia and the 
arrest of radical Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abd al Rahman in New York. By the mid-
1990s, Osama bin Laden moved pan-Islamism to its most radical state and declared 
jihad against Americans in the land of the two holy mosques – Saudi Arabia – and 
began building an Al-Qaeda network in Saudi Arabia (ibid: 101-113).           
However, during the mid-1990s, Saudi Arabia came under many direct and indirect 
attacks by Islamic extremist groups. All of which led the Saudi government to 
strengthen its internal security and counterterrorist programmes. It also cooperated 
with the United States in many investigations, including the 1996 bombing of the 
Khobar Towers, the 1995 attack on the Saudi National Guard Headquarters, and the 
2000 attack on the USS Cole (Cordesman, 2009: 45).   
The impact of the US presence was still to become fully obvious. Then, on 11 
September, 2001, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon came under attack, 
leaving nearly 3,000 people dead and some 6,000 injured (ibid: 47). The United States 
recognised clearly that protecting the region’s energy supplies, especially in Saudi 
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Arabia, could cause a substantial political, cultural and religious reaction to a massive 
degree. Despite this, some theorists insist that the attacks of 9/11 must have involved 
some of the US internal agencies, or that the attacks were an inside job. Nonetheless, 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, marked a turning point in US relations 
with Saudi Arabia, whereupon the relationship was affected negatively. The 
American military presence in Saudi Arabia became no longer sustainable in either 
the United States or Saudi Arabia (Hajjar, 2002). 
Saudi Arabia was also directly affected by the events of 11 September, 2001. The 
involvement of 15 Saudis, out of the 19 aeroplane hijackers that conducted the attacks 
on the World Trade Center (WTO) and the Pentagon, put the Kingdom under huge 
pressure, and Saudi-US relations came under real fear of severe damage.  Notably, the 
Saudi government, the media, and religious leaders all condemned the attacks of 9/11. 
But the Kingdom still faced a huge wave of blame, stoked in the main by the 
mainstream media.  
American liberals have always been cautious about the strong associations between 
Washington and Riyadh. But since the attacks of 9/11, the American right wing policy 
towards Saudi Arabia has changed (Gause III, 2003). Previously, both neo-
conservatives and the religious right accepted the close American relationship with 
Saudi Arabia on strategic grounds, even though this relationship contradicted many 
aspects of Saudi politics and society. They have now become vocal critics of the 
relationship, which was associated with a parallel shift in the Saudi public opinion of 
the presence of the US military, not only from a religious perspective, but also from a 
political point of view, as it implies a lack of independence for the country (ibid). 
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More recently, the Americans have identified that their political and military 
assistance for certain Gulf countries is causing internal problems for citizens within 
these states. Ongoing US diplomatic and military support for Israel is also creating a 
similarly negative association throughout the Muslim and Arab world (Gause III, 
2003).   
Since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has witnessed a new wave of attacks by terrorists, 
wherein they have faced several bombings, shootings, assassinations, and clashes 
between police and militants who call themselves Al-Qaeda. These clashes have 
caused numerous deaths. According to Hegghammer (2010), Saudi Arabia has not 
experienced violence on this scale in its modern history. Apart from the 1979 Holy 
Mosque incident, until recently there had been only one major attack by Sunni 
Islamists in the Kingdom, namely the 1995 Riyadh bombing which killed seven 
people; he believes that the 1996 Khobar bombing was carried out by Shi’a Muslims.  
Despite the widespread success that the Saudi government has achieved with regards 
to suppressing Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the release of a new 
wanted list of 85 suspects in February 2009, many of whom are suspected to be 
abroad, suggests that a new threat is posed by the return of hardened fighters from 
overseas. Saudis in Iraq present an important source of concern, and the re-integration 
of Saudi militants who may seek to return from Iraq present a new challenge. 
Previous interventions by the United States and the occupation of Iraq have incurred a 
number of strategic risks and costs. Such interventions have fuelled a heated debate 
that the United States is involved in a worldwide conflict against Islam in general, but 
under the cover of fighting against terrorism. As mentioned previously, these debates 
have created a rich environment for those looking to harm Westerners and United 
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States’ forces; this ideology is unfortunately reinforced in practice by a steady flow of 
small arms and other weaponry left over from Saddam Hussein’s arsenals not secured 
by the coalition or Iraqi security forces. The circumstances create an unstable 
environment that is ideal for recruits of anti-American organisations. However, in 
spite of the fact that Gulf countries may have received unwanted attention due to the 
issue of terrorism, no solution can be undertaken without them.  
American policymakers fail to understand the direction of some regimes in the region, 
whereby they allow or even support anti-Western or anti-American ideologies. 
Terrorism deriving from the Gulf has mainly focused on regimes that have been 
associated with or allied with the West or the United States.  
Saudi security does not focus on Al-Qaeda alone, two other factions have also 
threatened Saudi internal security: first, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, an associated 
group of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt; second, Shi’a groups, supported by Iran, 
were furious at the claimed Saudi mistreatment of their fellow Shi’a in the Eastern 
Province, they also resented the fact that Makkah and Medina were under Saudi Sunni 
control (Cordesman, 2009). In the past, Iran has conducted its own terrorist attacks to 
show the West the cost of being involved in the region (Ekovich, 2004).  
American analysts admit that some of the previous and current strategic US policies 
within the Gulf region have played a serious role in the rise of terrorist networks and 
extremist religious ideologies (Gause III, 2003). Although United States policies 
towards the Gulf may differ with regard to many aspects, there is general agreement 
that the protection of energy exports from the Middle East region is one of their first 
security priorities, and they want to ensure that there is no rival power in the area that 
would want to control the region and its energy supplies. It is highly probable that US 
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priorities will remain the same during the current Obama administration and perhaps 
for decades to come.  
The United States presence and involvement in the region, especially within Saudi 
Arabia, can, at least in part, be considered a stimulus for the emergence of terrorism 
in the area; thus, this presence can be considered a serious threat to state security 
involving all security levels. It mainly involves social/political factors (Saudi state 
legitimacy and internal pressure, and anti-Saudi and anti-American motivations 
caused by what appears to be Saudi-US dependence); military factors (caused by 
terrorists attacks and regional arms races, as a result of external power interests in the 
area); and economic aspects (terrorists attacks). 
The main Saudi efforts to reduce threats from terrorism involve the following:  
5.2.8.1 Facing Terrorists  
The Saudi government has always condemned the 9/11 attacks and has constantly 
denied any involvement or knowledge of the attacks. As discussed earlier in Chapter 
5, since May 2003, the Kingdom has itself witnessed a new wave of attacks by 
terrorists, involving several bombings and clashes between police (Cordesman, 2009: 
10). Since then, the Saudi government has been extremely focused on combating the 
domestic terrorist threat from Al-Qaeda. Members of Al-Qaeda have carried out a 
number of attacks on government officials, foreigners, oil facilities and even civilians. 
Saudi officials maintain that they are working closely with the United States against 
Al Qaeda and its supporters (Blanchard, 2009: 7).  
As both the Saudi regime and the United States became targeted by Al-Qaeda, the 
Saudi government launched massive efforts to eliminate Al-Qaeda internally and 
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internationally. Inside the Kingdom, Saudi forces confronted terrorist groups 
ferociously, through which they were able to eliminate many of the terrorist cells and 
enumerate them significantly. Since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has devoted 
considerable resources to combating terrorism: the budgets allocated to 
counterterrorism in 2004, 2005 and 2006 were estimated at $8.5 billion, $10 billion, 
and $12 billion respectively (Hegghammer, 2010: 217). A total overhaul of the Saudi 
security system motivated forces; and determination and attitudes within the security 
services increased in line with their salaries. This resulted in dramatic changes in 
Saudi security services capabilities (ibid: 218). The Saudi government also took 
measures to strengthen its borders, where the Ministry of Interiors worked to upgrade 
the overall infrastructure and security of its land, sea, and air borders (Country 
Reports, United States Department of State, 2010). 
5.2.8.2 International Cooperation 
Saudi Arabia is operating with other states and organisations concerned with 
combating terrorism. According to Blanchard (2009), since 2003, US government 
statements have generally praised the Saudi cooperation with US counterterrorism 
initiatives. Blanchard refers to the US Country Reports on Terrorism, 2008 (published 
on 30 April, 2009), where the US Department of State praises improvements in Saudi 
counterterrorism practices, and credits Saudi cooperation with US counterterrorism 
efforts as “significant”. The report also states “Saudi Arabia needs to continue to take 
steps to exercise oversight of fundraising activities in the Kingdom and Saudi 
charitable activities abroad.”   
In August 2003, Saudi Arabia and the United States established a second joint task 
force. This was initiated by the Crown Prince Abdullah and aimed to combat terrorist 
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financing (Cordesman, 2010: 297). The establishment of such a task force reflected 
the Saudi regime’s commitment to the fight against terrorism and the significant level 
of Saudi-US cooperation.     
Saudi Arabia has also hosted several conferences to combat terrorism. In February 
2005, Saudi Arabia held the first Counter-Terrorism International Conference. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia presented representatives from over 50 countries, including 
15 from the Arab world, as well as representatives from several international 
organisations. According to the website of the Saudi embassy in Washington, the aim 
of the conference was to improve bilateral, regional and international cooperation in 
counter-terrorism. The conference also focused on the capabilities to combat terror 
financing, money laundering, and drug trafficking.  
On 11 July, 2005, Crown Prince Abdullah renewed his call for more improved 
cooperation in the war on terrorism at the international level, and for the formation of 
an international counterterrorism centre – Abdullah first called for the formation of an 
international counterterrorism centre in an address in February 2005, at the first 
Counter-Terrorism International Conference in Riyadh (Cordesman, 2009: 299).  
On 24 February, 2008, the Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdul Aziz, 
signed a civil service agreement with the French Interior and Overseas Territories 
Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, to enhance bilateral cooperation in the fields of 
counterterrorism, anti-narcotics, and the combat against money laundering (ibid, 
p.299).  
In March 2008, King Abdullah announced his intention to sponsor an interfaith 
dialogue between the world’s monotheistic religions, including Jews. Furthermore, 
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Saudi Arabia aimed to promote reconciliation between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims 
through it, which became clear with the invitation of the former Iranian president 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. This was followed, in June 2008, by the first interfaith 
dialogue hosted by the Muslim World League in Mecca (Makkah), which represented 
the first step towards a unified Muslim voice, with a view to creating a culture of 
tolerance and working to broaden horizons in light of common denominators between 
civilisations (Merritt, 2009: 26).  
In July 2008, the second interfaith dialogue took place in Madrid; it was sponsored by 
Saudi Arabia and brought together nearly 300 Muslim, Christian and Jewish delegates 
and other experts on interreligious understanding (Times, 2008). The overall aim was 
to promote a peaceful coexistence among nations, and to put an end to international 
conflicts and problems (Heneghan, 2008). 
In October 2010, Saudi intelligence passed information to London, Washington, and 
Berlin – early warnings of an impending Al-Qaeda-Yemen airborne terror. 
Explosives, which were rigged inside computer printers, were shipped from Yemen 
and discovered in Britain and Dubai – their targets were inside the United States 
(Murphy, 2010). According to many experts, the Saudi intelligence tip reflected huge 
improvements in Saudi Arabia’s counterterrorism capabilities and more improved 
intelligence on AQAP in Yemen, which resulted in more accurate inside information 
about extremist Islamic networks. 
Saudi Arabia is also expanding its external relationships through the establishment 
and strengthening of partnerships with a number of developed and developing 
countries, perhaps most recently with China, India, Russia, and Japan. These 
relationships are based on cooperation in many areas, including security, to conjure 
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active cooperation in combating terrorism internationally, and also to enhance the 
security and stability of the Gulf region, which reflects the Saudi Arabian keenness to 
enhance global security and stability. 
5.2.8.3 Combating Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 
Saudi Arabia has continued to make progress in combating money laundering and 
terrorist finance. From 2003 onwards, Saudi Arabia has established a series of new 
entities and laws designed to combat terrorist financing in accordance with US and 
international standards (Blanchard, 2009: 8). It is worth noticing that Saudi Arabia 
was one of the first countries to take action against terrorist financing by freezing the 
assets of Osama bin Laden in 1994. Saudi Arabia also established units countering 
money laundering at the Ministry of Interiors, in the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), and in the commercial banks in 1995 (Cordesman, 2009: 299).  
By February 2003, the SAMA started to employ major technical programs to guide 
judges and investigators on legal matters involving terrorist financing and money 
laundering methods; they also outlined the international requirements for financial 
secrecy, and noted methods followed by criminals to exchange information. This was 
followed in August by new legislation that put strict penalties in place for the crime of 
money laundering and terror financing; it set a prison sentence of up to 15 years and 
fines up to $1.8 million for offenders. The new legislation implements the 40 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATA) on money laundering 
and their eight recommendations on terror financing (ibid: 299-300).   
In 2004, Saudi Arabia and the United States jointly designated several branches of the 
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, under United Nation Security Resolution 1267, as 
financers of terrorism (Merritt, 2009: 9).     
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In its 2007 Country Report on Terrorism in Saudi Arabia, the US Department of State 
praised Saudi authorities for arresting dozens of terrorist financing suspects and for 
enacting new declaration requirements for the cross-border transfer of cash and other 
high value items (Country Report, US Department of State, 2007). Furthermore, the 
Saudi regime was a leader in developing and approving an aggressive plan by the G-
20, designed at freezing the roots of terrorist worldwide (Cordesman, 2009).   
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) hosted the sixth annual Gulf–
European Symposium on Combating Terrorism Financing during the period 4-5 May 
2009. Several government bodies, including the Ministries of Social Affairs, Interiors, 
and Islamic Affairs, and the central bank, continued to advise Saudis to be cautious 
when selecting charity groups to which they contribute (Country Reports, United 
States Department of State, 2010).  
The Saudi government also banned any cash contributions to charities, required 
charities to seek permission from the Ministry of Interiors before opening a bank 
account, and required charity bank accounts to be in the name of the organisation 
(Cordesman, 2009). 
5.2.8.4 Reintegrating Terrorists 
Saudi Arabia has established a rehabilitation centre for extremists and jihadists in an 
attempt to reform extremist’s ways of thinking. The Saudi government is searching 
for new ways of reforming its radicals, apart from using violence towards them 
(Maher, 2008). Since it was launched, the programme has worked to reintegrate 120 
of some 800 former Guantanamo detainees, into Saudi society (Dodds, 2010). The 
rehabilitation programme relies on the involvement of Saudi counterterrorism 
officials, psychologists, and religious clerics with terrorist detainees, in an effort to 
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discourage detainees from supporting extremism and violence. Successfully 
rehabilitated detainees are presented with various types of social and financial support 
designed to prevent recidivism (Blanchard, 2009). 
Some outside observers have criticised the Saudi programmes for being “soft” and for 
not using repressive measures of the Egyptian and Algerian type. While others have 
questioned the wisdom of releasing and supporting former detainees because of the 
tangible threats that potential recidivism could pose. Yet, experts like Hegghammer, a 
research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, believe that it is 
precisely the restrained and diversified nature of Saudi counterterrorism which makes 
it so effective.  
5.2.8.5 Campaign against Terrorism 
Saudi officials consider efforts to combat violent extremist ideologies as being 
fundamental in their campaign to counter terrorism. The Saudi government and 
religious clerics have launched public campaigns that condemn extremism and 
violence (Merritt, 2009). The Saudi government launched a public campaign 
concerned with public awareness of terrorism; the programme was initiated in school 
and universities, in mosques, and on media and billboards to alert Saudis about 
terrorism and extremism (Cordesman, 2009).       
Hence, the Saudi institutional efforts to fight terrorism can be outlined as follows:  
• The elimination of terrorist cells (facing terrorists) 
• International cooperation 
• Combating terrorist financing and money laundering 
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• Reintegrating terrorists 
• Campaign against terrorism. 
5.3 Inter-GCC Security: Sub-Regional Dimensions  
The Arabian countries in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman) have a vital relationship, within which there are 
many problems and altercations between certain states. However, the Arab Gulf states 
share common regional, cultural, socio-economic and political structures, which made 
a sub-regional strategic partnership a possibility; the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) was therefore formed in 1981 (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 190-191).  
The GCC states share obsessions of securities and threats, especially if Iraq is 
excluded. There are distinguished relations between the rulers of most of these 
countries that go back centuries. Thus, the inter-GCC threats and challenges will be 
investigated as a single entity. The interacting and shared elements of national 
security among GCC states will be examined through elements such as ideology, 
territory, ethnic lines and historical precedents, to view shared cross-boundary links 
that can test the validity of such sub-regional partnership under the idea of “security 
complex”, as suggested by Buzan in his book People, State and Fear (1991). Buzan 
implies that security complex applies for “a group of states whose primary security 
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot 
realistically be considered apart from one another.” 
5.3.1 GCC Establishment 
On 25 May, 1981, the southern Gulf states or the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, met to establish a 
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collective security council that would involve all fields of partnership. They had 
particular concerns arising from Iranian military power and thought they may have to 
respond to threats evolving from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Joyner, 1990: 
91-92). Since its establishment, the GCC states have faced serious challenges: the 
Iran-Iraq war was the severest point, where Arab Gulf states were afraid of being 
dragged into the war. There were other disturbing developments, such as military 
build-ups by the Soviet Union in South Yemen and Ethiopia (Henderson, 2003: 67). 
Furthermore, the GCC states also faced the threat of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, and later the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the consequences of the war on 
terror (Cordesman, 2009: 35).    
Cooperation has been intensified in significant areas by setting up different 
specialised committees to achieve the instructions of the main constituent bodies of 
the GCC (the Supreme Council, Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General) 
(Pridham, 1985: 110-112). Initially, the GCC states attempted to function as a unified 
political force. Military and security cooperation were an important implication on the 
May 1981 original charter of the GCC, which made no mention of defence or security 
cooperation, but clearly emphasised coordination and cooperation in economic, 
social, and cultural affairs. This was later agreed to include defence cooperation in the 
activities of the organisation at the December 1981 meeting of the leaders of the GCC 
states (Pinfari, 2009: 5).  
In January 1982, the GCC defence ministers met to discuss a common security policy 
(including a joint air-defence and weapons system), which was followed by several 
military exercises. Then, in November 1984, the GCC states agreed to form a unity 
called the Peninsula Shield Forces, with the intention of fighting any external attack. 
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This force consists of units from each member of the GCC under a central command 
at the King Khalid military base in north-eastern Saudi Arabia (Henderson, 2003: 67). 
The unity of the GCC states was evident when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, 
whereby all GCC states denounced the Iraqi aggression and stood by the Saudi 
position to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait (ibid). These convergent attitudes show 
and reflect the extent to which these states are coherent and apply consensus in the 
face of any threat, which also indicates that these countries will be in united positions 
in the face of any future threat.  
The existence of well-built relations between Saudi Arabia and other GCC states does 
not mean that differences and disputes do not occur between those states. Although 
the nature of threats has changed considerably when compared to the threats in the 
1980s when the GCC was established, all GCC members still face the same national 
security challenges. The GCC could develop an interoperable force and develop their 
defence capabilities and counterterrorism efforts. But improvements have been 
deferred as a result of border disputes, political rivalries, economic instability, and 
pressure from other states such as the United States, Iraq, and Iran. In 2005, the GCC 
rapid deployment force was formally disbanded, resulting in the GCC being without a 
real military structure, other than a headquarters in Riyadh and some elements of a 
secure air force communications system. Despite this, disputes along borders between 
Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries continue to be the focus of feuds, along with 
differences in certain domestic and international issues (Cordesman, 2009: 35-36).  
Lately, the GCC countries have taken the idea of transforming the GCC into a joint 
unity seriously, to form a unified authority that can confront common regional threats 
and challenges. All GCC countries face almost the same regional threats as Saudi 
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Arabia, but with different intensities that vary from one country to another. Whether 
this relates to Iran, Iraq, instability in Yemen, Israel (as the traditional enemy), 
terrorism, or the US presence and its internal consequences on state security, the 
same-shared national security challenges could provide a means through which to 
develop a comprehensive force (Cordesman, 2009).  
Listed below are the main prominent problems or challenges that could limit or affect 
Saudi relations with the GCC states.  
5.3.1.2 Political Disputes (Border/Ruler/Political Differentiations) 
Border disputes have become the greatest element of threat within the GCC states; 
there are border disputes between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the so-called neutral 
zone or divided zone, where the land borders between them reach the coast of the 
Arabian Gulf. This zone was established in 1922 when Sir Percy Cox, the British high 
commissioner in Baghdad, infuriated by the disputes between the ruler of Nejd (ibn 
Saud) and the emir of Kuwait, took a pen to a map and drew two neutral zones, the 
first between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the other between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, 
but which touched the Kuwaiti border and enabled the Bedouin tribes to move freely. 
However, when oil was produced in the shared zone in 1953 it led to angry 
disagreements over the liability of the oil field (Henderson, 2003: 25). Later they 
agreed to divide their neutral zone and share equally the zone’s oil and gas revenues, 
but negotiations came to the fore again in 2000 when Kuwait claimed sovereignty 
over two islands in the neutral zone (Qaruh and Umm al-Maradim). This ended in 
July 2000 with a maritime agreement that gave the titles of the two islands to Kuwait 
(ibid: 26).  
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Saudi Arabian disputes with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) publicly reopened over 
two parts of their common border after years of quiet diplomatic frustration. The issue 
reverts back to 1974, when Sheikh Zayed al-Nahyan, the governor of Abu Dhabi, 
agreed to a treaty in Riyadh with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was 
given a strip of coastline between the UAE and Qatar and control over most of the 
discovered, but as of then unexploited, Shaybah Oil Field. The Saudi claim to 
maritime rights in the Khor al-Aideed between Qatar and the UAE is putting the 
multi-billion dollar Dolphin Gas Project into danger; a project that is supposed to link 
Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. If maritime rights are conceded, Saudi Arabia might be 
able to lay claim to at least part of the Qatari gas asset. The UAE went public with the 
dispute in the aftermath of the death of Sheikh Zayed in 2004 (Henderson, 2006). 
A 2006 edition of the official UAE yearbook map shows that the UAE has extended 
westward, across Saudi Arabian territory (Cordesman, 2009). The map in the 2005 
edition does not show this. The map also represents the extent of their southern border 
to include most of the Shaybah Oil Field (Saudi Arabia’s newest oil production area). 
Notably, UAE officials have not shown disapproval to local journalists for writing 
about the new map issue, although it arguably could damage relations with a friendly 
state, which is considered an offence in many Arab states (Henderson, 2006).   
The current campaign led by Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed, the UAE Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs, mentioned in June 2005 that parts of the 1974 agreement have 
become irrelevant. On the Saudi side, the Interior Minister, Prince Nayef, confirmed 
that a diplomatic protest note had been obtained in response to the UAE claims. The 
UAE might feel that the succession of King Abdullah, after the death of King Fahd in 
August 2005, might allow Saudi Arabia to be more conciliatory.  
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Saudi Arabia’s difficulties with Qatar do not only refer to land borders, but also 
maritime boundaries, which often involve individual personalities. Qatari officials 
privately admit that Qatar took advantage of the Saudi interruption in the 1990-91 
Gulf War to push the borderline south into Saudi Arabia, which involved an armed 
clash in 1992 between the Saudi and Qatari forces at the borderline between the 
countries. This resulted in at least one Qatari soldier dying, and ended by Qatari 
forces surrounding the Saudis (Henderson, 2003: 27).    
The maritime boundaries of the Qatar peninsula have also been in contention. In 
March 2001, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) drew a maritime border between 
Bahrain and Qatar, which enabled Saudi Arabia and Qatar to draw their own maritime 
borders west of the Qatar peninsula (Henderson, 2006); the problem of the eastern 
Qatari maritime borders (borders between Qatar and UAE) remains unsolved.  
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have close relationships, despite the 1980s riots in Bahrain 
by the Shi’a. The only lasting problem for Bahrain is government income, especially 
as it does not have any natural wealth resources. However, the Saudi government has 
long provided for the Bahraini exchequer by transferring revenues from the Abu 
Safaa oil field (located between the two countries) (Henderson, 2003).   
The relationship with Oman becomes problematic when referring to the border 
between Saudi Arabia and Oman. After the UAE settled the southern borders problem 
with Saudi Arabia in 1974, Oman claimed that a part of what Abu Dhabi surrendered 
belongs to them, however, the association between Saudi Arabia and Oman remains 
controversial with regard to this issue (Legrenzi, 2007). 
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There are other areas where rivalry creates problems. However, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia appear to be solving border disputes, since both sides stated that agreements 
have been reached on the global companies that will sponsor the demarcation process, 
and on the method of implementing boundary marks in the aftermath of the joint 
Qatari-Saudi committee for demarcation of land and maritime borders meeting on 3 
January, 2009 (Cordesman, 2009: 36). Despite this, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have 
different opinions about many issues.  
According to Cordesman (2009), some experts feel that Qatar is lining up with Iran as 
a counterbalance to Saudi influence, and that the Al-Jazeera television network, which 
has its headquarters in Qatar, remains anti-Saudi. Cordesman also indicates that some 
Saudi experts question the extent to which Iranian-Qatari and Libyan-Qatari relations 
might have anti-Saudi elements. 
5.3.1.2 Military Cooperation Difficulties 
The GCC states have some of the most advanced armaments in the world, with vast 
military spending and arms imports. But, in general, the GCC military forces face the 
same major problem that the Saudi military security sector faces (Saudi security 
forces, structure and threats were discussed in Chapter 4), in that it suffers from a lack 
of effectiveness, sustainability, and interoperability. Russell (2009) argues that, in 
spite of the enormous military expenditures and sophisticated Western weapons that 
the GCC states possess, they are realistically unprepared to defend themselves in 
“low-end” (insurgency and militia sponsorship) and “high-end” (ballistic missile, 
perhaps with nuclear warheads) scenarios against Iran (Russell, 2009: 40). Russell 
also highlighted a number of areas that limit the military effectiveness of the GCC: 
poor tactical and information management, weak training and weapons handling, and 
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poor maintenance. Cordesman (2009), on the other hand, noted the limited large-scale 
training and coordination between the GCC forces.  
5.3.2 The GCC Security Complex 
The GCC security complex mainly experiences difficulties with regard to its military 
security, as it still suffers from military dependence on the United States. This makes 
them vulnerable to security at the international level, in addition to rival threats 
caused by Iranian policies at the regional level, not to mention each state’s own 
particular threats and challenges at the domestic level of security. In particular, the 
2003 US invasion of Iraq and the consequential fundamental political and strategic 
changes. As discussed earlier, the two most remarkable features of the altered 
regional dynamics comprise the ultimate rise of Iran as a regional power, and a 
corresponding decline in the American influence in regional matters. This largely 
affects the GCC sub-regional complex of security, by increasing the influence and 
range of power of its most dominant rival state, Iran. All in all, this adds a further 
challenge to the GCC sub-regional complex.     
The Gulf Cooperation Council has further problems with regard to concessions and 
counter-concessions among its members, in addition, the members lack an actual 
collective cooperation power that works effectively. Furthermore, the GCC members 
have developed a sort of mistrust in each other, as a result of a combination of recent 
independence (for most of the GCC countries) and recent financial power, which has 
also created a range of tensions within and among the GCC states, which adds limits 
to a successful unity between GCC members. On the other hand, elements of a 
successful security complex among the GCC states are still possible, as they uniquely 
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share many socio-political links and face similar threats and challenges at all three 
state levels of security.    
5.4  Conclusion  
Due to economic and religious circumstances, the Gulf area has become one of the 
most vital areas in the world. The above threats and challenges (Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
instability in Yemen and the Horn of Africa, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, 
US presence consequences, oil security, and internal problems of Gulf states) are the 
main threats facing Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries; these affect the security 
not only of the region’s countries, but other states that are involved in the region 
through its resources. This makes Saudi Arabian security and the security of other 
GCC states an international security problem.  
Threats such as weapons of mass destruction present a serious challenge to Saudi 
Arabia. Riyadh is very concerned with Iran’s military potential. A nuclear-armed Iran 
would unbalance power in the area and would probably force the Saudis and other 
major GCC states to develop their own nuclear capability, and remain under the 
defensive umbrella of the United States. Tehran’s ambition to become a supreme 
power in the Gulf region also disturbs Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, especially 
in light of the increased Iranian interference in Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen and other Arab 
countries in the area (Syria and Lebanon).   
Instability in Iraq and Yemen also pose a threat to Saudi security. Iraq is facing 
several problems. The country is facing a danger of breaking apart into ethnic-
religious sections. The central government is weak and faces local and regional 
authorities and militia groups who are also fighting among each other. Instability in 
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Yemen will have consequences on the stability of the whole Arabian Peninsula and 
the flow of oil from the Gulf of Aden. Poverty is the root cause for most of the 
problems in Yemen. Political instability in Yemen has provided more opportunities 
for Al-Qaeda to flourish, and this will have a direct effect on Saudi Arabia and oil 
dependent economies around the world. Thus, domestic political development in 
Yemen is critically important to regional security and the stability of Saudi Arabia, 
which involves many security sectors (political, social, economic, and military). 
The protection of Saudi Arabia’s oilfields is one of the primary concerns for Saudi 
Arabia. But the importance of protecting oil is not the sole concern of Saudi Arabia. 
Since the Second World War, oil for the United States has become central to their 
foreign policy, whereby oil has been considered a vital resource and access to it must 
be secured by whatever action necessary, including military action. This US 
commitment caused huge internal and regional challenges to the Saudi regime, which 
led later to the establishment of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  
The GCC security complex suffers from a lack of effective unity and political 
disputes among GCC countries – disagreements are therefore common. There have 
been numerous unsuccessful attempts to develop an integrated and effective common 
military force that can face threats and dangers in a proper manner, and without any 
external intervention; this by itself is creating internal problems for these countries, as 
the absence of an effective force has led to a lack in confidence in the existing forces. 
This is harming the Saudi/GCC role in the area and must be resolved in the best 
possible manner. 
Most of the regional and external threats have emerged either in response to a United 
States military presence in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf area (that goes back to the 
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early part of the last century), or as a result of other neighbouring countries internal 
threats that extend to regional security dynamics of threats. Whatever the reason for 
the US existence in the region they will continue to pose challenges for decades to 
come. Therefore, the United States must recognise the risks caused to their partners 
through their involvement in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, and try to minimise 
the US military presence. They must also focus on and reconsider their policies 
toward the area, as the United States largely controls security at the international and 
regional levels of security. 
Saudi Arabia is as important to the region’s security and stability as it is to the 
world’s economy. Key efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council include creating local 
defences, and enabling US strategic cooperation with the southern Gulf countries. The 
GCC plays a critical role as a counterbalance to the radical and more aggressive Iran; 
it is the source of the Arab League plan for peace with Israel, and it has become a key 
partner in the war on terrorism. The strategic posture of the US in the Middle East 
depends on Saudi Arabia having a friendly and moderate regime. Finding this balance 
means that the monarchy, and the Saudi elites and technocrats, must work with the 
unique political and social system, and the various cultures to achieve a balance. The 
cultures and social systems are not fully understood by the Americans, yet they are 
controlling and influencing the security for these states at the international and 
regional levels – this makes it hard to put this aspect into just one perspective.  
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Chapter 6 
Re-Examining National Security Dimensions: Saudi Perspective  
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6.1  Introduction  
This study aimed to explore the threats, motivations, dynamics and weakness of Saudi 
Arabia’s national security, by focusing on the following research question: 
What are the main domestic and foreign strategies employed by Saudi Arabia to 
maintain its national security, what are their determinants and how are they 
evolving? 
Initially, this study considered Saudi Arabia’s domestic, regional and international 
security by analysing the relevant literature on Saudi national security, this included 
literature on state structures and threats, in term of: societal, political, economic, 
military and environmental security (discussed in detail in Chapter 4). Consequently, 
a deeper understanding of the state’s ideas, dynamics and state formation were 
obtained. In addition, by examining the regional and external threats affecting the 
state, as well as state actions and reactions to these threats, could be identified.  
Consequently, the nature and effect of each threat was identified based on the 
following elements of: a) amity and enmity; b) the effect of each regional threat on all 
three state security levels: domestic, regional and international; and, c) the nature and 
extent of each threat on the five sectors of security (social, political, economic, 
military and environmental).  These elements could be viewed as indicators for the 
nature of the global system of security (further discussion was provided in Chapter 5). 
Most of the research questions were identified in accordance with the secondary data 
findings that were based predominantly on the foreign literature noted in Chapters 2, 
3, 4 and 5; it was identified that there was limited research providing analysis of 
Saudi Arabia’s security from an internal perspective. Therefore, this Chapter will 
focus on re-examining the foreign literature by conducting interviews with Saudi 
officials, academics and experts with detailed knowledge of Saudi national security. 
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This chapter will be divided into five parts, in accordance with the main research 
questions, by examining the findings from the literature reviewed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The findings from these chapters will be applied within the interviews in order to 
confirm the national security factors and dynamics affecting Saudi Arabia.  
Firstly part one will focus on the current regional threats, by which several overall 
questions will be composed to evaluate the main threats and challenges affecting 
Saudi national security. These elements were identified in the literature to involve: 
Iran’s policies, Iran’s nuclear programme, the situation in Iraq, the situation in 
Yemen, terrorism, the conflict in Israel-Palestine as well as the role that oil plays in 
security. The second part will address Saudi Arabia’s internal challenges based on 
how these affect Saudi security and policymaking. The challenges or threats 
(identified in the literature) mainly involve corruption, unemployment, poverty, social 
differences among some sections of society and the existence of a Shi’a minority that 
has a different orientation. Part three will consider Saudi Arabia’s relations with the 
other major powers in the political arena, by reviewing relations with the 
regional/neighbouring states in the Middle East. This will include an evaluation of the 
current relations with these states and an assessment of the importance of each state to 
Saudi Arabia’s state power and security. Part four will evaluate Saudi Arabia’s 
domestic and global security policies by assessing the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s 
security and policymaking processes, in terms of the international, regional and 
domestic actions and policies. Finally, part five will inspect Saudi Arabia’s future in 
terms of politics and security. The participants’ opinions and their personal beliefs, 
views and thoughts on Saudi Arabia’s security and the manner in which the state 
could improve and enhance its role will be provided. In addition, the participants’ 
regard for the main obstacles or determinants of any enhancement to Saudi Arabia’s 
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politics and security will be considered in terms of the internal, regional and global 
spheres.   
This sixth chapter will also discuss the results and findings of this study by 
identifying the implications that the results have on each element of security. This 
chapter will also provide a summary of the interview results by relating the results to 
the relevant literature viewpoints. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this study will apply an 
interpretive research methodology in order to focus on the subjective perceptions, 
thoughts and values of the individual participants. Consequently, multiple points of 
view of the national security context should be considered as part of the interpretive 
methodology. The results of the study will then be integrated within the broader 
literature base. The research questions will be introduced again in accordance with the 
researcher’s assumptions and based on a review of the traditional and non-traditional 
security theories. 
The final research findings will therefore be based on the reviewed literature and the 
feedback from the interviews; consequently, a comparative result of each view will be 
given, to include the various advantages and disadvantages. In addition, in order to 
provide a validation of the adopted framework of state security analysis for the Saudi 
context, a detailed analysis will be illustrated in Chapter 7. 
For more detail about the data sampling method used and for more information on the 
participants’ backgrounds and the coding of their responses, please see Chapter 2.  
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6.2  Part One: Assessing External Dynamics of National Security 
Research Question 1: How do you evaluate the current situation (threats) in the Gulf 
area?  
In order to answer the first research question, the participants were asked several 
other questions to evaluate the main threats affecting security in Saudi Arabia, and the 
Gulf in general, as well as questions to specifically focus on the threats that were 
provided in the literature review in Chapter 5.  
As indicated in the first stage (literature analysis) of this study, various studies have 
been conducted to understand the situation and the serious threats and the dynamics of 
the Saudi national security in terms of the regional level (Peterson, 2002; Hajjar, 
2005; Rogers, 2008; Cordesman, 2009). These studies, among others, imply that 
much work has been undertaken in an attempt to understand the real situation 
affecting the Gulf region in general, including Saudi Arabia’s national security as part 
of the region’s security. However, the main question aimed to investigate the 
participants’ views of the situation in the Gulf area based on their assessment of the 
threats that have evolved there and as suggested by studies involved in Saudi national 
security.  
6.2.1 Iran 
In order to understand the assessment of each threat, the researcher firstly asked 
whether the current Iranian policies posed a threat to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
region.     
Overwhelmingly, 22 participants agreed that Iran poses a serious threat to Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf region, the remaining two participants (both academics) did not 
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feel that Iran was a threat to Saudi Arabia or to the Gulf’s security, but instead they 
viewed it as an ideological conflict in which each state acts in the favour of their own 
nation. None of the participants viewed Iran as an ally. Several participants stated that 
it would have been “better” if Iran changed its policies toward regional security; 
however, irrespective of the participants’ answers, little further explanation was 
given. Most of participants answering yes asserted that Iran had threatening policies 
and official statements and that Iran appeared to attempt to destabilise security in the 
Gulf by mobilising all of the resources that could cause insecurity in the Gulf region; 
hence, Iran being considered a threat to Saudi Arabia. One expert of Gulf affairs 
noted that Iran employed all means in order to extend its Persian and Shi’a influence 
in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area. Seven other participants emphasised that Iran’s 
interference in the internal affairs of other Gulf states is considered to be threatening 
by these countries, as seen in Bahrain, Iraq and Syria. To illustrate, one participant 
stated: 
The current Iranian regime involves fragile leadership because it believes that by 
extending its influence beyond its borders, especially in the Gulf area, it will reap 
economic and political gains as Iraq was an easy prey for Iran while the Syrian 
government allowed the Iranian regime to extended its influence in Lebanon and 
Palestine. On the other hand, Iran’s ambitions in Bahrain sustained a point of 
conflict, which has been used to raise disorder in the region (P1).  
Iranian involvement in Iraq and in other parts of the Middle East will be addressed 
later in this chapter; it should be noted that this represents one of the most 
controversial issues with regards to Iranian policies. In addition, many studies suggest 
that Saudi Arabia must deal with the fact that Iran has obtained long-range missiles 
which have already strengthened their role outside the gulf region, particularly in 
Syria and Lebanon (Cordesman, 2009). While some other participants commented on 
Iran as being “not trustworthy” or as having “radical thinking”, one participant stated 
that:  
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Iran does not pose a risk or threat to the existence of Saudi Arabia or other Arab 
Gulf states as disagreements are merely due to political differences caused by 
ideological differences.  
As displayed in Figure 6.1, Iran was identified as being a threat whereby the majority 
of participants agreed with similar comments and views about Iran’s regional policies. 
It is worth noting that most of the participants were representations of the Saudi view 
as most of them worked or lived in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, many other Western 
experts supported this outlook. To illustrate, Saudi Arabia’s policies and actions were 
considered to be “Westernised”, especially to those with radical thoughts or to those 
in support of anti-American opinions. However, it should be noted that Iran is seen to 
be interfering in GCC states’ internal affairs as all of the participants acknowledged 
that Iran interferes in other regional states’ internal affairs – it is this interference that 
is the main reason for them placing Iran as a main regional threat.  
Despite containment policies being implemented by Saudi Arabia and other GCC 
countries with Iran to strengthen relations, Saudi Arabia still views Iran as its biggest 
potential rival and military threat. According to Cordesman (2009), the Saudi leaders 
do not view Iran as being the most serious potential threat because of Iran’s current 
behaviour toward Saudi Arabia. Instead, Saudi Arabia is committed to peace and 
diplomatic solutions with Iran; to illustrate, Saudi Arabia has refused to take any 
military action against Iraq or Iran (including Iran’s nuclear programme) because of 
the sensitivity of these issues in the Arab and Muslim worlds – the aim is to keep the 
area clear of any conflicts.  
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6.2.2 Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programme 
To follow-up the first question, the participants were asked whether they considered 
the Iranian nuclear programme to be a serious threat to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
region. 
As indicated in Figure 6.2, 13 participants asserted that Iran’s WMD programme 
poses a threat, of which, 12, considered the programme to pose not only a military 
threat but also an environmental threat, and six participants failed to see any threat in 
Iran’s nuclear programme. The remaining five participants were not sure whether 
Iran’s WMD programme posed a serious threat to Saudi Arabia and the region.  
One of the participants who argued that the Iranian WMD programme doesn’t pose a 
threat to Saudi Arabia stated:  
Iran is surrounded with countries that have WMD and it’s not necessarily 
directed towards Saudi Arabia and other GCC states (A2).  
Whereas, another participants stated:  
Iran aims to obtain WMD is real and many evidence suggests that, which is 
clearly for a military proposes that is directed towards other neighbouring 
countries that got WMD plus towards GCC states (J1).  
Interestingly, the other eight participants added similar statements with regards to the 
threats from Iran’s WMD programme. 
Iran’s WMD programme is still controversial as it is unclear whether its intensions are 
peaceful or not (clean energy purposes). Many studies and reports have been 
conducted by various experts, including Cordesman (2013), Rogers (2010) and 
Henderson (2011), who suggest that the Iranian nuclear programme implies that Iran 
is seeking to obtain nuclear weapons. This adds to the rising notion that Iran poses a 
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threat to the Gulf state’s affairs as their programme increases the risk of Iran gaining 
more power and influence to the Gulf region’s security. Iran’s nuclear programme has 
become a source of anxiety not only for the regional states but also for other leading 
Western countries. These anxieties can be seen in the thorough and alarming coverage 
by the Western media who report on the seriousness of Iran’s nuclear programme – 
the speed at which Iran has developed and acquired nuclear weapons is seen to be 
alarming in the West.  
The researcher agrees with the participants and foreign experts about the significance 
of Iran’s policies as threatening security in the Gulf region; nonetheless, Saudi Arabia 
must focus and insist upon diplomatic approaches towards Iranian policies, including 
the desire for WMD in order to avoid any war or confrontation with Iran. To 
illustrate, even if Saudi Arabia were not a part of it, any new war in the area would 
add new risks and threats to the region and the world. It is also important to 
acknowledge the consequences of any attack on Iran as this would have a negative 
effect upon the other countries in the region as well as regional security; thus, security 
in this region is integral to the world’s security and economy. Furthermore, even if 
Iran did not retaliate, the situation would still be affected as repeated Iranian conflicts 
would most likely obstruct the vital navigation of oil transportation in the Gulf. It 
could be predicted that this obstruction would discourage the other regional countries 
from participating in any such attack.  
6.2.3  Iraq 
Participants were then asked whether the current security situation in Iraq presented a 
serious threat to security in Saudi Arabia and the region. Of the 24 participants, 19 
argued that the current situation in Iraq presents a serious threat, these participants 
233	  	  
were then asked to provide a brief explanation to their answer with regards to Saudi 
Arabia and regional security. All of the participants that answered yes confirmed that 
as a result of the lack of security in Iraq and due to the rising influence of Iran, they 
considered the Iraqi situation to be a threat to the Kingdom’s security. One participant 
added that the neighbouring borders with Iraq result in a situation that is extremely 
important to Saudi Arabia and it therefore cannot be dismissed. Interestingly, 14 of 
the participants suggested that as a result in changes in the leadership in Iraq, Shi’ism 
will is likely to rise within the region. It is therefore likely that this will slowly affect 
the internal politics in Saudi Arabia because of the minority Shi’a community in the 
Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia may be affected because of their high association 
with religious scholars in Iraq and Iran. To illustrate this point, several participants 
expressed their opinions by stating the following:  
The current situation in Iraq is unpleasing, instability in Iraq is affecting Saudi 
national security as all Gulf states’ security is connected (A3).  
The rise of sectarian conflict in Iraq is really a worrying sign that cannot be 
ignored especially with Iran’s involvements and its attempt to play a significant 
role there (P4). 
The remaining five participants did not acknowledge any threat from Iraq. It should 
be noted that the participants were from different fields of work (with interviewees 
from all three categories: officials and politicians [P], academics [A] and journalists 
[J]), but none of the answers correlated in any way with their job nature. 
The participants’ answers to the situation in Iraq, plus the experts for Gulf region 
affairs, revealed that Iraqi politics and security is highly connected to the situation in 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. In fact, Iraq is facing several problems because 
security itself varies from region to region. The country is facing risk with regards to 
breakdown into ethnic-religious parts. The central government in Iraq is weak and is 
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continually facing local and regional authorities and militias who are fighting among 
each other. Moreover, the spread of terrorism across the country has forced thousands 
of Iraqi to flee to neighbouring countries – this, in itself, is creating new problems. 
6.2.3.1 Iran’s Involvements in Iraq 
As a follow-up question, the participants were asked whether they felt that Iran was 
interfering in Iraq’s internal politics and affairs. Ironically, all of the participants 
stated that they believed that Iran was interfering in Iraq’s internal politics and affairs, 
even those who had answered no to the previous question.  Those who answered no 
did not view Iran’s interfering in Iraq as a threat, but rather as a competitive arena by 
which a rivalry situation was occurring between the regional powers of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran. One of the participants noted:  
Iranian interference in Iraq and the extension of Iranian influence is clear and 
explicit which was enhanced by Al-Maliki’s government and some of the Shi’ism, 
both of which have played a great role against the American troops by arming 
militant groups and allowing Iran to help in this matter.  
Several other participants stated:  
Iraq is an important country for the Arabs, and the subordination of Iraq under 
Iranian influence constitutes a hazard to the entire region. 
Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 6.4, most of the answers clearly show that Iran 
interferes in Iraq. Not all of the participants viewed this as a potential threat to Saudi 
Arabia, but 19 of the participants felt that it posed a threat. This view is supported by 
various other studies which suggest that Iran interferes with Iraqi politics and security, 
whereby the Shi’a parties are supported by the Iraqi government – this leads to more 
sectarian divisions where armed groups that resist the US presence are supported to 
destabilise security and peace in Iraq (Cordesman, 2009; Henderson, 2005). 
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Figure 6.1: Iran’s interference in Iraq vs. Iraq as a threat to Saudi national security   
Nevertheless, many studies and reports (such as: Cordesman, 2009; Henderson, 2009; 
Beehner and Bruno, 2008) suggest that Iran has been accused, by Iraqi officials, the 
US and by Saudi Arabia, of using its military and intelligence assets to support Shi’a 
militias. To illustrate, they indicate that the Mahdi Army is being supported to expand 
Shi’a power in the south of Iraq by making it a major political force that will 
influence and shape the future of Iraq. Analysts note that the Shi’a-led country is 
filled with figures, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who spent time during 
Saddam Hussein’s tenure exiled in Iran. Some even fought in Iranian-armed military 
units against Iraqi forces during the long and bloody Iran-Iraq War. Evidence of 
tactical support, supplied by Iran to the Iraqi Shi’a insurgency, is worrying to the US 
and other regional states. Furthermore, according to Beehner and Bruno (2008), 
President Bush said that the US had evidence of Tehran supplying “material support”, 
including mortars and elements of sophisticated roadside bombs, to insurgents in Iraq 
who in turn targeted and killed US forces. Conversely, Proctor (2008) argues that 
Saudi Arabia has a “strong stake” in curbing Iran’s influence and halting the creation 
of a “Shi’a crescent” between Iraq and Iran as this could cause further Sunni-Shi’a 
conflicts in the Gulf and beyond.  
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Hanelt (2007), however, argues that Iraq is most likely to become the central scene 
for the American-Iranian confrontation of interests as the land of selfish interests or 
jihadist actions. The data collected from the interviews suggested a similar view of 
the situation in Iraq. Most of the participants agreed on the seriousness of the situation 
in Iraq, both politically and in terms of security for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region; 
nevertheless, most of the participants agreed that Iran plays a role in Iraq’s politics 
and security; it thus spread its influence across the whole area. Some of the 
participants also supported Cordesman’s (2009) notion that Iran is creating a “Shi’a 
crescent”.  
This research shares a similar view about the situation in Iraq, it is apparent that Iran 
is playing an involved role in the political and security situation by spreading its 
influence and by providing tactical support to the Iraqi Shi’a insurgency.  
The final research findings for threats from Iran and Iraq will be presented in the 
following chapter (please see Chapter 7 for more detail).  
6.2.4  Situation in Yemen 
The next question asked participants about the level of security and the economy in 
Yemen with regards to whether it reflected either negatively or positively on Saudi 
Arabia’s regional security. A total of 23 participants felt that the level of security and 
economy in Yemen reflected on Saudi Arabia and regional security. They all believed 
that the geographical neighbouring location and long rugged borders of Yemen were 
associated with security in Saudi Arabia and the region. The following quotes 
illustrate how the current situation in Yemen affects Saudi security. Firstly, 
I believe Yemen is a bigger threat to Saudi security than Iran, due to its economic 
condition that makes people from Yemen migrate to Saudi for economic reasons 
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primarily. As a result, there are more than a million Yemeni’s in Saudi who are 
illegal, hence its very difficult for the government to track their movements. (A1)  
In contrast, other participants noted that:  
The migration from Yemen to Saudi and blending to Saudi community has made 
the borders and smuggling more difficult to control (P2), and  
The huge population in Yemen with low economic performance ultimately pushes 
people to serious crime (J1). 
With regards to Yemen there were similar views regarding the seriousness of the 
situation which are linked to connections over the conditions of Saudi Arabia’s 
security. The participants, as well as other researchers (such as Petersons, 2002), 
argue that Yemen has been a source of concern since the Yemeni Revolution of 1962.   
Although it is unlikely that Yemen would attack Saudi Arabia, there is still concern 
that Yemen is fragmented by its poverty as well as the existence of Al-Qaeda and the 
independent and armed tribes in Yemen. Yemen has been a safe haven for Al-Qaeda 
terrorists operating against Saudi Arabia, this region has become a staging area in the 
Arabian Peninsula targeted along the rugged Saudi-Yemeni border by illegal 
immigrants, drugs, arms and other types of smuggling and illegal activities.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, the experts suggest that Al-Qaeda decided to form Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in 2009, when various Al-Qaeda 
Yemeni and Saudi branches combined. Consequently, Yemen provided a potentially 
safe haven for a long-term base of operations by which terrorist attacks could be 
conducted internally and even abroad. It should also be noted that Saudi security 
forces have significantly obstructed Al-Qaeda’s presence in Saudi Arabia – thus, 
pushing these forces further into other territories in the area.  
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The other rising issue that poses an indirect threat to Saudi Arabia is the tribe of Al-
Houthi who belong to the Shi’a community (see Chapter 4 for more detail). As can be 
seen from the map in Figure 5.1, the Al-Houthis cover the southern border area of 
Saudi Arabia. The participants were asked whether any other security issues affect the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), two of the respondents acknowledged Al-Houthi as 
a developing security threat from Yemen to Saudi Arabia as a result of insurgency or 
uprising within the Kingdom. One respondent quoted:  
They are Shi’a with high loyalty to Iran, and they do not want Saudi to have a 
peaceful status in the region.  
Thus, Al-Houthi is proving to be problematic to Saudi security because it involves 
various critical elements (as discussed in Chapter 5) that affect security and stability 
in a country that is already facing a nationalist struggle in the south and with a global 
jihad movement that is in addition to poverty and weak security forces. In fact, any 
political instability in Yemen will have a serious consequence on the stability of the 
Arabian Peninsula as it will affect the flow of oil from the Gulf of Aden. Thus, the 
domestic political development in Yemen is critically important to the security and 
stability of Saudi Arabia. Consequently, it is important that the Yemeni difficulties 
are addressed in order to rectify the situation before it becomes unworkable.  
Ultimately, it needs mentioning that poverty is the root cause of most of the problems 
in Yemen. Political instability in Yemen has provided Al-Qaeda with opportunities 
which are having a direct effect on Saudi Arabia and the economies from around the 
world that are dependent on the oil from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.   
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6.2.5  Terrorism 
The following question asked participants whether they believed that terrorism was 
still a threat in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. Of the participants, 12 felt that 
terrorism remained a serious threat to Saudi Arabia and the world because it is still 
active despite the military tactics that have resulted in hiding it rather than resulting in 
its decline. In contrast, 10 participants felt that terrorism was not as serious a threat as 
it had been in Saudi Arabia – but, it was commented that it still exists in other 
countries, including: Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and North Africa. The 
remaining two participants indicated that terrorism only exists in individual cases and 
it therefore poses no or little threat to the states in the Gulf region.  Many participants 
acknowledged that various strategies had been adopting, included security and 
ideological approaches through the use of media and counselling in an attempt to 
contain misguided terrorist thoughts. It appears as though these strategies have 
achieved some success, but it should be noted that it is extremely difficult and time 
consuming to attempt to eliminate terrorism as the intellectual attitudes need to be 
changed in order for terrorism to be eliminated. The following quotes indicate how 
some of the participants expressed concern that terrorist actions had not diminished:    
What raises my concern that threat rises from terrorism, and Al-Qaeda in 
particular, were not completely finished in Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that 
Saudi Arabia has succeeded in eliminating terrorism militarily but it did not 
eliminate it intellectually which is even more important. (J1) 
What feeds terrorism and extremism in general is presence of a culture of not 
accepting the others among some who raises their children on such notions. (P1) 
Despite the adoption of multiple policies and strategies by Saudi Arabia which 
achieved many successes that led to a significant decrease in terrorism, but yet 
it’s the intellectual elimination that takes significant time and effort. (A2) 
As indicated in Figure 6.2, the participants who felt that terrorism still exists were 
then asked about the future of terrorism in Saudi Arabia. Of these participants, 12 
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(50%) thought that terrorism is likely to be diminished in the near future in Saudi 
Arabia. In contrast, the other 12 thought that terrorism had faced military 
confrontations which resulted in it being more hidden; nonetheless, they felt that it 
was not totally eliminated because it had not been sufficiently confronted in terms of 
ideology.    
 
Figure 6.2: Terrorism current status and terrorism future 
6.2.6  Israel 
The participants were then asked for their opinions on Israel, and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. The majority of respondents, 19, believed that the conflict in 
Palestine is the most important issue affecting regional security; furthermore, they 
noted that if this conflict were to be resolved then the whole region would be more 
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secure and stable. The remaining five participants did not provide a response to this 
question.  
Several participants stated that it would have been “a better region” if the conflict 
between Israel and Palatinate were resolved. Some interviewees stated the following: 
“If the Israeli-Palestinian [conflict is resolved then] many other regional threats will 
[also] be solved”, “[this] must be dealt with as a first priority”, and with regards to 
these conflicts they “must never be forgotten”. Most of the interviewees 
acknowledged that they would not be able to forget or accept Palestine. In general, all 
19 participants (from all three categories) believed that the issue of Israel, and the 
occupation of Palestine, is even more important than Iranian threats to Saudi Arabia’s 
national security; however, the issues with Iran are “more recent” and “direct”. 
As indicated by many of the interviewees, Saudi Arabia’s leaders have demonstrated 
their commitment to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the days of King 
Faisal. Both the interviewees and other researchers have suggested that Saudi 
Arabia’s western border is more secure than any other part of the Kingdom, as many 
suggested that the Arab-Israeli conflict has a major and direct impact on Saudi 
national security. Yet, previous studies and the interviewees suggest that any serious 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have a major destabilising effect on Jordan and Egypt. 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia must not ignore the impact that the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has on its relations with the US; this research will explore these notions 
further in the next chapter. 
242	  	  
6.2.7  Oil and Security 
The literature presented in Chapters 4 and 5, demonstrated that the oil in Saudi Arabia 
has created challenges and threats to the Kingdom’s national security; hence, the next 
question asked participants to evaluate the role that oil has played in the process of 
policymaking and national security in Saudi Arabia, in order to determine whether the 
oil has caused challenges to security in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region as foreign 
ambitions and interferences have increased. All of the participants unanimously 
agreed that oil plays an essential role in Saudi politics, security and policymaking 
because it forms the basis of the Saudi economy. Consequently, this has led the Saudi 
state to be integral to international politics; to illustrate this point, the interviewees 
used the following quotes:  
It’s the first and the foremost important factor in Saudi politics, oil is the main 
axis around which most Saudi relationships evolve. (P2) 
Oil plays a very essential role in Saudi politics but gives a false sense of safety to 
the Kingdom where it generates a large income which helped in placing the 
Kingdom among the major players in the political arena. (J1) 
Of course oil plays a key role in the Saudi policy-making and Saudi national 
security and the higher oil prices contributes in raising of the state policies even 
at the internal level by raising the state budgets and thus spending on citizens. 
(A2) 
In the second part of the question, the interviewees were asked whether they thought 
that the oil had caused challenges to Saudi security and regional security, by 
involving the country/region in conflicts and/or challenges, such as the Second Gulf 
War. Interestingly, only three participants believed that the oil had resulted in 
challenges to Saudi or regional security, and 20 participants believed that the oil 
would always result in challenges to Saudi security and regional security because oil 
is a needed energy resource. Many emphasised the “seriousness” of the challenges 
that oil had caused to Saudi national security. As a follow-up question, the 
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participants were asked whether they felt that oil had been the main reason for the 
American involvement in the 1991 Second Gulf War. Of the participants, 17 argued 
that oil was the main reason for American interference in the Second Gulf War, five 
believed that other geopolitical reasons, in addition to the oil, had resulted in 
American interference and two participants did not answer the question. The 
following figure, Figure 6.3, illustrates the manner in which the participants 
responded to all of the suggested regional threats. 
 
Figure 6.3: Response towards regional threats 
6.2.8  Additional Comments 
Finally, the participants were asked whether they wanted to suggest any additional 
regional threats that had not been previously mentioned. Six of the participants 
provided some additional regional threats. Three interviewees noted that interference 
from the West in the Gulf countries’ internal affairs should be considered a serious 
threat to the national security of Saudi Arabia because of the effect it has on the 
regional level. One participant acknowledged the high number of foreign labourers 
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within the Gulf countries as a potential threat, and the remaining two participants 
argued that the so called “Arab Spring” is a vital and serious threat to Saudi and 
regional security. 
 
6.3  Part Two: Assessing Internal Dynamics of National Security 
Research Question 2: What are the main internal threats and challenges affecting the 
policymaking process in Saudi Arabia? What are they main dynamics and players in 
Saudi Arabia’s national security? 
In this second part, the participants were introduced to a number of internal threats 
and challenges – they were asked to determine whether they posed any form of threat 
to the national security of Saudi Arabia. The threats were identified in accordance to 
the five sectors of threats which were identified in the literature review presented in 
Chapter 4. Consequently, this part will help to provide an understanding of the 
internal dynamic dimensions of security in terms of the social, economic, political, 
military and environmental threats.   
6.3.1 Economic Threats 
The following economic threats were introduced to the interviewees: a) 
unemployment, b) administrative corruption, c) poverty and d) the huge economic 
dependence on oil. They were firstly asked to evaluate each of these threats and then 
they were secondly asked to consider any other economic threats that they felt might 
affect Saudi national security. 
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All of the participants agreed on the first three economical threats as being serious 
threats to national security because they all affected the policymaking process within 
the country. Nine of the participants added that unemployment, administrative 
corruption and poverty all directly affected the state’s development and prosperity; 
these factors must therefore be considered, however it is unlikely that total 
elimination would be possible. Some participants asserted that these threats should be 
dealt with more “seriously” and “urgently” and one participant, a well-known ex-
Saudi official (P2), stated that these three factors represent the classical internal threat 
to Saudi national security – these are presenting a difficult task for the government to 
overcome or solve. 
6.3.2 Social and Political Threats 
As a result of the overlap between the social and political threats identified in the 
literature analysis, both of these threats will now be addressed together. The 
participants were introduced to the following social and political threats: a) social 
divisions and rapid changes – participants were asked about the social division that 
arises from the social conflicts between conservatives and liberalists, and the Shi’a 
minority within the Saudi social unity, they were asked whether each of these social 
divisions affects the policymaking process and Saudi national security; b) Shi’a 
demands and loyalties; c) internal demands and social media spread; and, d) the effect 
of the state’s internal social, cultural and religious nature on the state’s political 
system as well as internal and international policies. 
The participants were asked about the extent of influence or threat of social conflict 
between conservatives and liberalists with regards to national security and political 
influence. Interestingly, 13 participants believed that the social conflict between the 
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conservatives and liberalists has an effect on the policymaking in Saudi Arabia. Some 
of the participants disagreed and 11 participants felt that this was not a conflict but 
rather simple disagreements in opinion between the youths (new generations) and the 
clerics, rather than between the liberalists and conservatives. Those who disagreed 
with the titles had predominantly worked for the Saudi government for a long period, 
they argued:  
These Western titles do not apply significantly in the case of the Saudi society, 
where the majority of society does not clearly belong to any category or group, 
but these names have been adopted by some of the media in order to promote 
some of the Western terminology and ideas inside the Saudi society.  
One expert who had experience and involvement in the Saudi national security affairs 
stated that:  
The conflict between the so called “liberalists” and “conservatives” are artificial 
and in fact it’s more of a conflict between class, power and religion which has 
been used for years to monopolise and dominate the political scene by refusing 
any competitions to their role by any other party. Whereas, the other party is 
regarded as “liberalists” but it is mainly people who want to reform and change 
the current statues but they do not form any class or party, and this conflict 
threatens the security and national unity and is making the state and the 
policymaking process difficult, which could also lead to the emergence of some 
extremist groups as a product of this conflict. (J1)  
The participants also differed in their evaluation of the effect of the Shi’a minority 
division from the Saudi society, based on their demands and loyalty effects on Saudi 
national security. Of the participants, 12 considered the existence of the Shi’a 
minority to be a limited threat which would be affected by their loyalty to Iran and the 
Shi’a sect as well as to the Saudi policy and decision-making in Saudi Arabia. Seven 
participants asserted that their history and current actions posed a serious threat to the 
Kingdom’s security as this had an effect on the process of policymaking despite the 
fact that they cannot be treated as enemies as they are part of the Saudi society. Five 
participants believed that the Shi’a minority are being used to pressure Saudi Arabia, 
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despite the fact that they pose little or no threat to Saudi security or the Saudi 
policymaking process.  The following quotes represent these participants’ attitudes: 
The Shi’a minority in Saudi Arabia are part of the nation and they cannot be 
excluded no matter what. (A3) 
… Shi’ism in Saudi Arabia must be contained and fused within the Saudi society. 
(A5) 
…. Although they (Shi’as in Saudi Arabia) sometimes appear to be leaning 
towards Iran, they cannot be treated on the basis that they are another part or the 
enemies to Saudi Arabia. (A6) 
Interestingly, it was predominantly the academics that thought that the Shi’a posed no 
threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security; they therefore felt that they should not be 
excluded from the Saudi society; in contrast, the politicians and journalists generally 
viewed the Shi’a as threating to Saudi national security, due to their acts and 
favouritism towards Iran.     
When the participants were asked about the effect of the state’s internal social nature, 
which involves many cultural aspects, including tribalism and certain exclusions on 
women, to the state’s political system that are caused by Western political pressures 
that ask for a greater political presentation and more rights for women. Of the 
participants, 14 asserted that the West in general were trying to “impose Western 
ideologies” that contradict with “our” culture and traditions. While, six participants 
argued that Saudi Arabia needs to maintain its global development to ensure that the 
Kingdom is not excluded from the other nations. As such, one academic stated: 
… Lately Saudi Arabia is doing fine with regards to women’s roles and rights… 
despite the existence of those who call for woman to be kept away which is 
putting pressure on the government… yet, the government has managed to 
overcome many of these calls and were able to get females involved in political 
and economic life. (A4)    
Another politician stated: 
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Many have come to our ministry objecting about the recent decisions of the 
government that allow women to work in many places… yet, the Minister has met 
with them and explained the rationale and the regulations that ensure compliance 
with Islamic law… yet, many of them have been settled. (P5) 
In support of the explanations provided in Chapter 4, many of the interviewees 
commented that social aspects create pressures on the government that are in addition 
to the pressures from the West because of opposition with the internal aspects and 
social structures in the Gulf region.     
6.3.3  Military Threats 
The participants were asked to identify any military threats by evaluating the 
effectiveness of the Saudi security forces, both in terms of the military and other state 
security forces, so as to determine the extent to which they fulfil their role.  
Of the participants, 15 thought that there were no current or live direct military threats 
affecting Saudi Arabia or their security forces; consequently, they are currently 
managing internal and external threats as they develop. Conversely, the remaining 
participants felt that the security forces needed to develop in terms of manpower and 
quality. Some participants raised concerns about Saudi Arabia’s dependence on its 
military for security with regards to the US, one academic stated:  
The Saudi dependence and reliance on its military on the United States and 
Western states are making their security exposed and tied to these countries (A4).   
There is no straightforward method for assessing the overall effectiveness of the 
Saudi security efforts. But, the literature and interviewees indicated that Saudi 
Arabia’s security forces could work to identify the overall trend required for the 
Kingdom’s military in order to make internal security more effective.  
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Some participants identified internal terrorism as one of the main and serious military 
threats to Saudi national security (the effect of terrorism on Saudi Arabia’s national 
security was discussed earlier in this chapter as part of the analysis of the external 
threats).  
Another participant, who had been involved in the Saudi Ministry of Defence since 
2001, argued that the Saudi forces had witnessed a huge shift in personnel and 
apparatus in the aftermath of the 2003 terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia.  
One famous Saudi politician argued that Saudi Arabia has always been keen to 
develop it military forces. However, the literature suggests that the US led in 
supplying arms to Saudi Arabia. To illustrate, between 1950 and 2006, Saudi Arabia 
purchased and received weapons, military equipment and related services through 
foreign military sales (FMS) that were worth over $62.7 billion and from foreign 
military construction services (FMCS) that were worth over $17.1 billion, from the 
US (Blanchard, 2009: 17).  
6.3.4  Environmental Threats 
The participants were asked about the environmental threats that had been identified 
in the literature review; specifically, these threats included: desertification; depletion 
of underground water resources; the lack of perennial rivers or permanent water 
bodies which prompted the development of extensive seawater desalination facilities; 
and threats from coastal pollution from oil spills. Most of the interviewees (20) 
asserted that due to other “significant” internal and regional threats, the environmental 
threats and security were not deemed to be threatened and they were therefore not part 
of the state policymaking agenda. 
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In the last part of this section, the participants were asked to identify any additional 
internal threats; the following were identified by some of the participants:  
1. Distribution of wealth. 
2. Large numbers of foreign labourers. 
3. Racism. 
4. Rapid increase in population. 
5. Marginal area that mainly exists in the southern and northern regions. 
6. Judicial system effectiveness. 
7. Increasing gap between the rich and poor. 
 
Figure 6.4: Assessment from the 24 participants on Saudi Arabia’s internal challenges 
251	  	  
The researcher’s final findings with regard to the internal threats and the dynamics of 
Saudi national security, as identified from the interviews and the secondary data 
analysis, will be presented in the following chapter.  
6.4  Part Three: Saudi Arabia’s Relations and Diplomacy  
Research Question 3: What are the main states that play a major role and are vital to 
Saudi Arabia’s politics and security? And, what elements of Saudi diplomacy are 
associated with each of the presented states?  
In order to answer this third research question, several general questions were asked 
in order to evaluate the main states that are considered vital to Saudi Arabia’s regime 
for national security. The participants were introduced to most of the main players in 
the international arena, as well as the major states in the Gulf region, they were then 
asked to assess the importance of each state to the Saudi government in terms of its 
relations and diplomacy as well as the connections to security and state politics (these 
relations will again be discussed further from the researcher’s point of view in the 
next chapter, see section 7.3).      
6.4.1  US-Saudi Relations 
The participants were firstly asked to assess the Saudi-American relations. All of the 
participants assumed that Saudi-American relation were strategic and of significant 
importance to both parties; despite the turbulence of the post-9/11 period, these 
relations are considered to be normal in the current era. The participants were then 
asked to provide information on the main aspects that influence Saudi-American 
relations. Various answers were provided, but 14 of the participants focused on the 
following key points: oil and energy resources, the Arab Spring effect and stability in 
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Saudi Arabia. In addition, eight of the participants provided answers which can be 
summarised by the following quote:  
Due to the existence of interests on both sides and as long the United States is the 
superpower and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region hold a huge reserves of oil and 
energy resources, the strategic relations will remain and stand based on the 
requirement to provide protection and security in return for ensuring that oil 
supply is maintained and oil prices are kept stable. 
This notion is supported in the literature which shows that US relations with Saudi 
Arabia have been strategically important for both nations for more than 60 years, 
despite various periods of sensitivity (Peterson, 2002; Cordesman, 2009; Hajjar, 
2002). Two other participants argued that the US is unlikely to remain the most 
powerful superpower given the fact that the US has started to face huge economic 
difficulties that are likely to affect the state’s supremacy – this in turn will affect the 
foreign policies and strategies of the US.     
The following question asked whether the presence of US troops in the Gulf region 
would be affected by the US’ power/economical status. Of the participants, 20 (85%) 
felt that it would most probably continue as it is now as it is connected to the 
existence of oil and the power of the US as a state, they also felt that the relationship 
had both negative and positive effects. Some even felt that the US presence was 
necessary for the security of the Saudi state. The remaining four participants felt that 
the US’ presence would not continue for much longer. 
Many of the participants acknowledged the fact that some of the terrorism in the Gulf 
states has emerged in response to the US’ military presence in the region – this can be 
traced back to the early part of the last century. However, it should be noted that most 
of the interviewees identified the strategic importance of the US to the relationships 
and diplomacy in Saudi Arabia as these were deemed to be integral to Saudi Arabia’s 
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national security. The researcher will comment further on these findings and on the 
trends and importance of the US-Saudi relations to national security and diplomacy in 
Saudi Arabia in the next chapter (see section 7.3). 
6.4.2  EU-Saudi Relations 
The next question asked the participants to evaluate Saudi relations with European 
Union (EU) countries. All of the participants believed that relations with the EU 
countries were important, but not as important as relation with the US; furthermore 
relations between Saudi and the EU were currently considered to be good. 
Saudi Arabia is currently enjoying strong relations with most of the EU countries as a 
result of trading and political and security ties. Britain and France are deemed to have 
significant EU relations with Saudi Arabia – these strong ties, through the GCC, can 
be dated back to the establishment of the Saudi state. 
6.4.3 Sino-Saudi Relations 
The participants were also asked about their relations with China. All participants 
asserted that these relations should be considered very important as China’s 
importance is rising in the international arena; nonetheless, this relationship has been 
affected by the Chinese attitudes toward the United Nations. Key terms used by the 
participants included: “new superpower” and “China is the number one economic 
power”.  
The researcher will explain the trend and importance of the Sino-Saudi relations to the 
Saudi state’s national security and diplomacy in the next chapter (see section 7.3). 
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6.4.4  Russia-Saudi Relations 
The participants were then asked about relations with Russia. All participants asserted 
that relations with Russia are very important but that they are not as significant as the 
relations with the US or China; nonetheless, this relationship is also affected by the 
Russian stand in the United Nations. Key terms used by the participants to describe 
Russian importance, included: “under estimated great power”, “the old superpower” 
and “power balancer”.  
Again, the researcher will discuss the importance of Russia to Saudi relations and 
diplomacy, in more detail, in the next chapter.  
6.4.5  India-Saudi Relations 
The participants were also asked to assess Saudi relations with India. All of the 
participants agreed that these relations were important and need to be improved and 
extended; however, they all asserted that the strong ties that Saudi has with Pakistan 
have always affected this relationship. Furthermore, a large number of Indian 
labourers work in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region, in general (further discussion of 
the importance of Saudi relations with India will be given from the researcher’s 
viewpoint in the next chapter, see section 7.3). 
6.4.6  GCC-Saudi Relations 
Participants were then asked to evaluate relations with the GCC countries. All 
participants commented on the uniquely important relations with other GCC states, 
these relations have created vital unions by which strong ties and capabilities have 
been enriched among the GCC states. Eight of the participants argued that these 
relations have been affected by disagreements among the rulers of the different states 
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with regards to their position toward some of the regional and international issues as 
well as border disputes. In contrast, other participants argued that all of the historical 
disagreements and disputes between Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries have 
been removed (these relations will be discussed further in Chapter 7). 
6.4.7  Iran-Saudi Relations 
The next question asked participants to assess the Saudi relations with Iran. Of the 
participants, 20 (90%) agreed that the relations faced conflict and harmony; however, 
these relations are currently considered to be tense because of differences in the ruling 
regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia, consequently, their policies towards the whole 
region and relations are important and also conflicting. Four participants argued that 
the relations are no more competitive than other rival relationships between two 
neighbouring states (nonetheless, the researcher will provide further explanation of 
the importance of Saudi-Iranian relations in the following chapter). 
6.4.8 Iraq-Saudi Relations 
With regards to relations with Iraq, most participants believe that relations have been 
affected by the Iranian interference in Iraqi politics. The interviewees argued that 
these relations are currently quiet, despite the importance of Iraq to the whole region’s 
status. Some participants even described relation with Iraq as “bad relations” and “in 
its worst time”; yet, all participants asserted that relations with Iraq are important as it 
is an important part of the Arab world.     
Iraq has become a power vacuum without Saddam Hussein – this has resulted in a 
similar destabilising effect. Saudi Arabia saw the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as 
unavoidable, but also unpleasant. But, the Saudi regime is dissatisfied that the Shi’a 
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are dominating the Iraqi government and they are concerned about security in Iraq. 
The Iranian interference in Iraq will always present a challenge to Saudi-Iraqi 
relations; this needs reconsideration from Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states as 
this is deemed to present the biggest threat to the Gulf area. 
6.4.9  Turkey-Saudi Relations 
Participants were also asked about relations with Turkey, many participants argued 
that Turkey is an important state for Saudi relations because Turkey is having a 
positive effect on various aspects in the region, especially with regards to the Iranian 
regional impact. One participant (academic) used the following phase to describe the 
importance of these relations:  
It is essential to Saudi national security… especially in the light of Iran’s rising 
role in the Gulf region (A1).  
In addition, one politician commented: 
Relations with Turkey must be developed in various fields… especially with the 
presence of the Sunni faith in common (P2). 
6.4.10 Egypt-Saudi Relations 
The participants were also asked about relations with Egypt. All participants agreed 
on the importance of relations with Egypt, they argued that this relationship cannot be 
affected by regime change because Egypt has strong social ties and a shared political 
Arab association. Hence, it is most likely that relations with Egypt are not likely to 
change significantly, irrespective of the rulers of Egypt; it is therefore expected that 
the long lasting interrelationship between the two nations would continue to provide 
common ground for the two countries. 
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6.4.11 Additional Relations 
The final question, presented in this third part, asked participants to identify any other 
countries that they felt were of importance to Saudi foreign politics. Most of the 
participants felt that no additional states needed to be added, but a number of 
participants listed the states of Japan, South Korea, South Africa, Pakistan and 
Malaysia as potential strategic partners in the future – this was based on their possible 
future relations and need for Saudi oil. Others argued that Saudi international relations 
may become diversified so as to benefit and enhance Saudi partnerships – this would 
most likely ease the dependence of Saudi international relations with the US. 
Saudi Arabia is clearly expanding its external relations with some of the new growing 
political powers, perhaps most notably China, India and Russia, in order to better 
provide security and stability for the region and the world: however, it should be 
noted that previous approaches and efforts, undertaken by Saudi Arabia and other 
states in the Gulf, have failed to achieve the desired results. This, perhaps, represents 
the need for a stronger, more active, Saudi role within the international arena whereby 
the relations enjoyed by Saudi Arabia represent the strength of Islam and the Arab 
states that have continued to develop since the reign of King Faisal during the 1970s. 
6.5  Part Four: Evaluating Saudi Policies and Strategies on the Domestic, 
Regional and Global Levels 
Research Question 4: How effective are Saudi Arabia’s state and security policies 
and strategies in terms of the domestic, regional and global levels?  
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In order to answer this fourth research question, the participants were introduced to 
several questions aimed at assessing the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s policymaking 
process.  
6.5.1  Assessing Regional Policies 
Firstly, the researcher asked whether Saudi Arabia was fulfilling its role toward 
region security in the Gulf. Of the participants, 14 argued that Saudi Arabia was doing 
enough and 10 argued that Saudi Arabia was not doing enough to maintain regional 
security. As a follow-up question, the participants were asked whether Saudi Arabia’s 
regional policies and actions were being effectively directed toward addressing and 
eliminating regional threats. Of the participants, 16 believed that Saudi Arabia’s 
regional policies and actions were being effectively directed towards addressing and 
eliminating these regional threats; to illustrate, one interviewee stated: 
Its difficult to assess Saudi Arabia’s regional policies… but recently Saudi Arabia 
has definitely starting having more effective foreign policies and that is what was 
needed (A2). 
Another stated: 
Although Saudi Arabia plays a huge role… it cannot play a bigger role alone, it 
needs the other GCC countries and some other regional countries, such as 
Turkey to become involved (P3). 
While eight of the participants thought that that Saudi Arabia’s regional policies and 
actions were not being directed effectively toward addressing and eliminating the 
regional threats, some of the participants stated that Saudi Arabia needs to reassess its 
regional policies in order to reshape them to address the regional challenges in a more 
serious and appropriate manner. In addition, it is worth noting that six of these eight 
responses were from academics; conversely, most of the interviewees who thought 
that the regional policies were effective were politicians (in total 16).    
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6.5.1.1  Arab Spring Effect on Saudi Arabia  
The interviewees were also asked what influence they felt the so called “Arab Spring” 
had on Saudi Arabia. The respondents were briefed about the recent events that had 
occurred in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Syria. They were asked to provide 
opinions on these events with regards to how they impacted on Saudi security. Of the 
participants, 20 believed that the Arab Spring had a huge influence on Saudi Arabia, 
only three felt it had a limited influence and one participant felt it had no influence on 
Saudi Arabia because there were no significant similarities between these states and 
Saudi Arabia. 
It is important to note that many participants consider the “Arab Spring” term 
incorrectly, as the term fails to adequately describe and reflect on what is really 
occurring within these countries with regards to harm, torture and deaths. Some of the 
participants with academic backgrounds stated:  
Unless Saudi Arabia tries hard to cope with changes in other parts of the Arab 
world, the affect of these changes will be enormous on Saudi internal politics and 
these regime changes might result in alliances shifting whereby a state like Egypt 
might become a state of collision rather than alliance or friendship.  
As a follow-up question, the participants were asked to predict Saudi relations with 
the new governments in these countries (those that had witnessed regime change). Of 
the participants, 14 argued that relations with the new regimes would remain 
unchanged as a result of the Islamic position that Saudi Arabia holds and eight 
thought that relations with the new regimes would be tense and complex (most of 
these eight participants were either academics or journalists); furthermore, two 
participants refused to answer this question.  
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6.5.2  Assessing International Policies  
The participants were then asked to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s policies and actions in 
terms of the international level (foreign policies). Of the participants, nine rated it as 
excellent and a further nine rated it as good. The remaining six participants believed 
that additional effort is needed, five of which were academics. One politician stated: 
At the international level… Saudi Arabia is doing a successful job across all 
fields.  
6.5.3  Assessing Internal Policies  
The following question asked participants to evaluate Saudi Arabia’s social, political, 
and economic internal policies. In addition to determining this, the participants were 
asked whether the policies were successful at tackling and eliminating the internal 
threats and challenges. Of the participants, 19 believed that Saudi Arabia’s internal 
politics needed more effort as it wasn’t felt that it was currently effectively 
eliminating internal threats, three interviewees rated Saudi Arabia’s internal politics 
as good and two rated the internal politics as excellent.     
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Figure 6.5: The effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s security and state policies 
Ironically, as Figure 6.5 above illustrates, Saudi Arabia’s internal politics signifies the 
highest level of security that needs more consideration as it was deemed to be lacking 
in effectiveness. Interestingly, 19 of the 24 interviewees raised concern over the 
internal level of security, this was followed by regional policies whereby 10 
participants viewed Saudi regional security as insufficient, this was then followed by 
international policies whereby six participants stated that it needs more 
considerations. The researcher’s final findings on the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s 
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policies and strategies will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter (see 
section 7.3). 
6.6  Part Five: Saudi Arabia’s Political and Security Future 
Research Question 5: What are the main obstacles that limit or affect Saudi Arabia’s 
potential political outcomes? And, what are the perceptions of Saudi Arabia’s politics 
and security?  
To answer this fifth research question the participants were asked questions relating to 
the different sections of state politics and security, these were linked to Saudi state 
policymaking through the provision of personal beliefs on the way in which Saudi 
national security could be improved. This question was divided into three sections, 
each of which addressed the following areas of: a) regional, b) international, and c) 
internal security and politics. 
6.6.1  Regionally 
Many opinions were introduced by the participants with regards to the ways in which 
the Saudi regional role could be improved – they generally focused on the following 
points: 
• Activating King Abdullah’s call to transform the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) into a strategic union.    
• Maintain and improve the support and role of Saudi Arabia in the Arabic and 
Islamic world. 
• Supporting the Arab states economically by investing in these countries, not 
only through the use of grants and aid. 
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• Using the media and international forums to further illuminate Saudi Arabia’s 
views and orientations with regard to regional issues. 
• Manage regional circumstance, with more seriousness, with the other GCC 
states. 
• Develop a clear declared strategy towards regional concerns and establish the 
means to measure the implementation and success of these strategies. 
• Give more attention to the internal conditions, this will lead to the 
development of the regional and international position. 
• Improve regional relations with other regional powers, such as Turkey and 
Egypt, to curb the Iranian influence. 
6.6.2  Internationally 
The participants were asked how the international role and position for Saudi Arabia 
in foreign politics could be improved. Many believed that the current foreign political 
situation was perfectly fine as it was much better than the internal and regional 
positions.  However, the following items were noted for improvement:  
• Stronger and clearer relationships with some of the major powers, such as 
Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Russia, should be developed. 
• Saudi Arabia’s views and positions should be clearly expressed with regards 
to international issues to ensure they represent the nation’s interests. 
• Focus should be given to ways to encourage the Kingdom to become a greater 
leader.  
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6.6.3  Internally 
In terms of the internal field, it was felt that: 
• State institutions should be renewed and developed in order to meet with the 
internal and external developments and challenges as this will encourage the 
new generations to be involved in these institutions. 
• Clear strategic systemic solutions need to be developed to meet the challenges, 
and committees need to be developed to review and follow-up on the progress 
of these strategies. 
• Greater permissions should be given to the Shura Council and the media. 
• Citizen participation should be enhanced to encourage decision-making 
through the Shura Council and the Saudi National Dialogue Centre.  
• Corruption should be combated more seriously. 
• The judiciary should have more integrity. 
• The culture of moderation and tolerance should be encouraged to oppose 
extremist thoughts. 
• Political and social developments should be kept abreast with, in an attempt to 
meet the demands of the younger generations, to ensure that the current civil 
service system is relevant. 
• More institutions should be elected. 
• Social cohesion should be strengthened. 
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• Greater attention should be given to the education system with special 
consideration to child breeding methods.  
The participants were then asked their predictions on whether the challenges facing 
Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states would be resolved in the near future. Of the 
participants, 11 suggested that most of the current challenges would be resolved in the 
near future, eight indicated that they were unsure, and five felt that they would not be 
resolved. 
The next question asked whether Saudi Arabia was capable of adopting a greater role 
within the Gulf region. All of the participants felt that Saudi Arabia could adopt a 
bigger role, many participants asserted that Saudi Arabia has all the elements required 
for them to play a greater role and they could therefore hold a more effective position.  
The following question asked whether Saudi Arabia was capable of resolving the 
various challenges and threats that have evolved within the Gulf region, or whether 
they would need help from other GCC members. Of the participants, 20 felt that 
Saudi Arabia could not act alone as they needed the cooperation from either the other 
GCC states or other Western superpowers. This view is supported by the literature 
review which  suggested that Saudi Arabia needs to enhance its cooperation through 
the GCC in order to better assess and manage the Gulf challenges, more seriously, 
along with the other Arab Gulf states (Cordesman, 2009; Khalaf and Luciani, 2006; 
Peterson, 2002).  The remaining four participants felt that Saudi Arabia could resolve 
all of the regional challenges and threats on their own – they argued that Saudi Arabia 
has all of the elements needed to face all of the challenges and threats alone.  
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The following question asked whether the internal politics in Saudi Arabia would 
have a positive effect on regional and global politics. All of the participants answered 
yes to this question; in particular, one participant who had worked for the Saudi 
government for more than 30 years stated:  
There is no doubt that this old theory is very important which is based on two 
factors, social justice and national unity, it states that the achievement of these 
factors does not weaken it and it will not be defeated easily. 
6.6.4 Main Obstacles  
In the last part of this final section, the participants were asked to identify the main 
obstacles or determinants affecting the enhancement of Saudi Arabia’s politics in 
terms of the internal, regional and global spheres. Most of the participants provided 
answers, the main notions are now mentioned below: 
6.6.4.1 Internally 
• Groups and people that resist reform and changes. 
• Unsolved problems and challenges. 
• Bureaucracy. 
• Western intervention in internal matters. 
6.6.4.2 Regionally 
• Great power intervention in regional issues. 
• Regional disorder and chaos. 
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6.6.4.3 Globally  
• Alienated from some superpowers at the expense of others (i.e. US and 
Russia). 
• Global balance of power. 
• Economic global crisis.  
At the end of the interview, the interviewees were asked whether they had anything 
else to add; none of the participants added anything. 
The researcher’s final findings on the future of Saudi Arabia’s national security will 
be presented in Chapter 7. 
6.8  Conclusion 
This sixth chapter has provided additional information in an attempt to overcome the 
gaps in the current literature, as a result the threats suggested from the internal 
perspective have been re-examined by this research. The five main research questions, 
utilised in the interviews, were formulated in accordance with the main threats that 
the previous literature suggested were of relevance to the analysis of Saudi Arabia’s 
national security (see Chapters 4 and 5 for detailed discussions of the various relevant 
studies). This research project was therefore based on some of the assumptions 
obtained from the literature presented; in particular, the meaning of security was 
considered based on the unique status of the Saudi state. The specific structures of the 
Saudi state were identified, the state’s internal and external threats were also 
identified and finally these elements were then linked to the Saudi state’s relations 
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with regional and external powers. All in all, a deeper understanding of the dynamics 
and dimensions of Saudi national security were obtained.  
This chapter, in the first instance, proposed the use of a distinctive framework to help 
to further understand and analyse national security in Saudi Arabia – this will be 
explored further in Chapter 7. The five questions were devised in an attempt to 
provide better understanding of: the state’s internal and external threats, the state’s 
relations and diplomacy strategies for managing other regional and major powers, as 
well as a better understanding of the suggested future obstacles that may affect Saudi 
national security.  
This chapter has also illustrated that the key findings from the interviews have 
influenced the researcher’s opinion with regards to the regional and internal threats 
that were identified in the secondary data analysis. In addition, this chapter has also 
discussed the relationship that Saudi Arabia has with other states, these discussions 
acknowledged the views of the Saudi participants as well as the existing foreign 
literature. Based on these findings and discussions, the researcher will now, in the 
following chapter, present a systemic analysis of Saudi Arabia’s national security. 
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Chapter 7 
Conceptualising Saudi National Security: Researcher’s Final 
Findings 
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7.1  Introduction 
This chapter will present a systemic analysis of Saudi Arabia’s national security. This 
analysis will be based on the findings and discussions from the predominantly foreign 
literature, that were reviewed, and the findings of the semi-structured interviews in 
order to re-examine the situation in Saudi Arabia. The specific structures of the Saudi 
state were identified in accordance with the state’s internal and external threats, and 
the strategies deployed to counteract these threats; in addition, the state’s relations and 
diplomacy strategies were identified in an attempt to understand how Saudi Arabia 
managed the other regional and external powers.  
This chapter will present Saudi Arabia’s internal and external dimensions, and 
dynamics, in relation to their strategies of security; consequently, information 
concerning the state’s internal dimensions and threats of security will be identified for 
all five sectors of security (social, political, economic, military and environmental). In 
addition, the main internal players affecting Saudi Arabia’s national security, on the 
domestic level, will also be addressed. Furthermore, this chapter will suggest key 
points for improving internal security in Saudi Arabia, these suggestions for improved 
efficiency will be developed based on Saudi Arabia’s internal security policies and 
strategies that were suggested in the literature and interviewees. This chapter will also 
present the external threats affecting Saudi national security, as well as the main 
players affecting the regional and international levels of national security. 
Furthermore, the researcher will present an evaluation of Saudi Arabia’s external 
relations and diplomacy while also providing key ways in which external security and 
diplomacy in Saudi Arabia could be improved.  
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Consequently, this chapter will provide a more detailed understanding of the 
dynamics, strategies and dimensions of Saudi national security in terms of the internal 
and external perspectives. This chapter will therefore suggest a distinctive framework 
for understanding and analysing Saudi national security; as a result, the internal and 
foreign perspectives and thoughts, from all state security aspects, will be presented as 
the main aim of this study. 
7.2 Researcher’s Findings on Internal Dimensions and Dynamics of Saudi 
National Security 
7.2.1  Main Players in Saudi Arabia’s Internal Dimension of National Security 
The Saudi political system consists of various institutions and key powers, including: 
1. The King via the Royal Court. 
2. The Council of Ministers. 
3. Majlis Al-Shura (the Consultative Council). 
4. Hay’at Kibar al-Ulama (the Council of the Senior Ulama) which consists of 
Muslim scholars with specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and 
theology. 
5. Saudi security forces via the Interior Minister. 
The literature and interviews indicted that the first four are the most influential central 
components and most powerful players in the national security of Saudi Arabia. 
Topics and ideologies revolving around Islamism, nationalism and liberalism are the 
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main manipulated issues and elements within the internal arena of Saudi national 
security. The following four major domestic players influence Saudi internal security:  
• Sunni political activism. 
• Liberals. 
• Shi’a minority. 
• Tribal and regional politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Saudi political system and its interaction with the key players (Source: Author’s own) 
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Figure 7.1, above, shows the interaction between the Saudi political system and the 
key players that affect security in Saudi society. The figure illustrates that the 
following four authorities: the King via the Royal Court, the Cabinet of Ministers, the 
Majlis Al-Shura (the Consultative Council) and the Council of the Senior Ulama, hold 
the control of power in the country. Although the King holds the supreme authority in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it is the four authorities that convey control over the 
other state institutions (i.e. the ministers, the security forces, the judicial system and 
the municipal councils, etc.). However, the politics and the management of the 
institutions and government agencies are all shaped by the influence of several key 
socially and religiously motivated players, namely: Sunni political activism (which 
itself takes on many forms, from moderate voices, conservatives to militant jihads 
ideologies), liberals, Shi’a minority, as well as tribal and regional politics. The figure 
illustrates that the relationships are two-way; consequently, some of the players are 
more influential than others and the players with the bigger circles are generally more 
influential than those with smaller circles.    
7.2.2  Main Internal Threats  
7.2.2.1 Social and Political Security Threats  
The social and political threats form the most serious threats to Saudi Arabia’s 
internal level of national security. The discussions from the secondary and primary 
data about the internal social and political threats showed a huge overlap between the 
social and political threats and the dynamics of security. Tension has developed in 
Saudi Arabia as a result of political and religious differences, as well as regional 
differences. The Saudi regime has experienced conflict, differences and tensions from 
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Islamic reformists within the Saudi society; nonetheless, it would be possible for 
Saudi to become allied with these reformists.  The researcher will now identify the 
main social and political threats that he feels are of influence to Saudi Arabia. 
First, with regards to balancing the internal demands of all conflicting parties: Saudi 
Arabia faces the “internal dilemma” of creating balance between the elements of 
society that are demanding reform and change, with the other elements of society that 
are more conservative about change – this has created conflict between the cultural 
and social aspects of the Saudi society. As suggested by many of the interviewees, 
and the reviewed studies, the Saudi monarchy is not faced with the pressure of 
democratic electoral politics or the risk of losing power (as other Arab states face 
through elections). Nonetheless, the system of government in the Kingdom is based 
on Islamic and tribal traditions rather than Western models whereby an open society 
is repressed and women face a restricted way of live. The royal family endures 
internal influence struggles between those who are more open to economic, political 
and social reform (reformists) and those who are more conservative and attached to 
the status quo (conservatives).  
Second, with regards to Shi’a demands and loyalties: Saudi Arabia is home to a wide 
variety of faiths, sects and tribes. This diversity plays a part in the domestic pressures 
for reform and policymaking changes. The presence of the Shi’a minority in Saudi 
Arabia has created internal difficulties, especially as many of these Shi’a have shown 
loyalty to Iran. This could, in turn, weaken their allegiance to Saudi Arabia and result 
in a negative effect on social cohesion and Saudi Arabia’s interests. Irrespective of 
this, this minority group cannot be excluded and they must be considered within the 
Saudi context in order to ensure their loyalty.     
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Third, with regards to social media developments: it is clear, in light of the recent 
media revolution, that Saudi Arabia has faced pressure to respond to internal demands 
for reform and change. The introduction of social media communications, including 
Twitter, Facebook and Whatsapp, allow people to access unmonitored 
communications systems by which people can share information that the Saudi 
government may regard as confidential. Millions of people from Saudi Arabia now 
use the Internet; consequently, the control of information exchange has become 
impossible in this new social media era.  
Fourth, with regards to complying with external and internal commitments: many 
Western, and external, states dismiss or fail to understand how the social and cultural 
aspects are genuinely affecting Saudi Arabia’s national security. To illustrate, social 
and cultural aspects are restricting and influencing the state policymaking, 
consequently a political/social dilemma has been created between Saudi Arabia and 
other Western states with regards to issues such as women’s freedom which have 
created difficult dilemmas for the government – in the West, these notions are 
regarded as a suppression of freedom and human rights. However, the religious and 
social systems upon which Saudi Arabia was created, as founded by Mohammad ibn 
Abd Al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century (as discussed in Chapter 4), developed a 
highly religious and conservative society that is followed by many other Arabic and 
Islamic countries. Thus, any policies or agendas that are not compatible with these 
social and religious thoughts are considered to be of a threat to social and political 
security.  
In fact, these main four social and political threats illustrate the dynamic environment 
that Saudi Arabia faces with regards to its national security and they are considered as 
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the main current serious internal threats which rise the importance of urgent dealing 
with them in order to resolve and sustain internal stability and security.  Nevertheless, 
those threats expose the country progress towards the process of political 
development within the Saudi state. Embracing a clear series of Political 
Development pedestals that calls for political participation as mean to reduce the 
public pressure should enhance public participation in the state political system.  
Ironically, the majority of internal threats and challenges that the Saudi state faces 
comes as a result of the collision and the rising of the public demands which could be 
reduced and eased through an effective mechanism to engage further the pedestals of 
political participation and social integration as a mean to tackle most of the country 
internal threats and challenges and to enhance the state national security (for further 
details, please see section 7.3). 
7.2.2.2  Economic and Environmental Security Threats 
The interviews and secondary data analysis conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 indicated 
that Saudi Arabia, and the other states in the Gulf region, may face increased 
economic problems in the coming decade. The researcher considers the following 
threats to be the most serious to Saudi Arabia’s economic and environmental security. 
First, in terms of the oil-based economy: the Saudi economy needs to face the 
challenge of transferring its economy beyond its oil revenues. Oil still accounts for 
45% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP, this accounts for 70% to 80% of the state’s revenue and 
around 90% of their total export revenue.  
Second, Saudi Arabia needs to grow its economy to fulfil the rapid growth in 
population: Saudi Arabia’s population is growing on average by 3% every year. 
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Third, unemployment: the unemployment rates range from 15% to 25%, in line with 
the rapid explosion of youths; consequently, the government needs to create hundreds 
of thousands of new jobs every year. 
Fourth, poverty: although the Saudi government has already taken several steps to 
tackle poverty and unemployment, especially since the events of the “Arab Spring”, 
because unemployment rates have continued to increase; thus, it is likely that in the 
near future, a section of people will be under the poverty level. This raises huge 
concerns for the government because of the knowledge that there is a significant 
positive correlation between poverty and terrorism.  
Fifth, the education systems are insufficient in developing skilled workers: the 
education systems across the Gulf are still unable to produce large numbers of skilled 
workers, as a result of other social/cultural factors. Consequently, Saudi Arabia and 
other GCC states face inadequate education systems. Currently, young Saudi people 
(both male and female) are highly educated, in terms of global standards, they are also 
accustomed to high living standards; unfortunately, the education system fails to 
produce young men and women who are able to work as they have little or no work 
ethic. Moreover, many Saudi women and men are working in jobs that have no useful 
economic output.  
Sixth, Saudi Arabia relies heavily on foreign expatriate workers: the poor education 
system has faced problems as efforts have been made to replace highly-skilled foreign 
labour workers with local citizens. Consequently, the foreign expatriates working in 
Saudi Arabia account for 25% of the population, this has a genuine effect on Saudi 
Arabia’s identity.  
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Seventh, the shortage of fresh water resources and the lack of perennial rivers or 
permanent water bodies, makes the Kingdom inherently, depended on extensive 
seawater desalination facilities and with the country’s rapid growth, the demand for 
water is increasing. 
7.2.2.3  Military Security 
With regards to military threats, Chapter 5 acknowledged that Saudi Arabia has 
devoted its full resources to making more use of its security forces; specifically, the 
National Guard (SANG) and the Ministry of Interior security forces have been 
working since 2003 to deal with terrorism and to protect their oil facilities. 
Furthermore, with regards to counterterrorism, in 2004, 2005 and 2006 it is estimated 
that Saudi Arabia allocated $8.5, $10 and $12 billion, respectively, to increase the 
training, facilities and professionalism of its counterterrorism forces. Furthermore, in 
order to strengthen its borders through employing sophisticated measures to protect its 
borders, a total overhaul of the Saudi security system was provoked.  
The violent experiences faced by the Kingdom in 2003 led Saudi Arabia to establish a 
Joint Counterterrorism Centre in the Ministry of Interior (MOI) as well as a separate 
Counterterrorism Operation Centre in the Ministry of Defence and Aviation (MODA). 
Furthermore, the Saudi government established a National Joint Counterterrorism 
Command Protection Force (NJCC) that was headed by the Assistant Minister of 
Interior for Security Affairs, Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, to improve the 
cooperation, command and control capabilities among the different divisions of the 
MOI, SANG and MODA (Cordesman, 2009: 130).  
Saudi Arabia is still facing direct active military threat, most of the possible threats to 
its military security are discussed in terms of the external dimensions of national 
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security (later in this chapter – section 7.4). The Saudi military are therefore facing 
many challenges that are affecting their capabilities. This thesis has discussed the 
opinions of various foreign analysts and opinions from Saudi experts, but the 
researcher would now like to summarise the following points as the key military 
elements needing consideration:   
1. Saudi security forces lack coordination within and between their military 
forces: this is a problem associated with most of the Gulf states in their 
attempt to organise and command large military forces.  
2. Manpower quality and readiness to deal with the demands of modern security 
technologies and tactics: the Saudi security forces have suffered as a result of 
problems in the quality of their manpower who have limited or no knowledge 
of some fields such as technologies and contemporary security demand tactics. 
Consequently, it is difficult to create an advanced force structure that can deal 
with both regional and external possible threats. Saudi Arabia needs to 
recognise that they need more tactical independence in order to deal with 
Iran’s growing capabilities; they therefore need to be able to rapidly deploy 
forces to deal with terrorist threats that attack their population and 
infrastructures – examples of such threats include the Al-Houthi attacks from 
Yemen and the growing instability in the Horn of Africa.   
3. The SANG needs to manage more demanding security missions and be better 
trained in order to deal with developing internal and regional threats and 
duties. 
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4. Saudi Arabia is reliant on arms and defence from foreign countries, mainly the 
US, this linked Saudi national security to these countries. Consequently, 
security could be weakened as a result of this dependency and allegiances with 
these other countries. 
 
7.3  The Effectiveness and Future of Saudi Arabia’s Internal Policies  
Most of the interviewees indicated that Saudi Arabia needed to focuses on its internal 
policies rather than the external policies and dimensions of security. Nonetheless, 
much of the reviewed literature identified Saudi Arabia as one of the most active 
states in diminishing conflict and in advancing internal policies within the region.  
Lacy (2009) believes that the Saudi government is aware that, in order to maintain 
and strengthen their security, a broad process of reform must occur not only in terms 
of their militaries and internal security but also in terms of the country’s political, 
economic and social systems. According to Cordesman (2009), Saudi Arabia began 
implementing a “reform package” in the mid-1990s. These reforms have been steadily 
developing momentum by reforming the economic, educational, social and political 
systems. To illustrate, in recent years, Saudi Arabia has: held municipal elections, 
relaxed its media censorship, modernised its educational curricula and limited the 
power of the religious police.     
The Saudi government has therefore been implementing counterterrorism efforts by 
reforming the economic, educational, social and political systems. These reforms date 
back to before 2001, but various internal challenges have occurred in the Kingdom in 
the post-9/11 (2001) era. These challenges were discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 
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5; in response, the Kingdom re-organised its reform process in an attempt to tackle the 
most prominent challenges of terrorism, economic and demographic pressures, social 
and political dilemmas, and educational efficiency. 
These different reforms and policies were implemented in an effort to tackle Saudi 
Arabia’s internal threats and challenges and to develop Saudi national security 
further; however, the researcher believes that Saudi Arabia still needs to make drastic 
steps in order to manage and improve the internal dimension of national security. 
Saudi Arabia needs to seriously re-consider and re-sharpen the state practice of 
political development as it should improve the state stability, integration, equality, 
and institutionalisation; these elements are vital to reduce and overcome most of the 
current internal threats and challenges as most of these internal threats rise as a result 
of the rapid growth in the population with higher demands and social divisions which 
increase the importance of the state role in satisfying public needs and public 
demands. One way of doing so is by re-arranging the state policy-making institutions 
and regulations to meet these new needs and changes and thus reduce the pressure on 
the government caused by the increased and conflicted demands mentioned earlier in 
chapter 4.  
The reviewed literature and the interviews highly asserted that the internal dimension 
of Saudi national security is in more need for further considerations than the external 
dimension as it effects the state stability especially that of the political system which 
need to adapt a clear strategy in order to meet the public demands by reviewing and 
reconsidering the state political development process and achievements which should 
enhance further the citizen participations in the state policy-making while taking into 
account the impact of the social, cultural and tribal complexities and divisions on the 
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state politics in a way that could improve the state social and national integration and 
led for a further socio-political coherence. 
The researcher agrees with all of the key obstacles that were presented by the 
interviewees. In particular, the reviewed literature and the interviews presented 
various obstacles and solutions that need to be considered. Here are some of these key 
points that the researcher suggests as to be the most significant and important for the 
Saudi government to address in order to enhance its national security at the internal 
level and to overcome most of the current obstacles facing the national security in 
Saudi Arabia which also consider readdressing the idea of political development and 
other economic, military, social, and environmental factors of national security.  
1. An independent high committee or ministry needs to be developed, this needs to be 
connected directly to the King and supreme authority needs to be implemented to 
organise and follow-up progress of the state policies. Consequently, a clear strategic 
and systemic method needs to be devised under the King’s direction as this will help 
to address the challenges and threats (including corruption and other internal threats) 
affecting the state.  
2. Superior authorisation needs to be given to the Shura Council (Saudi Parliament) 
and citizen participation needs to be enhanced to encourage decision-making through 
the Shura Council and the Saudi National Dialogue Centre. Consequently, the Shura 
Council could then play a greater role in the policymaking process. Also, in designing 
general policies of the state and review the annual budget and issues. 
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3. To give the Shura Council resolutions with greater force in decision-making and to 
give it more legal jurisdiction and responsibilities that enables it to raise and reflect 
the interest and demands of the citizens.  
4. The judiciary needs to be reformed in order to facilitate sincerity, independence, 
and equality. 
5. The media, government agencies, schools and universities should be used to spread 
the culture of moderation, tolerance and enhances integrity as part of the political 
development process and as a tool to face extremism, corruption and other internal 
threats.  
6. The youths should be given a greater role in the state reform initiatives that were 
initiated in 2003 by King Abdullah, in an attempt to reconsider the current Civil 
Service System. 
7. More elected institutions should be considered and presented, similar to the 
Municipal Council elections of 2005, which could represent, satisfy and meet with the 
public increasing demands and reduce the pressure on the government to fulfil this 
task and the develop a special committee that overlook the state institutions 
performance 
8. A special department within the Ministry of Social Affairs should be developed in 
an attempt to enhance the national integration and to develop strategies to integrate 
the Shi'a minority further within the Saudi society – this should help to encourage 
national social cohesion. 
9. High quality programmes and strategies should be implemented to encourage the 
child breeding methods in schools. This should become an essential part of the 
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education and training system whereby new generations would be established to 
encourage a culture of work and workmanship, honesty and sincerity would be 
spread. Consequently, reliability, corruption and other negative morals would be 
reduced.  
10. Deliberate and clear strategies should be developed to meet with the outstanding 
economic and environmental threats and challenges, especially economic dependence 
on oil and water shortage. 
11. Saudi Arabia needs to further advance the water sector infrastructure while 
balancing desalination and wastewater treatment capacities, with those of water 
demand management and conservationist measures. As water security is a growing 
concern in the region, cost-effective integration of desalination and/or wastewater, 
and aquifer storage recovery technology can secure a reliable, sustainable and high 
quality fresh water supply for the Kingdom. 
12. To develop strategies and plans that would increase the military and security self-
reliance and to reduce reliance on external arms supplies. 
7.4  External Dimensions of National Security in Saudi Arabia: Threats 
Dynamics 
7.4.1  Dynamics of the Iranian and Iraqi Threat  
The Iranian and Iraqi threats will be commented on together by the researcher because 
of the deep connection between these two threats. Based on the analysis of the 
secondary data, and the data collected from the interviews, it can be concluded that 
Iran’s regional policies represent one of the most serious and significant issues to 
affect regional security. This has a possible and direct threat to the internal security of 
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the GCC countries, especially as Iran has a desire to spread its influences across the 
region, starting with Iraq by creating the “Shi’a crescent”. This crescent includes 
Syria and Lebanon, where Iran is currently playing a major and obvious role there 
through the Hezbollah group. It is expected that Saudi Arabia may form strategic 
alliances in the north, a region that had previously been obstructed by Saddam 
Hussein. Now, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon have become an open field in which Iran can 
exercise its influence and power; Saudi Arabia therefore needs to develop strong and 
close relations in order to influence these countries before it becomes too difficult. 
It is also worth noting that Iran has attempted to obtain power and influence in other 
areas in the south of Saudi Arabia, namely in Yemen through the Al-Houthi tribe’s 
movements (this was discussed in Chapter 5 and it will be discussed further in the 
next section). Hence, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC countries need to address 
Iran’s penetration into the region in a serious and realistic manner. 
Iran therefore represents a regional threat that extends to Saudi Arabia’s domestic 
level of security as the Shi’a minority within Saudi Arabia are being used to threaten 
the legitimate Saudi rulers (mainly via the Iranian leaders statements and declared 
agenda). Iran poses various threats, socially, politically and militarily, to Saudi 
Arabia’s internal security. Iran is therefore affecting the Saudi state’s security as 
Russia and China are being used in a veto position, internationally. In addition, Iran is 
a threat because it is an imposing interdependent state that is affecting Saudi Arabia 
as it is one of the most powerful regional states.  Based on these threats, Iran can be 
considered as an enmity to Saudi security, as it is a source of ideological, territorial 
and ethnic threats that exist from an historical precedent. 
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7.4.2  Dynamics of the Yemeni Threat  
Again, based on the analysis of the secondary data, and the data collected from the 
interviews, it can be argued that Saudi Arabia has, in recent years, become the most 
important donor and key partner supporting the economic and social development in 
Yemen. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has imposed various and significant efforts to 
support Yemen within the framework of the GCC countries. Saudi Arabia is keen to 
encourage relations between Yemen and the GCC in order to accelerate the 
rehabilitation process by which Yemen’s economy will be integrated into the GCC 
stands. Consequently, Yemen needs to overcome various problems both 
economically, in terms of poverty and demographics, and politically, in terms of 
domestic insurgencies and instability, as the situation in Yemen makes it an ideal 
choice for insurgence groups, such as Al-Qaeda.  
It is important to note that instability in Yemen would affect the security of global 
energy; furthermore, any instability would most likely persuade Somali pirates to 
become involved through Yemen which could have a negative effect on the Horn of 
Africa. Furthermore, Yemen overlooks the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, between the Red 
Sea and the Indian Ocean, and therefore influences the flow of trade from the Red 
Sea; consequently, any instability here would disturb these trade routes.   
Interestingly, more of the interviewees (which represents an internal perspective of 
national security) viewed the situation in Yemen to be a more serious threat to Saudi 
national security than the situation in Iran or Iraq. Conversely, the literature viewed 
Iran as the most serious threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security affairs. 
Consequently, the situation in Yemen should be considered to be a significant threat 
(and it should be considered to be at least no less important than the Iranian threat.    
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7.4.3  Dynamics of the Terrorism Threat  
The secondary data and interview analyses suggest that a mix of social, cultural, 
religious and economic reasons affect the way in which the Gulf region and the 
Middle East area provides a practical environment for terrorist activities, through the 
forming and enrolling in groups to the funding of terrorism that are motivated by the 
Western involvement, ambitions, and interferences in the area. Thus, the Gulf region 
plays a crucial role in the struggle against terrorism as this region is known, 
historically and culturally, for being the centre of the Islamic world. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was the first major internal 
threat that Saudi Arabia experienced. Recent reports show that the US plans to 
increase its attempts to target members of AQAP.  According to a report published in 
the Washington Post, the US’ campaign to target the killings of AQAP members is 
likely to expand with more strikes being launched against terrorism suspects, even if 
the identities of those killed are unknown. In 2012, several secret drone bases were 
constructed in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa; as a result, drone strikes 
in Yemen are on the rise (Miller, 2012). 
It is important to note that Saudi security is not only facing terror threats from Al-
Qaeda. There are two other factors threatening Saudi security: firstly, the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, an associated group of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt; and, 
secondly, Shi’a groups, supported by Iran, these Shi’a groups are furious over the 
mistreatment of their fellow Shi’a in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. In 
addition, various US policymakers emphasised that Iran had allegedly attempted to 
sponsor terrorist groups and the efforts of revolutionary Islamic Shi’as – this resulted 
in the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. Even though Iran demonstrated some 
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cooperation in the campaign against the Taliban, it is widely acknowledged that Iran, 
most likely supported, in some way, the terrorist groups, as agents to support terrorist 
and insurgent movements in Iraq were sent; furthermore, Iran has also been suspected 
of harbouring Al-Qaeda members who had/have planned attacks against Saudi Arabia 
(Korb, 2005: 12).  
Jamal Khahoggi, a well-known journalist and an expert in the national security of 
Saudi Arabia, provided information that was of interest to the researcher in his 
interview. With regards to the basis of terrorism in Saudi Arabia, he noted that: 
In general, there are countries that accept terrorism and Al-Qaeda intellectually, 
like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and there are countries that reject terrorism, 
such as Egypt, Syria and North African Arab countries, and that is due to many 
intellectual factors that include cultural and social aspects that interfere with 
religion and politics. 
Many studies and participants asserted that in order to resolve or compress terrorism, 
the causes of terrorism must be identified and dealt with. As discussed previously (see 
Chapter 5), some of the critical analyses accused the Saudi government of being 
responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Many also criticised various Saudi policies 
that encouraged fundraising in Saudi Arabia by some foundations that are believed to 
support extremist ideologies or that were in some way linked to or exploited by Al-
Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Moreover, others have argued that for several decades 
the Saudi policy decisions have both directly and indirectly supported the 
development of certain types of religious extremism. In addition, Osama bin Laden 
and other extremists had long criticised the Saudi government for its close relations 
with the US. Furthermore, it is worth noting, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
that Al-Qaeda emerged as a result of the US troops that were left in Saudi Arabia in 
the aftermath of the 1990 Gulf War. To illustrate further, in order to maintain the “no-
fly zone” over Iraq’s southern region, and to prevent the Iraqi president Saddam 
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Hussein from taking any further action towards the Gulf Oil states, Al-Qaeda declared 
war on the US in 1996 in attempt to make them withdraw their troops from the 
Arabian Peninsula.  
American analysts declare that various strategic US policies (old and new), within the 
Gulf region and the Middle East, have played a serious role in the rise of terrorist 
networks and extremist religious ideologies. Additionally, it is believed that the 
political and military assistance for some of the Gulf states, from the US, has and will 
continue to cause internal problems for the citizens within these states. To illustrate, 
as indicated in Chapter 5, both revolutionary and classical jihadists have applied the 
notion of an anti-American jihad in response to (and motivated by) the ongoing US 
military presence in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the ongoing US diplomatic and 
military support for Israel is also creating similar negative associations throughout the 
Islamic and Arab world. All in which have contributed to increasing and fuelling 
terrorism; as a consequence to the seriousness of these matters, the importance of 
tackling each factor has also increased.  
7.4.4  Dynamics of the Israeli Threat  
As mentioned previously in Chapter 5, Israel has been involved in many wars since its 
establishment in 1948, including: the Suez War of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, 
the Yom Kipper War of 1973, the 1982 Lebanon War and the 2006 War in Lebanon 
(Baxter, 2008: 46-65). Consequently, the way in which the Israeli state was 
configured created unpleasant feelings among the Palestinian and Arab people as they 
felt that the West, specifically Britain, had abandoned them as the official protectors 
at that time. Concurrently, the US has provided immediate and significant support to 
Israel since its inception.  
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As indicated by many of the interviewees, Saudi Arabia’s western border is more 
secure than any other part of the Kingdom, it has been suggested that this is in 
response to the Arab-Israeli conflict which clearly directly impacts on Saudi national 
security. Various studies and interviewees suggested that any serious Israeli-
Palestinian conflict would have a major destabilising effect on Jordan and Egypt. 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia cannot ignore the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 
this affects not only their relations but also relations with the US. 
Saudi Arabia’s leaders appear committed to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
ever since the days of King Faisal. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the war in 
1967 marked a point in Saudi involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Saudi Arabia 
is one of the most important states responsible for designing Arab policies toward 
Israel (Bahgat, 2007: 50). King Faisal had prayed at the Al-Aqsa mosque several 
years earlier, he had a deep desire to pray again at the mosque before his death, but 
his wish was never satisfied (Quandt, 1981: 31).  
During the 1970s, Saudi Arabia began offering financial and diplomatic assistance. 
Then, by 1981, Saudi Arabia offered its first peace plan, this was their vision of a 
comprehensive peace plan that marked the first Saudi public attempt to play an active 
role in resolving the conflict, this was initiated by King Fahd while he was still the 
Crown Prince (Cordesman, 2009: 43).  
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Fahd, at this time presented an eight-point peace plan 
that called for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, in 1967, this involved 
the dismantling of all Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. It also demanded 
for the right for all Palestinian refugees to return, as well as the creation of an 
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with Jerusalem as its 
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capital. Both Israeli leaders and the Reagan administration described the Saudi 
proposal as a positive step; irrespective of this, the Saudi plan was in essence 
dismissed by Israel (Bahgat, 2007: 52). 
Then, King Abdullah, in 2001 while he was the Crown Prince, offered the second 
peace plan. Similar to the plan proposed by Fhad, the Prince called for a complete 
Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories that had been occupied since the 1967 
war, including: full withdrawal from the Syrian Golan Heights and the remaining 
occupied parts of southern Lebanon; it also demanded for an independent Palestinian 
state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its capital; and, it 
confirmed the Palestinian refugees’ right to return to their land in Israel. The 
Abdullah plan progressed further than Fahd’s plan; instead of simply identifying the 
existence of a Jewish state in the Middle East, the Abdullah plan offered Israel 
political, economic and cultural normalisation (Pollack, 2002).  
Prince Abdullah and the Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal keenly supported this 
peace plan which was reapproved unanimously by the Arab leaders at the Beirut 
Summit on 2 May 2002; but, it should be noted that it was not fully accepted by the 
Israelis. 
As mentioned previously, the emergence of the latest Saudi peace plan came to exist 
in response to a common interest between Israel and the moderate Arab states, with 
regards to Iran’s regional ambitions. Unlike their counter-parts in Egypt, Jordan, 
Oman and Qatar, the Saudi leaders had no preference to engage in joint, direct or 
open talks with the Israelis; nonetheless, they still took a leading role in promoting the 
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace talks (Bahgat, 2007). Many Saudi’s, however, 
believe that the US has failed to push Israel towards peace with the Palestinians; 
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instead, they feel that the US’ media and congress, driven by an Israeli lobby and its 
supporters, incorrectly identifies Saudi Arabia as a supporter of terrorism and as a 
potential threat to Israel (Cordesman, 2009).  
Many Senior Israeli leaders also expressed support for talks based on King 
Abdullah’s proposal, but various issues remain in the details which have divided both 
sides. These issues include: divisions over the future of Jerusalem, adjustments of the 
1967 case-fire lines, and the rights for Palestinian refugees to return home; these 
issues have presented significant problems in the past and they may continue to do so 
in the near future. Consequently, Saudi Arabia must bear these elements in mind and 
thus form its security accordingly.     
Saudi Arabia has maintained connections with the two main Palestinian political 
movements: the Fatah Movement and the Islamic Resistance Movement, known as 
Hamas. But, since 2006, the political opposition between Hamas and Fatah has led to 
complex Saudi policies toward the Palestinians. As a result, Saudi initiatives toward 
Palestinian have sought to promote a resolution between Hamas and Fatah in order to 
encourage inter-Arab unity and block further progress that is affecting the Palestinian-
Israeli peace process (Blanchard, 2009: 28). This clearly demonstrates Saudi Arabia’s 
commitment to resolving peace in Palestine, and across the region.  
According to Blanchard (2009), the US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Senator 
George Mitchell visited Saudi Arabia repeatedly with other high-ranking US officials. 
The Saudi officials continued to call for Palestinian unity and the forceful engagement 
by the US to support a balanced approach to the conflict by restraining potential 
Israeli military operations against Hamas as well as other regional threats. But, as 
suggested by the interviewees (from all three categories), Israeli will never accept any 
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approach that does not satisfy their original plans for establishing a Greater State of 
Israel.  
It is worth noting that Israel’s settlement policies and its treatment of Palestinians will 
always create more tension between the Arabs and Israelis. The ongoing construction 
of settlements, across the occupied territories of Israel, have been criticised as 
negatively affecting the peace process, along with its nuclear programme. More 
elements have therefore been added to the Iranian threat, in addition to Iran’s race for 
nuclear arms; consequently, this will most likely cause more trouble and insecurity to 
the whole region. 
7.4.5  Dynamics of the Oil Security and US involvments 
In addition to the interviewees, many studies considered the increased attention that 
the West had given to the Gulf region and the enormous oil reserves in this area. 
Klare (2004), Rogers (2008), Cordesman (2009) and many others, illustrate that the 
US began focusing on the oil located in the Gulf region during the 1970s.  
Furthermore, the US identified the importance of securing this oil, by all means 
including military means. As a result, a Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force (JRDTF) 
was established at the end of the Carter presidency; but, this had little impact on the 
crises at that time, which included the Iranian Revolution and the occupation of 
Afghanistan by the Soviets, the JRDTF grew into a new unified military command, 
the US Central Command (CENTCOM), in January 1983 during the Reagan 
administration. CENTCOM continues to act as the “nerve centre” for all US military 
operations across the Persian Gulf and the whole of the Middle East.  
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CENTCOM also operated in the Gulf War of 1991; this war illustrates the extent to 
which the US was willing to secure and protect the Gulf area and its oil. It should be 
noted, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 and as mentioned earlier in this chapter, that 
this war also facilitated anti-American feelings in some sectors of Saudi society. In 
addition, it fuelled various campaigns including the one launched by Bin Laden in 
1990; consequently, “Al-Qaeda” developed in response to the large number of troops 
that the US had in Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, most of the interviewees (politicians, 
academics and journalist) believed that Al-Qaeda used the US presence as an excuse 
to gain public sympathy. To illustrate, a well-known politician said:  
Al-Qaeda has tried to exploit the situation of the American presence in order to 
gain supporters. 
In addition, an academic said:  
Al-Qaeda started during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan… the US presence in 
the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War was used as an excuse to launch attacks and 
gain public opinion. 
Hence, in one sense the oil caused difficulties to Saudi Arabia as attention and 
presence in the area from the West resulted in anti-Western and anti-government 
motivations. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the oil has made Saudi Arabia one of 
the richest country in the world and the securing of oil fields, pipelines and terminals 
has not caused any serious threats apart from the 2006 Abqaiq attacks (see Chapter 5 
for more detail). Consequently, the securing of Saudi oil not only involves Saudi 
Arabia as the oil itself is not enough, in addition the oil flow from the region also 
needs to be secured; this is where involvement from some of the major powers, with 
their high risks and consequences, are concerned.  
It is worth noting that only two participants considered oil to also be an environmental 
threat. This, perhaps, reflects that security and military aspects, caused by the 
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presence of large amounts of oil in Saudi Arabia, may have led the other participants 
to overlook the environmental threats that are caused by oil production.  
7.5 The Main External Threats  
There was agreement over the regional and external threats that face Saudi national 
security from the literature and the interviews, but differences were observed in the 
extent to which each threat was deemed to be important. This section will present the 
researcher’s opinions with regards to the most serious threats, in an attempt to analyse 
the situation further and to develop the notions that were presented in Chapter 5; each 
threat will be discussed based on an assessment of its importance/seriousness. 
7.5.1 Iran’s Policies and Interference in the Gulf Area and its Military Capabilities  
Iran is seen to represent the most serious threat to the area. The current Iranian regime 
aims to extend its influence beyond its borders in the Gulf area, especially into Iraq, 
Bahrain, and Syria, the consequences of such a strategy/policy cannot be ignored as it 
is likely to affect security in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region – it must therefore be 
managed seriously and sensibly. Iran’s involvements in Iraq include political 
hegemony and the spread of insecurity through its military and intelligence which is 
supporting Shi’a militias, such as the Mahdi Army, to expand Shi’a power across the 
south of Iraq. Consequently, Iran is a major political force that is influencing the 
future of Iraq. Furthermore, the creation of a “Shi’a crescent”, between Iraq and Iran, 
is likely to cause further Sunni-Shi’a conflicts in the Gulf region and beyond. 
As discussed in chapter 5 (see secition 5.2.1.4), it is unclear as to the extent of the 
nuclear programme and its military capabilities. A nuclear-armed Iran would defiantly 
unbalance the power in the area and will probably increase the arm race in the region.  
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Consequently, Saudi Arabia must undertake all possible means to encourage the US 
to adopt peaceful solutions by which more control and supervision can be imposed 
over Iranian nuclear facilities – this will help to ensure that they being used for only 
peaceful purposes.  
7.5.2 The Israeli-Arab Conflict and Israeli military capabilities 
The Israeli-Arab conflict represents the second most serious threat to security and 
peace in the Gulf. The western border of Saudi Arabia is deemed to be more secure 
than any other part of Saudi Arabia; however, the Arab-Israeli conflict is still 
impacting significantly on Saudi security. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is seriously 
affecting Saudi relations with the US.  To illustrate, the manner in which the Israeli 
state was created, instigated objections among the Palestinian and Arab people who 
felt abandoned by the West, and specifically Britain. The West and the US acted as 
administrator protectors of the area, at that time, and they have continued to provide 
significant support to Israel since its inception. In addition, the land of Palestine 
represents the holy land of Islam and thus, it is argued this cannot be changed. 
Finally, the ongoing Israeli construction of settlements in the occupied territories has 
been criticised as affecting the peace process, along with the recognition that their 
nuclear programme could lead to a nuclear race with Iran which is likely to cause 
more trouble and insecurity across the whole region. Israel undeclared WMD 
programme in addition to its military capabilities is also representing a serious threat 
to Saudi national security.    
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7.5.3 The Political and Economic Situation in Yemen 
The third most significant threat to Saudi Arabia comes from Yemen which has been 
a source of worry since the Yemeni Revolution of 1962. Despite the fact that it is 
unlikely that Yemen would attack Saudi Arabia, there is still concern that Yemen 
could become fragmented as a result of its poverty – this could fuel the existence of 
Al-Qaeda and other independent armed tribes/militia in Yemen. The Al-Houthi tribe 
also presents a problematic matter to Saudi security across various critical areas. Any 
political instability in Yemen will have serious results on the stability of the Arabian 
Peninsula and the flow of oil from the Gulf of Aden. Hence, the domestic political 
development in Yemen is critically important to the security and stability of Saudi 
Arabia. Consequently, it is imperative that the situation in Yemen be resolved soon 
before a resolution to these problems becomes unviable.  
7.5.4 The US Partnership with Saudi Arabia and its Involvement in the Region 
Although its vast oil resources have given Saudi Arabia a significant position of 
strength in the international arena, these resources have also instigated major 
involvement from the West, which could potentially have initiated various routes for 
terrorism. US authorities acknowledge that their involvement with partners in the 
Gulf is risky, particularly in Saudi Arabia; as a result, the US have attempted to 
minimise their military presence in Saudi Arabia and in other Gulf states. However, 
their continued political and strategic relations with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC 
states will continue to create difficulties in the Gulf region.  
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7.5.5 The Situation of Iraqi and Syria  
The situation in Iraq since the US intervention, represents the fifth most important 
threat to Saudi security as Iran has, since this time, become more involved with Iraq. 
Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states must hold frequent meetings with the US and 
other coalition countries in order to facilitate Iraq to recover in the post-war era, in the 
best possible manner, so as to finally have a complete withdrawal of the US from 
Iraq. Furthermore, steps need to be taken to identify ways in which Iraq can find unity 
and cohesion while stopping the insurgent attempts to increase division within Iraq 
which, if not controlled, will result in increased tension and conflict with other states, 
including Iran. 
The US’ invasion of Iraq created instability which will threaten security across the 
Gulf if Iraq fails to become unified. The distrust from Iraqi Sunnis in their Shi’a 
dominant government resulted in a boycott of the first elections whereby voting was 
linked directly to ethnicity and religion. As a result, dominance of politics in Baghdad 
by the Shi’a increased – this dominance will most likely create more problems 
internally and externally. 
It is also imperative that all forms of partisanship and all types of weaponry, that are 
feeding the conflicts and violence including the placing of more control on the arms 
depots of the American and Iraqi army, are combated to eliminate corruption within 
Iraq as this will critically obstruct the reconstruction operations in Iraq. In addition, by 
placing more control over the Iranian shipments to Iraq, and any money transfers 
from Iran to figures within the Iraqi government or Shi’a militias, the situation will 
become more controlled. Saudi Arabia must therefore impose more control over its 
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border with Iraq to prevent terrorists from gaining access to Iraq while also preventing 
the smuggling of weapons or dangerous materials from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. 
Situation in Syria 
The Syrian civil war, which started in 2011, created a major challenge for Saudi 
Arabian national security. It caused a collision between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States, and Russia, in addition to some of the GCC countries. The current Syrian civil 
war also produced internal divisions between Sunnis, Alawites, Kurds, and Syria’s 
smaller minorities, and has launched a long-lasting anger and hatred between Sunni 
and Shi’a (Alawite) Muslims. The war has already spread to involve Lebanon and 
Iraq, unleashing a reawakening of sectarian tensions and conflict in each country. 
Thus, the Syrian civil war is adding a possible political, economic, social, and military 
threat to Saudi Arabian national security at all three levels of state security (domestic, 
regional, and international) and will probably continue to do so in the near future. 
7.5.6  Terrorism 
Since 2003, counterterrorism abilities have improved significantly among the GCC 
countries. To illustrate, Saudi Arabia has made specific efforts and developed 
strategies aimed at confronting extremism and terrorist groups, namely Al-Qaeda, this 
appears to have resulted in a decrease in terrorism. Nonetheless, terrorism has not 
diminished completely and terrorist ideologies remain within the country and region 
which need confronting ideologically and more comprehensively.     
7.5.7  Effective Unity Among the GCC States 
The GCC countries have competitive and sophisticated military resources. However, 
worryingly, there is a need for effective unity among the GCC countries as there is a 
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lack of actual leadership among them. Consequently, disagreements are common and 
have, in the past, led to unsuccessful attempts to develop accepted integration and 
effective common military forces which would be dangerous and threatening if 
external intervention is not employed. Thus, the GCC countries are most likely 
concerned with the state of other forces within the region.  
Saudi Arabia must focus on strengthening and enhancing security within the GCC 
countries, in terms of self-defence forces such as the Peninsula Shield Forces, which 
have enormous military assets. Consequently, one of the main requirements of joint 
military forces includes the need to be responsive to real-world needs, by being 
effective in deterrence and defence over the region’s challenges. To summarise, these 
defences needed to have little or no external interference and they need to be 
passionate about serving the security and stability of the region.  
It would be worth focusing on and considering the experiences of others, for example 
NATO. Consequently, it is important to attempt to overcome the border problems 
between the GCC countries in order to find common, peaceful solutions which 
overcome differences and achieve a common and effective cooperation council. It is 
also important to eliminate bureaucracy and inefficiency as these elements are likely 
to obstruct the effectiveness of any developing processes within the GCC.  
7.6 Regional Threats Effects on the State’s Three Levels of Security 
The impact of each of the aforementioned threats will now be demonstrated in 
relation to Saudi Arabia’s three levels of security (specifically: domestic, regional and 
international security). The following table, Table 7.1, illustrates the way in which 
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security is affected for each level, based on the previous literature reviewed and the 
feedback from the interviews. 
Levels of security State/threat 
Domestic  Regional  International 
Iran Yes (via Shi’a sect 
within Saudi Arabia) 
Yes (via its regional 
policies and agenda, 
and its involvements 
in the internal affairs 
of many other 
regional states, 
including: Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Bahrain, 
Yemen and Iran’s 
WMD programme) 
Yes (via Russia and 
China)  
Iraq Partly (via Iran and 
Shi’a) 
Yes  No 
Yemen Yes (via large 
numbers of Yemeni 
workers in Saudi 
Arabia and through 
trafficking)  
Yes (via the Houthi 
tribe and Al-Qaeda) 
No  
Terrorism  Yes (socially, 
politically, 
economically and 
militarily)  
Yes (via Al-Qaeda in 
other states, i.e. 
Yemen and Iraq) 
Yes (via other 
external powers’ 
involvements in 
regional security, i.e. 
United States) 
Israel No  Yes (via its WMD 
programme and its 
military capabilities) 
Yes (via United States 
lobbying) 
Table 7.1: The regional threats affecting Saudi Arabia’s various levels of security 
 
7.7  Main Players at the External Level of Saudi National Security (Saudi 
International relations) 
Understanding Saudi Arabia internal and regional dimensions and dynamics of 
security and threats in addition to the nature of the international system, showed that 
Saudi Arabia foreign policies are shaped and influenced by the specifics of all these 
components, either caused by the state internal threats and weakness or by the 
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surrounding regional threats and revivals or by the changing policies of the 
superpowers towards the region. In fact, Saudi Arabia foreign policy is hugely driven 
by the strategic concerns of national survival through many serious internal and 
regional threats and challenges, while lacking actual sufficient self-reliance defensive 
capabilities, which makes the Saudi state foreign policies and relations highly 
dependent on alliances as a means of survival, making state security dependent on the 
outputs of the international system and the foreign policies of the great powers.   
An analysis of Saudi Arabia’s regional and external dimensions of national security 
has revealed the main external players that influence security. On the whole, most of 
these states have already been considered in terms of how they affect Saudi Arabia’s 
internal and regional security, but they will now be addressed again in terms of how 
they affect the Saudi state on the external level (International relations).    
7.7.1 United States 
The US is likely to continue to pose challenges for decades to come for Saudi Arabia 
in terms of security. To illustrate, the Gulf region still hosts the largest concentration 
of US allied troops in the world outside the US, and this area is therefore central to 
the US’ security strategies. As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, strategic relations 
between the US and the GCC countries began in the post-World War II era, these 
relations continued throughout the Cold War and into the post-Cold War period. The 
US security strategy in the region is mainly motivated by the three perennial factors 
of interest: access to oil, security of Israel, and the stability and security of the region. 
The US has political, economic and strategic interests in the Gulf region resulting in 
the Gulf as a region being a priority within the US’ foreign policy agenda; this has 
been made clear in various presidential administrations. Oil, however, has always 
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been a key interest of the US in the region, especially as Saudi Arabia alone has the 
largest oil reserves in the world. Irrespective of this, there are a number of issues that 
could increase tensions between the US and Saudi Arabia: firstly, is the fact that they 
hold different positions on Iraq; secondly, involves the Arab-Israeli issue; thirdly, is 
the oil issue; and, the fourth and final issue concerns the war on terror. 
All of these issues could encourage the US to shift its presence to other smaller Gulf 
states who may be more willing to accommodate the American military. To illustrate, 
Qatar and Bahrain are currently hosting many of the US military troops and it is felt 
that the smaller Gulf states may feel the need for greater American protection than 
Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia may also widen its relations with other major 
powers, such as China or India, as these are new major powers. This could all 
contribute to counterbalancing the connection that the US has with Saudi Arabia.  
With the instigation of the war on Iraq in 2003, the US made Iraq, either intentionally 
or unintentionally, an active scene for Iran whereby Iran’s power strengthening it 
within the region. As been discussed earlier in chapter5, Iran has extended its 
influence in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon. Furthermore, with the withdrawal of 
the US troops from Iraq, this area became a more fertile location for Iran to develop 
its influence. Nonetheless, as a result of US recent policies with respect to Syria or the 
Iranian nuclear programmes, it can be seen as though the US has left the Arab Gulf 
states to face the rising Iranian power. The US has more recently become less 
dependent on the Gulf region’s oil (discussed previously in Chapter 5). Consequently, 
Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states need to quickly advance and strengthen their 
military, political, social and economic stances in order to become more strategically 
dependent across all necessary internal and regional elements. However, the various 
304	  	  
literature and the interviewees agree that neither China nor India are likely to replace 
the US’ security provisions in Saudi Arabia in the short-term. On this respect, it is 
more likely that the Saudi-US partnership is likely to remain solid in the near future. 
7.7.2 Iran 
In general, the interviewees and literature argue that the overthrow of the Iranian 
Shah, when the Iranian revolution leaders took control of the country, resulted in 
relationship crises between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Iranians, tried to penetrate the 
Saudi debate which included the self-declared custodianship of the two holy places of 
Islam (Mecca and Medina). Without Saddam Hussein, Iraqi Shi’as became powerful, 
while the Iranian influence, as discussed earlier in this chapter, increasing in Iraq as 
well as Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. Consequently, this Iranian influence also reached 
the Saudi Shi’as living in the east of Saudi Arabia – an area which contains most of 
the important oil fields. The notion of spreading Shi’ism among the Gulf and Arab 
countries has resulted in official rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran; consequently, 
this is likely to always play a role in Saudi-Iranian relations. 
7.7.3  Turkey  
Due to the rise of Turkey’s regional power, Turkey is constituted to be one of the 
important states for Saudi international relations and national security whereby Saudi 
Arabia and the other GCC states could gain more influence and power on the regional 
level. Thus, as discussed previously, this is likely to increase Turkey’s effectiveness at 
restricting Iran’s policies and ambitions in the region.    
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7.7.4  China 
The emergence of new states within the international field has broadened Saudi 
Arabia’s choice for relations; as mentioned previously, this could lead to not only a 
halt in the Saudi-US relationship, but it may also act as a counterbalance for the US’ 
influence in Saudi Arabia, especially as countries like China become stronger to 
potentially rival the US’ role in international relations (Rogers, 2008). According to 
Petrini (2007), both security and political economies played a pivotal role in Saudi 
Arabia’s decision to shift to powers such as China and India. In fact, China is the 
second largest importer of oil after the US and it is most likely that this will continue 
to increase in the near future (Hufbauer, 2006). China represents the most important 
Asian partner for Saudi Arabia. It should be noted that relations were affected by the 
Chinese attitudes to the United Nations, especially when China (in February 2012) 
vetoed with Russia against the Arab League’s peace plan for a political transition in 
Syria (MacFarquhar and Shadid, 2012). Nonetheless, China and Saudi Arabia still 
share similar views on many important international issues, such as the establishment 
of a new international order, a multi-polar world and continued reconstruction efforts 
in Iraq. Therefore, the cooperation on the energy front is likely to facilitate the basis 
for friendly political relations (Petrini, 2007). 
7.7.5  Russia 
Russia is still a great power and is a member of various important international 
groups, including: a member og the permanent UN Security Council of the United 
Nations, it is also a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) and the Group of Eight 
(G8) industrialised nations which comprise the major industrialised countries in the 
world, along with the United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
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France and Canada. Russia also can use its power of veto over any resolution 
presented to the Security Council. 
Despite the recent opponent position that Russia played in the United Nations during 
the crises in Syria, Russia remains a vital state to Saudi Arabia’s international 
relations and national security which must not be underestimated. Saudi Arabia is 
considered to be allied with the US, but it is unlikely to ever dismiss Russia from its 
future considerations as the dimensions of this relationship are greatly valued. 
7.7.6 India 
In January 2006 King Abdullah visited India whereby he and the Indian Prime 
Minister, Singh, signed a joint declaration to focus on active cooperation in 
combating terrorism. This declaration is deemed to have not only empowered the two 
states but also encouraged stability in the Gulf and India. This was the first visit in 
more than 50 years, and, in spite of a strong Saudi-Pakistan relationship, it is likely 
that the two countries have established grounds for a long-term partnership. The visit 
provided a framework for cooperation over various fields of mutual interest. A further 
visit, by the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Saudi Arabia in 2010, 
reflects the level of joint commitment to a “strategic partnership”; furthermore, the 
“Riyadh Declaration” signed during this visit further enhanced the cooperation on the 
political, economic, security and defence levels (Embassy of India in Saudi Arabia, 
2013). 
It should be noted that India is seen to be one of the most important emerging powers, 
especially in terms of the changes in the global balance of power; this is in addition to 
Saudi Arabia’s relations with Pakistan. India’s economy is growing and with it is a 
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need for greater energy; currently, Saudi Arabia supplies around 30% of India’s oil, as 
a result trade between the two countries in the 2012/2013 fiscal year reached around 
$43 billion, an increase by 18% over the previous year (Hassan, 2013). It is expected 
that relations with India could be developed in more than one area, but it must be 
considered with caution as India has strategic relations with both Israel and Russia.   
7.7.7 GCC 
All participants asserted that the GCC countries share a common regional culture, as 
well as socioeconomic and political structures; consequently, these countries share 
similar security concerns. There are distinguished relations between the rulers of most 
of these countries that date back centuries; but, the existence of strong relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states does not demonstrate that there are no 
differences or disputes between these states. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
differences and disputes predominantly revolve around border disputes and 
differences with regards to certain domestic and international issues that have caused 
tension. Furthermore, the GCC states have experienced problems with regard to 
concessions and counter-concessions among its members. There is also a lack of 
effective unity among the GCC states and political disputes and disagreements are 
common; as a result, there have been various unsuccessful attempts to develop 
integrated and effective military forces for facing threats and dangers, without any 
other external intervention. By itself, this created internal problems for these 
countries, especially in the absence of effective forces which led to reduced  
confidence in the forces. As a result, the Saudi-GCC relationship has been damaged 
and must be resolved; the final chapter will suggest some recommendations with 
regards to the GCC-Saudi abilities and their future. 
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7.7.8 Egypt 
From an official Saudi perspective, the overthrow of President Mubarak, in February 
2011, represented a strategic loss, not only because he was an important ally in the 
containment of the Iranian-Syrian axis but he also played a significant role in the 
control of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. After around six decades of government 
repression, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was legalised in 2011 when the regime 
of Hosni Mubarak was overthrown. As the country’s strongest political organisation, 
the Muslim Brotherhood won the 2012 presidential election and Mohamed Morsi 
became Egypt’s first democratically elected President. However, only one year later, 
on 3 July 3 2013, Morsi was himself removed from power when the military took him 
into military custody (Kirkpatrick, 2013).  
7.8 Saudi International Relations and Diplomacy Under the Pattern of 
“Amity and Enmity” 
Saudi relations can be observed under the pattern of “amity and enmity” as a way of 
assessing the regional and external powers that vary from hostility (enmity) to 
friendship (amity). The following table, Table 7.2 summaries the states mentioned 
above in terms of their pattern of amity and/or enmity – this table has been developed 
in response to the literature presented and the interviewee responses. 
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Amity Amity/Enmity Enmity 
US   
EU   
 China  
 Russia  
India   
GCC (a sup-regional security 
complex) 
  
  Iran (due to Iran policies and 
regional agenda) 
 Iraq  
Turkey   
Egypt   
 
 Table 7.2: Saudi relationships under the pattern of amity and/or enmity  
 
7.8.1  Saudi Diplomacy and External Security Future and Efficiency  
While assessing the interviewee opinions of Saudi Arabia’s external policies and 
national security practices toward regional and external threats and challenges, many 
of the interviewees indicated that they were satisfied with Saudi Arabia’s regional and 
external threats and challenges and the role that Saudi Arabia plays in the regional 
perspective. However, much of the literature and interview responses indicate that the 
Saudi role is restricted and influenced by external elements. As such, the following 
key points may be suggested as an approach for the Saudi government to advance 
their national security on the external level.   
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7.8.1.1 Regionally 
• The GCC needs to be transformed into a strategic union, urgently and 
seriously, in order to overcome all of the inter-GCC disputes by identifying 
common solutions and overcoming differences for common and effective 
cooperation. In addition, it is also important to eliminate bureaucracy and 
inefficiency in order to develop the GCC’s role further in this area.  
• The security of the GCC’s self-defence forces in the Peninsula Shield Forces, 
need to be strengthened and enhanced, especially in terms of the existence of 
important military assets (this is one of the main requirements in having joint 
military forces). Consequently, it would then be more: focused on real world 
needs, effective in deterrence and defence, and more able to face challenges 
within the region without needing external interference. Finally, the 
experiences of others should be considered, such as NATO’s experience, in 
order to learn from their experiences. 
• A greater role needs to be played in improving the inter-Arab relations and 
disputes. 
• A clear and declared strategy towards regional concerns needs to be developed 
to manage regional circumstance in a more serious manner, alongside the 
other GCC states to ensure that their strategies deal with all elements as well 
as crises. 
• All of the means that make Saudi Arabia’s actions and policies in the regional 
and international arena should be utilised to ensure that they are a true and 
actual representation of the voice of the Arab and Islamic nation. 
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• The Arab states need to be developed economically through investment in 
these countries, not solely through the use of grants and aid. 
• Regional relations into strategic partnerships need to be improved with other 
regional powers, such as Turkey and Egypt, in order to control and reduce 
Iranian influence. 
7.8.1.2 Internationally 
• Stronger and clearer relationships need to be developed with some of the 
major powers, such as China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and Russia, 
in accordance with each state’s condition. 
• There should be more involvement in international issues to ensure that 
national interests, and the interest of the Arabic and Islamic nations, are 
represented; thus, the Saudi state should utilise its status for development 
(including its religious, economical and geopolitical status). 
• Access to the state needs to be developed in order to advance the state’s 
international position and partnerships with major powers so as to foster these 
relationships rather than it becoming a de facto dependence. 
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7.9 Discrepancy Between the Secondary Data Analysis (Western Literature) 
and the Primary Data Analysis (Saudi Interviews)  
Literature Saudi interviews 
Mainly focuses on military and economic 
aspects of Saudi national security and dismiss 
social and cultural factors while analysing Saudi 
national security. 
Mainly focuses on social/cultural and the 
religion aspect of Saudi national security. 
Lacks a deep understanding of Saudi national 
security, and fails to focus on the internal 
dimensions of the policymaking process in 
Saudi politics. 
Provides a deep rooted understanding of the 
state’s national security by mainly focusing on 
the internal dimensions of the policymaking 
process in Saudi politics. 
Views Saudi Arabia from the logic of the 
benefits that Saudi Arabia has with regards to 
the importance of Saudi Arabia to the West. 
Looks at the logic of how to protect the country 
while considering the national interest, 
internally and externally, as well as considering 
how national security can be advanced.  
 
Focuses mainly on the external dimensions of 
Saudi security, with limited consideration of the 
internal dimensions. 
Focuses mainly on the internal dimensions of 
Saudi national security. 
 
7.10  The Effectiveness of Buzan’s Framework in Saudi Arabia’s National 
Security  
Buzan’s framework provided a well-founded tool to study national security. But while 
attempting to apply Buzan’s framework of national security analysis to the Saudi 
Arabia context, several gaps were found. Such gaps occurred mainly due to the 
factors, mentioned previously, concerning Saudi Arabia’s uniqueness in terms of the 
triple influence, and the religious role that it plays within the global platform. In this 
study, while trying to apply Buzan’s factors to analyse the security situation in Saudi 
Arabia, several obstacles occurred. As such, the findings show that the major security 
concerns in the Middle East currently concern the impact of social pressures caused 
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by social media channels (i.e. Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Buzan’s framework fails to 
clearly indicate where these technological issues should be included, should they form 
part of the social, the political or the environmental factor.  Due to the nature of the 
politics and the social dynamics of Saudi Arabia, this study considered the 
technological issues/findings within the political factor. This in itself creates 
confusion with regards to security analysis studies. To illustrate, threats such as cyber 
attacks cannot be assessed using Buzan’s framework, thus suggesting the need for 
further analysis. Hence, this study recommends the use of technology as a separate 
factor/heading which should be considered in isolation from the other factors, as it 
appears to be of direct significance to this study. 
Another issue with Buzan’s framework, as observed from this study, is that it ignores 
the historical aspects of the state. While applying Buzan’s framework the researcher 
struggled to acknowledge some of the important historical incidents that have 
impacted significantly on the current political and security systems in Saudi Arabia. 
Although Buzan asserts the importance of gaining an understanding of the idea of the 
state before addressing its security, this should include the historical factor as the 
history of the state as further understanding of this is necessary for a country such as 
Saudi Arabia. The rise of Shi’ism in Saudi Arabia and its indirect influence in the 
politics has made the Saudi government take several steps to reduce security threats 
from within its own territory. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has faced various struggles and challenges even before the current states 
was formed – some of these challenges are still of relevance today; but, their 
incidence has been dismissed by Buzan’s framework in his analysis of a country’s 
security situation.        
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Nonetheless, Buzan’s framework of security analysis was selected in this study as it 
incorporates the theoretical underpinning of different components of security, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Both of the selected frameworks cover most of the factors 
involved in national, regional and international security dynamics and their interaction 
with the different internal and external elements. The central concerns over security 
measures at the domestic level (i.e. the political, economic, military, societal and 
environmental components) as well as an evaluation of the regional/external threats 
using the pattern of amity and/or enmity, and an evaluation of the extent to which each 
state/threat affects the three levels of security, were all considered.  
Consequently, this study intended to not make claims as to whether Buzan’s security 
theory was the most appropriate theory for all circumstances in IR literature, but it 
intended to use the theory as the basis for gaining insight into Saudi Arabia’s security 
practices/issues in a manner in which the structural similarities/dissimilarities could 
be assessed. As a result, the researcher has managed to investigate the potential issues 
that are involved with Saudi Arabia’s national security. 
7.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed understanding of the dynamics and dimensions 
of Saudi national security. It presented a conceptualised analysis of Saudi Arabia’s 
national security was based on findings and discussions from the secondary data 
analysis. The analyses consisted mainly of foreign literature and the data collected 
from the interviews of Saudi participants in an approach to re-examine and re-assure 
the findings from the literature.   
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This chapter identified Saudi Arabia’s internal dimensions of national security, which 
included the state’s internal threats and dimensions of security, for all five sectors of 
security (social, political, economic, military and environmental), which also assessed 
the state protection of its national interest and values. The findings indicate that the 
internal threats to Saudi Arabia’s security are more apparent and significant than the 
regional or international security threats are (external). The social and political 
security threats were deemed to be the most serious threats affecting security, 
followed by economic, military and then environmental threats. In addition, the main 
players on the internal level of security were also identified and suggestions were also 
presented with regards to the improvement of the state’s internal security, whereby 
the efficiency of their policies and strategies were identified in relation to the internal 
dynamics and threats affecting Saudi Arabia.  
In terms of the external level of national security, the external threats and players 
affecting Saudi Arabia on the regional and international level were also presented. 
Specifically, Iran was playing a major role as its policies and agendas were extending 
and affecting the whole region, this can clearly be seen in their influence in Iraq, Syria 
and Lebanon. Consequently, Iran is considered to be the most serious threat, followed 
by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the second major traditional threat to Saudi 
national security and then, thirdly, by instability in Yemen which is affected by the 
US presence and policies in the area.  
This chapter also provided an evaluation of Saudi external relations and diplomacy; as 
a result, the key points influencing the advancement of Saudi Arabia’s external 
security and diplomacy were identified. This has sought to provide a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics, strategies and dimensions of Saudi national security 
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for the internal and external levels. Hence, this chapter has proposed a distinctive 
framework that can be used to help provide further understanding and analysis of 
Saudi national security as it considered all of the internal and foreign perspectives and 
thoughts, which were identified as the main aim of this study. 
This chapter also provided a comparison of the secondary data analysis (Western 
literature) with the data obtained from interviews. The analyses indicate a number of 
differences between the various perspectives provided to the researcher with regards 
to obtaining a detailed and comprehensive outlook of the external and internal 
perspectives. Ultimately, the analyses were combined to allow the researcher to 
conceptualise and review national security, for both perspectives, for Saudi Arabia.  
Finally, this chapter also accomplished the final objective of the study whereby the 
validity of Buzan’s framework of security analysis was examined in terms of the 
Saudi context. A number of gaps were identified with regards to the application of 
Buzan’s framework – in particular, it fails to consider clearly the technological and 
historical elements that are clearly integral to the study of states in the Gulf region. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
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8.1       Research Achievements and Outcomes 
How does Saudi Arabia implement and formulate its national security policies and 
diplomacies? And, who are the main players influencing Saudi politics? To answer 
this research main question, an investigation of the manner in which the state’s 
policies and actions are formulated for their security; as a result, the threats, 
motivations, dynamics and limitations of the national security process in Saudi Arabia 
were examined. As has been explained earlier, an understanding of the domestic and 
regional security policies in Saudi Arabia is an important subject of study, especially 
as little research has been conducted into Saudi national security. Thus, the intention 
of this study was to focus on the subjective perceptions, thoughts and values of the 
individual participants as well as experts and various literature items associated with 
this topic, in order to better understand and interpret the multiple viewpoints of the 
national security context in Saudi Arabia.  Consequently, the research design was 
structured in order to achieve the following objectives: 
• To examine the dynamics of Saudi national security and policymaking. 
• To identify factors that may limit or affect the effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s 
national security and policymaking. 
• To identify and analyse the key aspects and weakness in each of Saudi 
Arabia’s social/historical, political, economic, military and environmental 
structures. 
• To discuss and assess various measures which could be deployed to improve 
the overall effectiveness of Saudi Arabia’s security policymaking. 
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• To examine Buzan’s framework of security in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
In order to attain the above objectives the following research questions were 
investigated:  
• How does Saudi Arabia implement and formulate its security policies and 
diplomacies? And, who are the main players influencing Saudi politics? (State 
dynamics, structures and nature.) 
• What are the main internal and external threats affecting Saudi Arabia? (State 
threats and concerns.) 
• What states play a major role and are vital to Saudi Arabia’s politics and 
security? (State relationships and diplomacy.) 
• How effective are Saudi Arabia’s state and national security policies 
domestically, regionally and globally? (State performance.)  
• What are the main obstacles that limit or affect Saudi Arabia’s potential 
political outcomes? And, what are the perceptions for Saudi Arabia’s politics 
and security? (State’s future prospects.) 
To answer the previous questions, four hypotheses were formulated in response to the 
reviewed literature: 
• H1: Saudi Arabia will maintain and advance its role as the leader in the Gulf 
region, and the Muslim world, by improving its domestic and foreign national 
security. 
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• H2: Religious and social issues play a central role in policymaking and 
security in Saudi Arabia. 
• H3: Oil procurement and distribution is viewed as the most important issue in 
Saudi Arabia’s security policymaking. 
• H4: Foreign involvement in Saudi policymaking is seen as one of the major 
obstacles in reforming and improving Saudi Arabia’s security policy and 
regional security. 
To achieve the research objectives mentioned above, the researcher firstly utilised a 
number of methods. This was done in chapter 2, which provided an outline of the 
various steps adopted by the researcher; it justified the philosophical standpoint for 
the chosen research method, approach and strategy. It also demonstrated that in order 
to track the research setting, objectives and variables, an in-depth semi-structured 
interview were this most appropriate as this method combines the advantages of 
unstructured and structured interviews. The methodology chapter therefore provided 
all reasoning for choosing this qualitative method, from its beginning to the final 
stage, this included criterions for: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
conformability, as well as reliability and validity. In particular, this study employed 
an empirical, semi-structured interview method by which key decision makers, 
experts and academic consultants of Saudi security were interviewed to obtain a 
deeper understanding of the particular security issues that are affecting Saudi Arabia. 
Viewing various methodological approaches and techniques guided the researcher to 
deploy various strategies by which the research broad parameters were addressed.  
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The researcher then started to develop his work by identifying the meaning of security 
and the border concept of security in relation to the international relations (IR) 
approach and the different views of security, which led the researcher to adopt 
Buzan’s framework of analysis. Examining various IR approaches also appraised the 
importance of identifying the referent object for this study; in this case, the referent 
object of my study was the Saudi state’s security or Saudi national security. Chapter 
3, therefore, provided a review of the different philosophies and theories utilised, in 
an attempt to understand the general meaning of security as well as national security 
in particular. The analysis of various philosophical approaches in chapter 3 showed 
that the concept of security is complex and related directly to various historical 
contexts. Studying various approaches toward security indicate that each approach 
corresponds to different values, threats and capabilities so as to meet the perceived 
challenges. Therefore, the researcher analysed and critically evaluated the different 
security meanings that were proposed, this led to consider the importance of 
conceptualising a framework of analysis in accordance with the specific features of 
the Saudi state. Hence, within chapter 3, the researcher developed a conceptualised 
assumption about national security with regards to Saudi Arabia – this was based on 
the unique characters that the Saudi state encounters which in general involves its 
exclusive political and tribal systems and religious statuses. 
While studying various IR theories, Buzan’s frame particularly was chosen. Buzan 
imposed a different approach to analysing and understanding security. As a result, this 
framework theoretically considers the different components of security, in terms of 
most of the factors and dynamics that are involved in national, regional and 
international security on the internal and external levels.   
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Thus, this section of the study has revealed that In order to investigate Saudi Arabia’s 
national security, the study needed to examine the state domestic dimension of 
security threats in addition to external dimension that goes beyond the traditional 
military threats. The framework of analysis therefore considered the following 
security threats: political, economic, environmental and social variables, as well as 
military factors as the principle components that are in addition to the regional threats. 
Thus, this framework contributed to the structuring of the rest of thesis whereby the 
researcher utilised the framework of security analysis to identify national security 
variables, dynamics, motivations as well as the internal threats and challenges 
(Chapter 4). In addition, the framework was also used to identify the various regional 
and external threats and players that affect security (Chapter 5).  
Internal Dimension of National Security 
Chapter 4 focused on the literature concerned with the internal aspect of Saudi 
national security. It was structured in accordance with the adopted framework of 
security analysis that addressed the different sectors of security, as proposed by Buzan 
to include the following five sectors of threats; political, military, economic, societal 
and environmental. It suggested strongly that these sectors are believed to affect the 
state security and it can therefore be difficult to isolate them from one another when 
examining state security. Consequently, the main focus was on the impact of each 
sector on the domestic level of security; hence, this chapter was sub-divided to 
address these five sectors. 
Part One: Societal Security 
This first section helped to identify the most important historical periods that 
influenced and shaped the social and cultural identity of Saudi Arabia, including: the 
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rise of Islam; the emergence of Shi’ism; and, the development of the various Saudi 
states that have materialised since the establishment of the first Saudi State. This part 
assisted in the understanding of the current social status of Saudi politics and the 
political mindset of the leaders by comprehending the significant influence of the 
country’s social and traditional roles.  
An analysis of the social structure demonstrated that Islamic values have inspired and 
uniquely influenced the culture and lifestyle of people in the Saudi desert. In addition, 
this section also showed that, in conjunction with the discovery of the large oil 
reserves in the early twentieth century, the rulers of this colony were also given 
significant power that stretches much beyond the Saudi territories. The last few 
decades have instigated rapid social change in response to the discovery and the huge 
revenues obtained from the oil within the state. This section also showed that the 
Bedouin mindset has influenced the whole state as one of the main unique feature of 
the Saudi society that is based on tribal ancestry. To illustrate, the conservative tribal 
origins and values have significantly affected political interactions in Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, it also demonstrated that Islam is the country’s official religion and, as a 
result, Islamic law has shaped many of the legal codes within the country. The 
existence of the two holy sites of Islam, in Makkah (Mecca) and Al-Medina (Medina), 
make Saudi Arabia the most valued nation to the Muslim world. Consequently, Islam 
has been vital to the Saudi royal family’s legitimacy whereby religious establishments 
hold significant roles and influence in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the government must 
often engage with the Council of the Senior Ulama in order to obtain their approval 
when introducing new innovations. However, the emergence of anti-government and 
radical Islamist groups have created a divergence between the government and the 
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religious establishments. In this respect, this section also provided the main social 
threats that are affecting the Saudi state identity and thereby the national security.  
Part Two: Political Security 
The second part examined the political structure and political threats that could create 
difficulties which might affect the foundation of the current Saudi state. A clear view 
of the political dynamics and the process of the policymaking in Saudi Arabia were 
also given. In addition, this section also identified the most important players within 
Saudi politics. This chapter therefore provided insight into the institutions, trends and 
key powers within the Saudi political system by identifying the major domestic 
players that influence the politics and policies in Saudi Arabia. This section also 
located the main political threats that affect the political entities and the legitimacy of 
the Saudi state. 
Part Three: Economic Security 
The third factor demonstrated the economical structure of the state as a means to 
understand the state access to resources, finance and markets that are necessary to 
sustain acceptable levels of welfare and states power. However, this section showed 
that the state’s income is predominantly based on the revenue from oil production, 
this accounted for 45% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP, 70% to 80% of the state’s revenues 
and around 90% of the total export revenues. There is also involvement from the non-
oil sector, which is still expanding and mainly incorporates: manufacturing, 
agriculture, construction and the privatisation of key industries such as 
telecommunications and electricity. The part also introduced the various difficulties 
and threats that the Saudi economy is currently facing and might need to consider. 
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Part Four: Military Security 
This section of the study demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s military structure which 
showed that it consist of a complex mix of military forces that are controlled by the 
Ministry of Defence and Aviation (MODA). This includes the four sections of the 
Saudi Armed Forces, a separate National Guard (SANG) as well as numerous internal 
security and intelligence services within the Ministry of Interior (MOI). All in which 
play a crucial role in helping the Kingdom overcome its various challenges. This 
fourth part also discussed the current state of defence and the offensive capabilities of 
Saudi Arabia. It demonstrated that Saudi Arabia currently maintains a status quo in 
terms of its armed offensive and security defensive capabilities. Due to its current 
relationship with other superpowers in the world, Saudi Arabia intends to maintain a 
minimum profile in terms of its investments in the defensive and offensive 
mechanisms, since it influences relationships with other partners while demonstrating 
the intensions of the national security. In addition, this section showed that Saudi 
Arabia is well equipped in terms of its defensive and offensive security capabilities 
for the internal security of the country. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in 
equipping a defence sector to fight terrorism and to maintain and protect the 
sovereignty of the country by dealing with any factors that may, in anyway, threaten 
the current governance of the state. this section also located the main military threat to 
its military structure that can effect the state ability to protect its citizens . 
Part Five: Environmental Security 
The fifth and final section focused on the environmental/ecological concerns affecting 
Saudi Arabia. These concerns do not appear to form a national security threat as the 
current Saudi society appear not to be fully concerned by environmental elements. To 
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illustrate, people are not generally worried about the environmental issues; however, 
it is expected that technological developments and social media will gradually 
influence the understanding that people have for this phenomenon. However, studying 
environmental threats to Saudi security showed many environmental concerns which 
included: desertification; depletion of underground water resources; the lack of 
perennial rivers or permanent water bodies which has prompted the development of 
extensive seawater desalination facilities; and, coastal pollution from oil spills.  
External Dimension of National Security 
Chapter 5 solely reviewed the literature (mainly Western) concerned with Saudi 
Arabia’s regional and external security. Consequently, it was identified that most of 
the regional and external threats to the Saudi state were principally associated with 
amity and/or enmity, based on threats to the state’s: legitimacy, ideology, territory, 
ethnic lines or historical precedent; specifically, this included the five threats to the 
proposed state sectors of societal, political, economical, military and environmental 
security. The literature analysis identified the following regional and external threats 
to Saudi Arabia: 
• Iran and its policies and agenda. 
• Iran’s missiles and nuclear programmes. 
• The uncertain future of Iraq. 
• Iran’s involvements in Iraq. 
• Iraq’s border threat (i.e. foreign fighters and smuggling). 
• Yemen’s internal situation (i.e. demographics, poverty and instability). 
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• Yemen’s border threat (i.e. illegal immigration and smuggling). 
• AQAP in Yemen. 
• Syria as part of the Shi’a crescent at the northern border of Saudi Arabia.  
• Al-Houthi fighters and Iranian involvements. 
• Other Red Sea challenges (i.e. piracy).   
• Arab-Israeli challenges. 
• The United States partnership. 
• Terrorism. 
• The GCC’s internal border and international positioning disputes.  
• The effectiveness of the GCC’s collective security.  
The Saudi view 
Chapter 6 was structured in accordance with the secondary literature analysis and 
findings from Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Thus, this chapter helped to fill the gaps in the 
literature by illustrating the key findings, from the interviews conducted as well as the 
researcher’s observations which were related directly to the reviewed literature. This 
part aimed to re-examine and re-confirm the findings from the literature analysis 
through the researcher’s utilisation of semi-structured interviews to obtain more 
detailed, and possibly more relevant, Saudi viewpoints which was sub-divided into 
five parts that related directly to the five research questions. The five main questions 
used in the interviews were based on the threats identified in the literature and studies 
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that had attempted, in some way, to analyse Saudi Arabia’s national security and 
threats (see Chapters 4 and 5 for more detail). Furthermore, they were formulated 
based on some of the assumptions made concerning the meaning of security in 
relation to the unique state status that the Saudi state preserves (discussed in Chapter 
3). The specific structures of the Saudi state were identified, along with the state’s 
internal and external threats, dynamics, policies and strategies; in addition, the state’s 
relations and diplomacy with regional and external powers and the importance of each 
of these as allies or enemies was also identified. Consequently, a deeper 
understanding of the state’s national security was identified as the researcher revisited 
all aspects and perspectives associated with Saudi national security.  
Final Findings 
Based on the secondary and empirical findings (chapter 4, 5, and 6), Chapter 7 
provided a discussion of the final outcomes of the whole thesis in terms of the 
elements that conceptualise Saudi Arabia’s national security. Chapter 7 considered the 
views presented in the existing literature by analysing and re-examining these notions 
against the internal views obtained from the interviews with Saudi officials, 
academics and journalists. The domestic dimensions of national security were 
investigated which present one of the main objectives of this study; the findings 
indicated that the internal threats were deemed to be more serious and important than 
the external threats to Saudi national security. In particular, it showed that social and 
political security threats were the most serious threats which mainly involved public 
demand pressures and clashes between many sectors of society as a result of cultural 
and religious preferences. Social and political threats also included the degree of 
national unity as one of the main issues that needs to be focused upon because of its 
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impact on the state unity.  The study also re-identified (via literatures and interviews) 
the main political players within the Saudi politics and they include various 
institutions and key powers: 
• The King via the Royal Court. 
• The Council of Ministers. 
• Majlis Al-Shura (the Consultative Council). 
• Hay’at Kibar al-Ulama (the Council of the Senior Ulama) which consists of 
Muslim scholars with specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and 
theology. 
• Saudi security forces via the Interior Minister. 
While the following four major domestic players influence Saudi internal security:  
• Sunni political activism. 
• Liberals. 
• Shi’a minority. 
• Tribal and regional politics.  
What the interviews suggested strongly is that Saudi Arabia needs to focus more on 
its domestic area of national security and specifically the social, political and 
economical aspects as the main serious threat to the Saudi national security. The 
researcher views on the internal threats to Saudi national security which is based on 
what was found from interviews, as well as through the analysis of the literatures are 
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as follows: I) Societal security, the existence of conflicts and differences between 
some parties within the society (conservatives and liberal) and the degree of social 
cohesion forms the main societal threat that forms a threat to the national identity and 
to the national security. II) Economic security: unemployment, the huge economic 
reliance on oil and the increasing rates of poverty as the many economic threats that 
threaten the national security. III) Political security: the most prominent political 
problems lies in the existence of conflicted demands depending on the each party of 
the society and the ability of the state to fulfill the demands of each group despite the 
collision of these demands because of the social and religious background of each 
group. IV) Military security, there have been some problems related to the efficiency 
and quality of military personnel and their ability and readiness to deal with external 
threats realistically, as well as, the heavy reliance on arms purchases and security 
protection on the Western countries and the U.S. in particular as one of the problems 
that might extended to form a political threat by affecting the sovereignty of the state 
and its overall power. VI) Environmental security, there have been some 
environmental threats, but it dose not rise to the form a national threat. 
In fact, as discussed in Chapter 7, most of the internal threats and challenges could be 
encountered by reconsidering the strategy of the Saudi government towards the 
political development process, which should aim to promote political participation 
and lead to ease the pressure on the government caused by the public increased and 
complex demands, especially in light of rapid growth in the population and the spread 
of social media in Saudi Arabia. The government duty to fulfill and to meet the 
demands is usually the main duty of any state which could directly affect the state 
political stability and security. The Saudi government should always review and 
develop the public participation with carefulness due to the presence of different 
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social and religious groups that carry conflicted orientations and demands that always 
position the government in a dilemmatic situation to deal with each party demands 
while conducting the state policy-making. To solve this dilemmatic situation and to 
ensure that the government is fulfilling the public demands, the government could 
endorse and reapprove the state commitment towards the principles of political 
participation and political development through enhancing the citizens participation 
further in the state policy making while taking into account the circumstances and 
complexities of social and tribal dimensions that the Saudi state has.  
Furthermore, the final findings of the study also highlighted the external dimension of 
Saudi’s national security as part of the main objectives of this study by providing a 
view of Saudi Arabia’s external threats and the main players on the regional and 
international levels. At the external part of the Saudi national security, both Saudi and 
Western analysts provided a similar view on the possible regional and external threats 
to Saudi national security. The researcher found that the most important external 
threats to Saudi Arabia’s national security as follow: The first external threat rises 
from the Iranian policies and agenda in the region, there was a consensus between the 
Saudi and foreign analysts on the seriousness of the Iranian threat which had been 
extended into the region through the gaining of influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, 
Bahrain, and Yemen. The second threat which is no less important than the first is as 
indicated by the interviews come from the economical and political instability in 
Yemen as a direct threat that affects the Saudi national security. The third threat rises 
from the US direct involvements in the region which caused the beginning of other 
threats, such as, Al-Qaeda which also highlights the role of oil security and the US 
dependency to the oil from the Gulf area which included a number of military, 
economic and political complications to the Saudi state. The Israeli-Palestinian 
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conflict was also identified as one of the major traditional threat to Saudi national 
security. Finally, The political and military situation in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon as 
part of Iran extended influence areas (the Shi’a crescent) represented a challenge to 
the Saudi national security at the regional and international level of security.    
Nevertheless, this study also presented in chapter 7, an evaluation of Saudi 
International Relations and diplomacy by suggesting the main states and key points 
that are affecting the regional and international part of Saudi Arabia’s national 
security which present one of the main objectives of this study. Thus, understanding 
Saudi Arabia internal and regional dimensions and dynamics of security and threats in 
addition to the nature of the international system, showed that Saudi Arabia foreign 
policies are shaped and influenced by the specifics of all these components, either 
caused by the state internal threats and weakness or by the surrounding regional 
threats and revivals or by the changing policies of the superpowers towards the 
region. Saudi Arabia foreign policy is hugely driven by the strategic concerns of 
national survival through many serious internal and regional threats and challenges, 
while lacking actual sufficient self-reliance defensive capabilities, which makes the 
Saudi state foreign policies and relations largely dependent on alliances as a means of 
survival, making state security dependent on the outputs of the international system 
and the foreign policies of the great powers.   
An analysis of Saudi Arabia’s regional and external dimensions of national security 
has revealed the following states as the main external players that influence security at 
the regional and international levels: the United States; Russia; China; India; Iran; 
Turkey; Egypt and GCC.  
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The study also showed that for a long period Saudi Arabia adopted a quiet diplomacy 
and foreign policy to protect the interests of the state which included preserving the 
internal security of the Saudi Arabia while at the same time preventing regional issues 
from rising and damaging the state’s fundamental interests. The Arab Spring, 
presented Saudi Arabia with a set of new challenges which required Saudi Arabia to 
adopt a more activist role. The recent US lack of decisiveness role in the regional 
affair, as in the case of Syria, in addition, to the active Iranian role in the regional 
affairs, has encouraged Saudi Arabia to conduct a more visibly active role, either in 
Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Egypt. The Saudi view on Iraq is largely 
pessimistic due to Iranian huge influence in there.  As it been suggested strongly by 
the interviews, given the regional disorder, it is vital for Saudi Arabia and for the rest 
of the GCC states to have a strong and positive relations with the regional power, 
including Egypt, Turkey and Iran. Due to Saudi Arabia’s multiple and effective 
features as a leading Gulf, Arab, and Muslim country, Saudi Arabia therefore can 
promotes a moderate version of Islam that can play a enormous role in terms of 
stability.  Although Saudi Arabia will eventually go through a series of internal 
changes in the near future, the basic principles of Saudi policy will probably remain 
the same. Within those factors, Saudi officials need to look at the domestic, regional 
and international developments, given the responsibility of Saudi Arabia to play a role 
on all these levels.  
Finally, this study demonstrated a number of gaps in Buzan’s framework as the final 
objective of the thesis; to illustrate, the framework fails to consider the historical and 
technological factors that are of relevance in today’s society. Consequently, the 
findings and outcome of the literature and the data analyses were documented to 
identify several gaps in this research project. It was noted that these mentioned factors 
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generally relate to Saudi Arabia’s uniqueness in terms of the triple influence and 
religious role that the state plays within the global platform. Ultimately, the testing of 
Buzan’s frameworks, in the Saudi context, provided verification that most of the 
security aspects can be applied to the specific features of the Saudi state. 
At the end of this study it can said that analysing Saudi national security from both 
Saudi and Western perspective has allowed the researcher to ensure that all aspects of 
national security are covered. Studying both Saudi and foreign views revealed number 
of differences on how each views the internal section of the national security of Saudi 
Arabia. Foreign/Western analysts and experts tend to focus on the aspects and 
components of the security that are of interest to the Western states, mainly involving 
economical and military aspects. It also appeared that Western analysts do not fully 
consider other social, historical, cultural, and other national aspects that are of 
national interest to the state. Whereby, Saudi analysts tend to focus on social, 
historical, cultural, and other aspects that are of the national interest in addition to 
other economical and military security. Saudi/internal analysts also view regional and 
external relations and threats while considering the national interest which are more 
vital to national security analysis than external sources analysis. Therefore, it 
appeared that the Saudi analysts provided a deeper understanding of the national 
setting of Saudi Arabia, especially in the respect of understanding social, cultural and 
religious aspects on national security implications.    
To summarise, this study presented an analysis of Saudi Arabia’s national security by 
considering all of the domestic and external security dimensions that were deemed to 
be of relevance. Consequently, a large base of literature was considered, this involved 
a general review of national security and international relations with a particular focus 
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on Saudi Arabia’s security. The identified studies were validated by adapting two of 
Buzan’s (1991) security analysis frameworks which focus on: the five security sectors 
and regional security analysis. As a result, various issues and concerns for multiple 
levels of national security in Saudi Arabia were identified. The researcher also 
identified all of the dynamics and aspects associated with understanding Saudi 
national security by assessing the relevant states, components, players and issue that 
influence the implementation of national security in Saudi Arabia.  
8.2  Addressing Research Objectives and Hypotheses  
Research objective Addressed in: 
1. To examine the dynamics of Saudi 
security and policymaking. 
 
It was addressed in the following three parts: 
1) In Chapter 3, by explaining and conceptualising the 
meaning of national security in Saudi Arabia, through 
identifying the Saudi state’s nature and institutions, the 
main players, and the state’s ends and means.   
2) In Chapter 4, by identifying the state security factors as 
part of Buzan’s framework of security, this included the 
state’s political, social, economic, military and 
environmental threats/factors.  
3) In Chapter 5, by exploring the state’s threats based on 
Buzan’s regional security and security complex context that 
includes the external threats which affect state security 
within its regional power. This could lead the state to 
security complexities via the GCC.    
2. To identify factors that may limit or 
affect the effectiveness of Saudi 
Arabia’s security and policymaking. 
Addressed in Chapter 6, through the interviews, which 
identified the state’s threats as the main obstacles 
(developed in Chapters 4 and 5 and confirmed via the semi-
structured interviews in the first part of Chapter 6). In 
addition, some further points were suggested by the 
participants – these were discussed in Chapter 6. 
3. To identify the threats, challenges, 
and dynamics affecting Saudi Arabia’s 
security and policymaking.  
Addressed in Chapters 4, 5 and 7, through the identification 
of internal and external threats and challenges – these were 
re-confirmed and re-examined by the interviews.   
4. To discuss and assess measures to 
improve the overall effectiveness of 
Saudi Arabia’s security policymaking. 
Addressed in Chapter 6 and 7, based on the findings from 
the interviews.  
Table 8.1: Research objectives  
 
336	  	  
Research Hypotheses Accepted/rejected  
H1: Saudi Arabia will maintain and advance its 
role as the leader in the Gulf region, and the 
Muslim world, by improving its domestic and 
foreign national policies. 
Based on the interviews discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6, this hypothesis is accepted.  
 
H2: Religious and social issues play a central role 
in policymaking and security in Saudi Arabia. 
An analysis of the collected data and literature 
approve that this hypothesis is accepted. 
H3: Oil procurement and distribution is viewed as 
the most important issue in Saudi Arabia’s 
security policymaking. 
An analysis of the collected data and literature 
approve that this hypothesis is accepted.  
H4: Foreign (Western) involvement in Saudi 
policymaking is seen as one of the major 
obstacles in reforming and improving Saudi 
Arabia’s security policy and regional security. 
An analysis of the collected data and literature 
approve that this hypothesis is accepted. 
Table 8.2: Research hypotheses 
8.3  Major Contributions of the Study 
8.3.1 Theoretical Contributions 
One of the main purposes of this thesis was to not engage in proposing an alternative 
theoretical approach equal to realism, but to instead add to the existing literature by 
applying some of Buzan’s security frameworks to the Saudi state. Buzan’s 
frameworks is considered to be one of his greatest contributions to the theory of IR as 
it has provided a more complete understanding of the complexities of security 
whereby these concepts have and can be applied to current issues or states. The 
adopted framework incorporates the theoretical underpinning of different components 
of security, including the factors involved in the dynamics of national, regional and 
international security as well as their interaction with different internal and external 
elements.   
An understanding of Saudi security is an important subject of study, especially as 
little research has been conducted into Saudi security. As Saudi Arabia represents one 
of the major nations in the region, it is a major player in the region’s security. Saudi 
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Arabia holds huge economic, religious and political statuses which makes its security, 
within the context of regional security, inherently tied to the matter of international 
security. The lack of studies into Saudi Arabia’s national security from internal 
sources encouraged the researcher to investigate its national security, firstly from a 
Western point of view, by reviewing the relevant literature and then re-presenting and 
re-examining this in accordance with the Saudi perspective through the use of semi-
structured interviews. Consequently, the researcher obtained different perspectives 
and a detailed understanding of the extent of the similarities and differences in the 
understanding of Saudi Arabia’s national security from the internal (Saudi) and 
external (Western) perspectives.  This study aimed to explore the threats, motivations, 
dynamics and weakness of Saudi national security firstly by conducting a secondary 
literature analysis of the relevant studies which had been predominantly conducted by 
external and Western scholars who had investigated regional security and, to an 
extent, Saudi Arabia national security. These literature items were then re-examined 
and re-confirmed through the researcher’s utilisation of semi-structured interviews in 
order to obtain more detailed, and possibly more relevant, Saudi viewpoints. 
Interestingly, this helped to provide a greater understanding of Saudi Arabia’s 
national security, from different angles and points of view, which helped the 
researcher to address the research questions posed in this study and to not dismiss any 
aspects of Saudi national security. However, the researcher also showed the extent to 
which there were differences and discrepancies in the understanding of the nation’s 
security in terms of opinions from the Western/foreign political analysts and the 
views of the local Saudi analysts. Furthermore, the researcher indicated the real extent 
to which the local point of view of Saudi national security is understood by Western 
analysts.  
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8.3.2 Practical Contributions 
The findings from this study can be applied and are of relevance to various sectors, 
states, organisations and policymakers. To illustrate, this study provided a key 
analysis of Saudi Arabia’s security by providing a detailed understanding of the 
nation’s security, based on the various factors that affect the state including the: 
political, societal, economical, military and environmental aspects, as well as a 
consideration of the state’s regional security within the context of the international 
security environment. This study has therefore provided a conceptualisation of the 
meaning of national security that reflects the specific and unique criteria that the 
Saudi state imposes.  
It is worth noting that the researcher’s family role and connections with many Saudi 
politicians, journalist, and academics involved with the Saudi politics and policy-
making has provided the researcher with the privilege of meeting many of these 
personalities which has helped and enhanced the researcher in conducting his 
research. 
8.4  Limitations of the Study  
As with all research, this thesis is not without its limitations with regards to the 
resources, research strategy and data collection. However, this research was structured 
in a manner so as to consider the aspects of all of these limitations so as to reduce 
them when considering the research objective and aim. Although this study analysed 
participant views of Saudi security, the researcher was also faced with limitations as a 
result of a short timeframe and limited resources. As a result, other sources of 
information, for other aspects of security measures, were not investigated via the 
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resources or the interviews, including: opinions from the tribal leaders, public 
opinions or opinions from foreign experts and analysts. 
This study mainly focused on interviews with the relevant people that were involved 
and acquainted in Saudi security (from the internal perspective), this included 
officials from the Saudi Arabian government (as representatives of the Saudi 
view). These officials were selected from different government sectors based on their 
connections or role in improving Saudi Arabia’s position in the Gulf region. In 
addition, other relevant people were interviewed, including political scholars and 
journalists who had a knowledge and involvement of Gulf security and affairs. Thus, 
it would also have been interesting to include other external resources in the form of 
interviews to obtain further knowledge of how external people view Saudi security.   
Another limitation of the research is that the analysis of the Saudi relationship was not 
extended to include further states that may have an effect on Saudi Arabia’s 
international strategy. This study therefore focused on the regional states and the 
external powers that are involved in regional security, as suggested by Buzan. Hence, 
it would be interesting to include some of the other states that are not directly 
involved in the region, such as Japan and Malaysia, as they may still have an effect on 
Saudi security. 
Another limitation of the study is that only a singular research strategy and validation 
approach was used. To illustrate, only semi-structured interviews were used to extract 
the qualitative data. It would therefore be useful to have employed another approach 
to understand Saudi security and to identify ways in which security could be 
improved. The other methods could include: questionnaires, surveys and/or focus 
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groups with identified professionals in order to further validate the findings on Saudi 
security.  
8.5  Future Research Directions  
On the basis of the earlier analyses, the researcher recommends that future research 
could utilise the proposed concept, of Saudi Arabia’s National Security, as a starting 
point for their study of security in Saudi Arabia (based on Buzan’s suggestions). In 
addition, security students could utilise a similar conceptualising method to gain a 
deeper understanding of the state that they intend to study, this however would 
depend on the specific criteria that the state under study possesses. If all studies of 
security use the same constructs, a new approach would then by formed which could 
be consistently applied to different regions and countries. Hence, it is recommended 
that further application of the proposed concept, in an international context, could 
form the basis of security research analysis in general and specifically in the Middle 
Eastern countries.  
The sustaining of unyielding security and security policies is a desirable goal for most 
states around the world. Consequently, there are several directions in which future 
research could be developed. Firstly, as policies and security as a whole are 
continually changing in response to national and international events, future 
researchers must be able to recognise the changes that are evolving in response to 
changes in the political climate. 
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Appendix A: Letter to Participants 
Dear	  Sir/Madam	  
Please	   help	   us	   to	   conduct	   research	   for	   Bradford	   University,	   Peace	   Studies	  
Department,	   Doctoral	   Research	   Programme.	   Your	   cooperation	   is	   critical	   to	   the	  
success	  of	  this	  study.	  Your	  responses	  will	  be	  treated	  with	  the	  strictest	  of	  confidence,	  
analysed	  anonymously	  and	  not	  passed	  on	  to	  any	  third	  parties.	  You	  are	  not	  required	  
to	  identify	  your	  name	  or	  organisation	  you	  are	  associated	  with,	  if	  you	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  
do	  so.	  The	  study	  title	  is:	  
Saudi	  Arabian	  security	  policies	  in	  the	  Gulf	  region	  
The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  current	  role	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  in	  the	  
security	  of	  the	  Gulf	  region,	  along	  with	  the	  threats	  and	  challenges	  the	  area	  is	  facing	  at	  
the	  moment.	   This	  will	   be	   done	   by	   highlighting	   Saudi	   Arabia's	   relations	  with	   other	  
Gulf	  states	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  some	  major	  states	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  as	  
well	  as	  by	  considering	  most	  of	  the	  Saudi	  efforts	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  and	  
stability	  of	  the	  region.	  
Please	  allow	  me	  to	  use	  voice	  recording,	  this	  will	  help	  in	  analysing	  the	  interview	  and	  
put	  it	  in	  data	  later.	  If	  you	  give	  me	  the	  permission,	  I	  will	  ensure	  that	  the	  recorded	  
replies	  will	  remain	  confidential	  –	  only	  available	  to	  the	  interviewer	  –	  and	  that	  all	  the	  
interview	  information	  will	  be	  confidential	  and	  anonymous.	  	  The	  audio	  recording	  will	  
be	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  audio	  data	  only	  and	  will	  not	  be	  passed	  to	  any	  third	  parties. 
Participation	  in	  this	  research	  is	  voluntary	  and	  you	  can	  withdraw	  from	  the	  interview	  
at	   any	   time.	   The	   interview	   should	   take	   around	   30	   minutes.	   The	   results	   of	   this	  
research	  may	  be	  of	  benefit	  to	  you	  in	  the	  future.	  If	  you	  wish	  to	  receive	  an	  Executive	  
Summary	  of	   the	   results,	  please	  complete	   the	   form	  on	   the	  next	  page.	  Your	   input	   is	  
essential	  for	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  results,	  and	  we	  are	  very	  grateful	  to	  you	  for	  agreeing	  
to	  give	  your	  valuable	  time	  to	  support	  this	  study.	  	  
Thank	  you	  for	  your	  assistance.	  
Sincerely	  
	  
Mahmoud	  Nasif	  
	  
Doctoral	  Researcher	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Appendix B: Interview Questions 
Part	  I:	  Assessing	  external	  dynamics	  of	  national	  security	  (external	  dimensions	  of	  national	  security).	  
No 
 
Question Prompts/ 
Instructions 
Variable 
1 How do you evaluate the current situation 
in the Gulf area? 
 
What are the main threats to Saudi and Gulf 
security? 
 Assessment of the 
security situation 
 
Assessment of the 
security threats 
2 
 
Do you think that the current Iranian 
policies pose a threat to the region and 
Saudi Arabia? 
If the answer is just 
a brief ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
ask why to explain. 
Assessing the Iranian 
threat 
3 Do you consider the Iranian nuclear 
programme is a serious threat to the region? 
Why? 
 Assessing Iran’s 
nuclear programme  
4 Do you believe that the current situation in 
Iraq presents a serious challenge to Saudi 
Arabia and the region? 
 Assessing the 
situation in Iraq and 
its impact on the 
region 
5 Do you think that Iran is interfering in 
Iraq’s internal politics? If so, what sort of 
challenge does that pose on Saudi security? 
 Assessing Iran’s 
involvement in Iraq  
6 Do you think that instability in Yemen 
poses a serious threat? 
If the answer is just 
a brief ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
ask why to explain. 
Assessing Yemen 
security effect  
7 Do you believe that terrorism still remains a 
threat in Saudi Arabia? What about 
globally? 
 Assessing terrorism 
threat 
8 Do you think that oil has caused challenges 
to Saudi Arabiam security and 
policymaking? 
Do not you think that oil is responsible for 
many of the current challenges in the 
region, including the US involvements in 
the 1991 Gulf War and the following 
consequences of their presence in the 
aftermath of the war? 
 Assessing oil role in 
security and policy 
dynamics  
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Part II: Assessing internal dynamics of national security  
No. Question Prompts/ 
Instructions 
Variable 
9 What are the main economic threats? Does 
1) unemployment, 2) administrative 
corruption, 3) poverty, 4) economic 
dependence on oil, form the main economic 
threats to Saudi security and internal 
policy? Do they pose a threat to security 
and policymaking? 
Ask why? Assessing economic 
threats effect on 
security and 
policymaking 
10 What are the main social threats? 
Does the social division and rapid changes 
including social conflicts between 
conservatives and liberalists form a social 
threat? Does it affect the policymaking 
process and Saudi national security? 
Do Shi’a demands and loyalties form a 
social threat? Does it affect the 
policymaking process and Saudi national 
security?  
Does the rising internal demands and social 
media spread form a social threat? Does it 
affect the policymaking process and Saudi 
national security?  
Does the state internal 
social/cultural/religious nature affect the 
state political system and international 
politics? To what extent does it affect Saudi 
Arabian policymaking? 
If the answer is yes, 
ask Why? 
Assessing social 
threats effects on 
policymaking 
 
 
 
 
11 What are the military threats that Saudi 
Arabia faces? How do you evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Saudi security forces 
both the military or other state security 
forces and to which extent is it fulfilling its 
role? 
 Assessing military 
threats effects on 
policymaking 
12 What are the main environmental threats?  
Does desertification; depletion of 
underground water resources; the lack of 
perennial rivers or permanent water bodies 
that has prompted the development of 
extensive seawater desalination facilities; or 
coastal pollution from oil spills, form the 
main environmental threats? To which 
extent does it affect Saudi Arabian 
policymaking? 
 Assessing 
environmental 
threats effects on 
policymaking 
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Part III: Saudi relations and diplomacy 
13  
 
How do you assess the Saudi-US relations? 
Do you believe that Saudi/US relation was 
affected after 9/11? In which direction is 
this relationship heading? 
 Relations with 
America after 9/11 
14 How would you evaluate the Saudi 
relations with the countries of the European 
Union? 
 Saudi/EU relations 
15 How do you see Saudi Arabia’s relations 
with China? 
 Relations with China 
16 How do you consider Saudi Arabia’s 
relations with India? 
Gulf relations 
 Relations with India 
17 How would you describe the relationship 
with the Gulf States? 
 Saudi GCC relation 
18 How do you perceive Saudi Arabia’s 
relations with Iran? 
 Saudi/Iranian 
relations 
19 How would you describe the Saudi relation 
with Iraq?  
 Saudi/Iraqi relations 
20 How would you describe Saudi relation 
with Turkey?  
 Saudi/Turkish 
relations 
Part IV: Current Saudi policy at the local and global level 
No. Questions Prompts/ 
Instructions 
Variable 
21 Do you think that Saudi Arabia is fulfilling 
its role towards the Gulf region’s security? 
(Whether in regard to the Iranian threat, or 
other regional challenges.) To what extent 
do you think that the Saudi’s policy is 
aimed to eliminate most of the challenges in 
the region? 
 Evaluation of current 
policy in the Gulf 
region 
22 How do you see the Kingdom’s policy at 
the global level? 
Is it excellent, good, 
how needs more 
Evaluation of 
international politics 
23 How do you see the internal policy of the 
Kingdom? Is it aimed to face internal 
challenges? 
 Evaluation of local 
policies 
24 How do you view the Kingdom’s position 
either locally or regionally in the wake of 
the so-called Arab Spring? 
 Policy evaluation 
after the revolutions 
in the Arab world 
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25 It is often argued that the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia has done nothing with regard to 
regional security. What do you think? 
 Evaluation of current 
policy in the Gulf 
region 
26 It is also often argued that Saudi Arabia is 
not doing enough with regard to its 
international policies. What do you think? 
Why? 
 Evaluation of 
international politics 
 
27 It is also often argued that Saudi Arabia is 
not doing enough with regard to its 
domestic policies. What do you think? 
Why? 
 Evaluation of 
domestic politics 
 
Part V: The Future of the Kingdom in terms of political and security 
No.  Question Prompts/ 
Instructions 
Variable 
28 In your opinion, what should be done to 
improve the Kingdom or to make its role in 
the Gulf region more effective? What about 
globally? 
 The future of the 
Kingdom at the 
international level 
29 What can be done internally in order to 
enrich domestic security and policymaking?  
 The future of the 
Kingdom internally 
30 Do you think that the challenges facing the 
GCC countries, including Saudi Arabia will 
be solved in the near future (Iran, Iraq, 
Yemen), and how? 
 Regional threats 
future 
31 How do you see the future of terrorism in 
Saudi Arabia and globally? 
 The future of 
terrorism 
32 What is your assessment to the future of the 
US presence in the Gulf area? What 
consequences would it hold? 
 The future of the US 
presence in the Gulf 
33 Do you think that Saudi Arabia is able to 
adopt a greater role with respect to regional 
security? 
 Saudi regional role 
future 
34 How can the Kingdom adopt a greater role? 
And can Saudi Arabia do it alone (without 
GCC countries or Western help?) 
 Saudi regional role 
future 
35 Do internal policies in Saudi Arabia affect 
regional or international policymaking? 
 Saudi domestic 
policies connections 
with regional and 
international 
policymaking 
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36 Do you want to add anything else? 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your precious time. This was very useful. 
 
	  
1. Name of the guest: 
2. Job title and experience: 
3. Time and date of interview: 
4. Length of time: 
5. Location: 
 
Note of any non-verbal reactions, such interruptions, irritation of the interview: 
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